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i. 
A B S T R A. C. T 
This thesis is concerned with the study of the cognitive 
experience of man -made environment and its implications on 
design. It is based on the exploration of the richness 
of the potential informational content of man -made 
environment. This content is stored in it in the process 
of its shaping in the form of representations of social 
relations. Cognitive experience of man -made environment 
is related to the development of the individual's mental 
world in view of his cognitive needs. When man is seen 
as a person in his own right, his cognitive needs may be 
regarded as potentially transcending the scope of the 
activity he is engaged in at the time, so as to refer to 
any social relation in the environment. It is suggested 
that, apart from supporting the human activities it 
contains, man -made environment is of notable significance 
to man for another reason: it constitutes a major domain 
for experience which is complementary to his overall 
experience of the world. All environmental objects can 
be seen as taking part in this function. 
In as much E.s the users' cognitive experience is concerned, 
the designer is required to approach the design problem in 
two ways: firstly, in relation to the activity contained 
and, secondly by placing the emphasis .on the users, in 
relation to their deeper psychological and cognitive needs. 
The discussion in the first part of the study provides a 
picture of the social relations which may become represented 
on the end product to meet the requirements of the second 
approach. The designer is further required to acquire a 
deep understanding of the significance of cognitive 
experience of man -made environment to man, the parameters 
and variables involved, the means to ensure the smooth and 
efficient transmission of meaning and so on. Above all, 
as his role in society may be considered as broadened, he 
is required to understand that his responsibility is also 
increased. 
ìi, 
I N T R O D U C T I O N 
0.1 THE REASONS WHICH INIATED THIS STUDY 
It is a sad fact that the condition of our cities is contin- 
uously deteriorating while their image is becoming 
increasingly fragmented. This is particularly so if one 
observes change in certain parts of the city and especially 
inner city areas and the districts where the low -income 
groups live. Writers such as Jane Jacobs, Theo Crosby and 
Robert Goodman have described this convincingly nearly two 
decades ago. 
Mainly because of this fact and partly because of the natural 
evolution in society's priorities, researchers and theorists 
have approached the man -environment relationship vigorously 
in recent years. Writers, like Constance Perrin, pointed 
at the multi -disciplinary nature of environmental issues and 
placed an additional emphasis on man, the user. A new field 
of studies, most commonly called Man -Environment Studies, has 
emerged; its main point of concern is centered on the 
systematic study of the mutual interaction of people and their 
built environment. According to Rapoport, the discussion and 
research on the field has been centered around three major 
issues: the way people shape their environments, they way 
they are, in turn, affected by them and the mechanisms 
through which this link is expressed. (Rapoport, 1977, 
Pp. 1 -7). 
The discussion so far has suggested that, apart from being 
functional in the conventional sense, man -made environment 
may have to satisfy additional requirements. In as much as 
its image is concerned, one may argue that contemporary 
designers are now becom'_ng increasingly aware that the 
environment can be seen as a form of non -verbal communication. 
It seems reasonable to suppose that the growing interest in 
the human aspects of the man -environment relationship has 
enhanced designers' perceptiveness over the social implic- 
ations of what they design. 
Yet, it appears that research on the field and its major areas 
of concern is still in the process of its shaping. One 
arrives at this suggestion from the simple fact that, 
although the issues are currently being widely discussed, 
new developments in design practice do not seem to have been 
influenced significantly, apart from a few notable exceptions. 
This may be attributed to several reasons. Firstly, in 
epistemological terms, it is arguable whether theoretical 
and empirical advances on the field have been capable of 
initiating the novel overall views (or "paradigms", to put it 
in Kuhn's, 1970, words) which are needed to change the 
designers' conception of the problem in a revolutionary 
manner. 
The fact that the man -environment relationship typically 
involves many disciplines is clearly a constraint to this 
end. Although research is basically concerned with the 
human aspects of the issue in question, there does not seem 
to be any prevailing theory referring to what man requires 
iv. 
from his environment as yet. Several holistic approaches 
that have been attempted (e.g. Norberg- Schulz's) did not 
prove to be eligible of serving as the basis for the 
discussion. As a result, the latter remains to a consider- 
able degree fragmented while the requirements it sets on 
design tend to be sporadically identified. 
Secondly, the context in which designers operate is not 
particularly helpful in providing the grounds for the 
majority of them to be actively involved in the discussion. 
The harsh facts of the reality of everyday life, in relation 
to the economic priorities set, do not allow the luxury of 
such theoretical wanderings. This is further prohibited 
by the lack of a clearly defined conceptual framework and 
the growing specialization that characterizes research on 
the field. Apart from being incapable of influencing design 
practice significantly, the discussion does not receive the 
feedback it needs and entails the danger of becoming 
increasingly elitist. 
The third reason is to be sought in the prevailing approaches 
to the problem and their reflection on contemporary design 
theories. A notable number of such theories are basically 
concerned with a particular range of human needs which are 
to he satisfied by the built environment. In as much as 
man's cognitive experience of his surroundings is concerned, 
these needs usually relate to foreseeable action. For 
example, as a direct effect of a sign of communication (as 
it is often apparent in the writings of semiologists), or 
in relation to way- finding (as it is implied in the work 
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of Kevin Lynch and subsequent studies in the image of cities) 
or, finally, as forming the basis for choosing between 
different environments (as this has been extensively analyzed 
by Rapoport). 
The bias towards overt behaviour must surely be accounted with 
the long tradition of behaviourist thinking, according tc which, 
to put it in Laing's (1965,p. 20) words, people tend to be 
regarded as organisms merely responding to external stimuli 
rather than persons in their own right. Man, then, tends 
to be seen as receiving the information needed for his mere 
operational needs in view of his goal- oriented behaviour. 
One could perhaps argue that even the findings of the cognitive 
approaches in psychology are often being incorporated to the 
direction of explaining how people behave in their physical 
settings rather than what the experience of their surroundings 
means to them. 
It appears reasonable to suggest that this attitude is liable 
to lead to an approach in which the environment is viewed in as 
much as it merely facilitates the activities in contains. As 
few design theorists (like, for example, Norberg -Schulz) have 
a holistic conception of human needs as their point of 
departure, it may be expected that, on the whole, designers 
are asked to put little weight on the universal psychological 
needs of man as a person. In this sense, the role - indeed, 
thee significance - of man -made environment for man may be, 
somehow, misconceived. 
vi. 
0.2 AIMS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
The present work is dedicated to the study of cognitive 
experience of man -made environment and its implications on 
design. The aim is to explore the richness of the 
environment's potential informational content and the 
varieties of cognitive experience in view of man's cognitive 
needs. Based on the relation between cognition and the 
development of the person's mental world, it will be attempted 
to reassess the significance of the cognitive experience of 
man -made environment to man. 
The discussion in the preceeding section poses three 
additional families of criteria that this study has to meet. 
Examining them in reverse order, it is firstly important to 
to view cognition in relation to the qualities of the 
individual when seen as a person in his own right. In this 
sense, cognitive activity is to be approached in as much as 
it refers not only to man's goal- oriented behaviour but also 
to his deeper psychological needs. On the other hand, the 
impact of such activity is to be related to the most 
dispositicnal characteristics of man's inner structures. 
Secondly, it is important for this study to come to clear 
conclusions both as regards the development of its 
theoretical considerations and their implications on design 
theory and practice. In view of the limitations of the 
context in which designers operate, clarity appears to be 
a necessary prerequisite. The confinement of the scope of 
the study to that of cognitive, rather than aesthetic or 
holistic, experience of the environment is expected to help 
vii. 
in this direction. 
The area of concern is narrowed down to one particular 
channel through which man relates to his surroundings. 
It has been noted earlier that designers are becoming 
increasingly perceptive of the social implications of their 
designs. Yet, it can be argued that this perceptiveness 
may be often considered as random, unstructured or super- 
ficial. It is essential to provide them with the means to 
acquire a deeper and more accurate knowledge over the impact 
of the image of their designs. 
Finally, this study is based on the assumption that in a 
time of crisis in theory (to use Kuhn's term) it is 
important to re- organize and increase the knowledge of the 
confused subject rather than to search for mere blueprints 
and guidelines to be applied indiscriminately. It is 
hoped that the theoretical considerations elaborated in this 
study and the way they are applied to design will be a 
further step to the understanding of the issue in question. 
At this point it is essential to note that there are several 
conceptual limitations imposed by the lack of universal 
agreement over the question of how man acquires his know- 
ledge of the world. Eighteenth century empiricist 
philosophers, like Locke and Hume, assumed that at birth 
the mind is in a blank slate condition and that knowledge 
of reality is built up from successions of sensations 
imposed upon it. On the other hand, rationalism (advocated 
by philosophers such as Leibnitz and Descartes) starts from 
viii. 
the opposite contention that knowledge is given immediately, 
as an innate idea, before experience (see Bochenski, 1966). 
Contemporary developments in science and epistemology have 
suggested that the issue is more of a question of degrees 
to which experience preceeds knowledge rather than absolute 
truths. Philosophers like Kant, who differentiated between 
the "form" and "matter" of knowledge, have contributed to 
this direction by providing the ground for more interactive 
positions to be taken (see Moore and Colledge, 1976, pp. 
13 -16). 
Yet, the argument is still alive, particularly so in an 
extremely controversial discipline like psychology. For 
example, a researcher who is leaning towards empiricism will 
tend to view external and visible stimuli as more fundamental 
than what is internal and not directly observable. 
The present study, as perhaps all research on the human 
condition, can not claim to be impartial to the above 
argument. Its area of concern, however, covers both the way 
potential information is stored in the environment in the 
process of its shaping and the way this information is 
integrated within man's mental world; that is,both an external 
and an internal condition. To the extend that both opposing 
attitudes give a fair explanation of different aspects of 
reality to some considerable degree (see, for example, Arndt, 
1974), it is essential that this study does not exclude any 
of them from being taken into consideration. In this sense, 
the development of argument in this thesis should basically 
concentrate on the issues in question and then refer to the 
ix. 
way each philosophical position affects the discussion. 
As it will be noted in the second part of this study, the 
nature of the cognitive experience of man -made environment 
is particularly restrictive in adducing empirical evidence 
as to the degree of inference involved. Because of this 
and in relation to what has been discussed above, it is 
clear that it is not possible to come to a firm conclusion 
with regard to the question of which part of the environ- 
ment's potential informational content is experienced. In 
this sense, this study may only be exploratory in nature, 
as its basic conclusions are essentially suggestive. 
x. 
0.3 THE STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY 
The first part forms the background knowledge needed for the 
development of the argument. This knowledge is to be 
attained through the exploration of the potential informational 
content which is stored in man -made environment in the process 
of its shaping. Based on analytical observation, the aim is 
to see whether it is possible to arrive at a formulation which 
will provide an adequate explanation for the variety in forms. 
Differentation in form is, firstly, attempted to be explained 
in view of the composite need for change and then (more 
successfully) in view of the social relations which are involved 
in the production of environment. 
Man -made environment is, finally, seen as embodying a wide and 
deep array of representations (or, objectivations, to use the 
term of phenomenologists Berger and Luckman, 1967) of social 
relations which may potentially function as signifieds to 
differentiation in form. 
The approach in the second part of the study is necessarily 
ego- centered since it focuses on the cognitive experience of 
man -made environment in view of man's cognitive needs. 
An overview of the literature in psychology suggests that 
man's cognitive needs are not necessarily instrumental 
(operational) in nature. They may also be more closely 
related to man's basic needs and, hence, transcend the scope 
of goal- oriented behaviour. It is then suggested that these 
cognitive needs may be held responsible for giving man the 
tendency to experience the fuller dimensions of the environ- 
ment's potential informational content. 
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Piaget's concepts of assimilation and accomodation of 
cognitive experience provide an explanation for the way in 
which individual cognitions affect, modify or alter cognitive 
structures and the person's mental world as a whole. After 
examining the factors which affect tl.e formation of collective 
images, it is concluded that man -made environment may be 
regarded as an important domain for experience which is 
complementary to man's overall experience of the world. 
The last part of the study constitutes an attempt to apply 
what has been discussed so far to design theory and practice. 
Firsly, the theoretical considerations of this study are 
brought in relation to urban design theories which are 
similar in scope. 
The second section, which is pertinent to design practice, 
points that the users' cognitive activity does not only refer 
to their operational needs. It is suggested however, that 
a notable number of contemporary architects and designers are 
basically concerned with this aspect of cognition. Yet, as 
man -made environment can be regarded as an important domain 
through which man attains his experience of the world, all 
environmental objects can be seen as functioning in this 
direction. This leads to specific requirements as regards 
the objectivation of social relations involved in the 
production of environment, as this has been analyzed in the 
first part of this study. In as much as the cognitive 
experience of man -made environment is concerned, design 
problems are to be approached by focusing both on the 
activities involved and the users' deeper needs. 
xii, 
The designer is further required to come to a deep understand- 
ing of the significance of cognitive experience of man -made 
environment to man and the parameters and variables involved 
and the implications they entail. What is also needed is an 
awareness of the social relations involved in a particular 
production of environment, the configuration of the users' 
personal parameters in respect to this and the way in which 
social relations may become represented on the end product so 
that meaning may be transmitted smoothly and efficiently. 
Clarity and complexity in the environment can be seen as 
functioning in this direction. 
As the designer's role in society is clearly broadened, it is 
inevitably paired with increasing responsibilities. It 
appears that the deeper understanding needed may only be 
acquired through the designers' increased education. 
PART ONE 
THE PRODUCTION OF MAN -MADE ENVIRONMENT 
AND THE RICHNESS OF ITS POTENTIAL SIGNIFICATION 
1. 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
One of the main aims of this study is to explore the importance 
of man -made environment as a domain for cognitive experience 
and, as such, contributing to man's intellectual development. 
The first state in examining this function is the analysis of 
the origins of environmental stimuli which, when perceived, 
may serve as cues for social inference. As this study aims 
at establishing a link between potential information in man- 
made environment and man's mental world in the widest 
dimensions of the cognitive structures it contains, the 
potential informational content of environmental forms is to 
be explored in all its richness. To achieve this it appears 
essential to examine the way in which they are stored in the 
environment in the process of its shaping. 
Searching for an approach which will provide the foundations 
for an inquiry on the question posed there are some criteria 
that have to be met and which stem from the nature of the 
problem. Firstly, as noted above, the approach taken should 
consider the potential informational content of man -made 
environment in such a way that its richness is retained. 
Secondly, it should provide some theoretical construct which 
would, on the one hand, give a good picture of this content, 
and, on the other hand, it should be flexible enough to be 
applied for different cases and in different conditions of the 
production of environemntal forms. The reason behind this 
second criterion is that, not only is it needed to come to a 
conception of the content in all its richness, but it may also 
2. 
be required by designers to come to such a conception before 
their designs are put into shape. This latter point will be 
discussed at a later stage in this study. 
Let us now consider the approaches to the problem. One may 
identify several of them and these originate from different 
disciplines. An approach which seems to be of substantial 
relevance is the one of architectural and urban semiologists 
who aim to describe the environment in terms of its power to 
operate as a system of signs. Developing models largely out 
of natural language studies, the object of these researches 
is to show how the physical environment can express social 
meanings in the same way as natural language. (Broadbent, 
1977; Jencks, 1969, 1980, 1981; Eco, 1980). By doing so, 
they identify a substantial amount of information embodied 
on artefacts which, according to natural language rules and 
codes, can be structured in an orderly manner. 
Yet, there are two reasons to explain why this body of work, 
relevant as it may be to the present context, can not serve 
as the starting point for the study. The first reason refers 
to a recent controversy developing amongst semiologists in 
regard to the analogy between natural language and the 
language of the environment. Several theorists appear to 
be taking this analogy for granted while others are much more 
sceptical. Based on the thesis that between material and 
linguistic artefacts there exists a constitutive homology 
originating from their common genetic root in production - 
as this has been formulated by Italian semiologists Prieto 
3. 
and Rossi -Landi - Krampen suggests that the relation of 
direct analogy between the two sign systems is not to be 
easily assumed. It appears tI_at there is no evidence 
to sustain the hypothesis that "since all languages are 
made up of words and all words are signs, all things made 
up of signs are languages" ( Krampen, 1979, pp. 34 -36). 
Krampen's arguement appears to be shaking the efficiency, 
if not the validity, of semiotic analysis as it asks for 
additional requirements to be taken into account. And, 
as these requirements remain ill- defined as yet, there 
seems to be new ground opening for research on semiological 
issues. In relation to the present study however, the 
above arguement appears to imply the need to go into the 
examination of how the potential informational content of 
man -made environment originates from the "genetic root of 
its production" rather than employ ready -made models of 
natural language. 
The second reason is related to the above, as it refers to 
the origins of the sign. When Morris modified Pìercian 
semiotics, he identified three fields of study which 
semiotics had to cover: "semantics ", that is the study of 
the sign in relation to what it stands for, "syntactics ", 
the study of the structural relations between more than one 
signs, and "pragmatics ", the study of the origins, the uses 
and the effects of signs (Morris, 1946, p. 2171, The 
development of semiotics however, has tended to concentrate 
on the first two branches and it appears reasonable to argue 
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that this tendency - on which Krampen's arguement throws some 
light in as much as the origins of the sign are concerned - 
has affected both the findings as such, as well as the whole 
nature of semiotics as a methodological discipline. When an 
artefact is seen in isolation of its origins and use, the 
informational content that can be identified on it is substant- 
ially less than what the complexities of real life situations 
have stored in it as potential meaning. This loss could have 
been crucial for a study such as the present one which focuses 
on the cognitive needs of the individual and should rely on 
methods that would identify the widest body of potential 
information in man -made environment. A semiotic analysis, 
therefore, would not cover the problem. 
Nevertheless, as semiotics evolved into the study of the 
systematics of appearance (by concentrating on semantics 
and syntactics), a notable analysis of the characteristics 
of the sign has been developed. Concepts and distinctions 
from this research are extremely helpful in clarifying and 
elucidating a number of aspects relating to the communicative 
qualities of man -made environment. In this sense, it is 
essential for this study to relate to semiotics, especially 
once the potential informational content of man -made 
environment has been explored, so that the continuity between 
the sign and its origins is retained. 
A second line of approach which has several links with the prob- 
lem examined in this part of the study is the study of the evol- 
ution of environmental forms, and as such research has largely 
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concentrated on two "objects" of study, the history of art 
and architecture. Until the beginning of the twentieth 
century, the history and interpretation of art and 
architecture was basically concerned with analyzing the 
formative aspects of what had been produced and deserved 
appraisal. Later, the level of discourse became more 
scientific as it was heavily influenced by the Hegelian 
idea of "Zeitgeist ". According to this notion, every 
civilization is characterized by its peculiar and 
distinctive spirit, its "Zeitgeist ". Since all phenomena 
should always be viewed within their living (actual) 
cultural and social context and never in isolation, the same 
principle must be applied when interpreting human products, 
such as masterpieces of art and architecture. Porphyrios 
argues that this notion has been prevalent in the approach 
of historians even until the present day (Porphyrios, 1981, 
p. 96). 
Once historians pass the threshold of being concerned with 
the purely physical aspects of forms (as f.i.,Fletcher, 1961), 
they are interested in discovering analogical similarities 
between the social framework and the artefacts they describe 
and their stidies may definitely be of substantial relevance 
in the present context. These studies however, can not 
serve as offering the foundation on which this study can be 
based since such identified analogical similarities generally 
refer to the specific forms which are being analyzed. Even 
when they transcend the scope of the particular form, going 
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from the individual to the generic, theoretical formulations 
tend to be very general in character. In "Space, Time and 
Architecture ", Giedion wrote: "We are looking for the 
reflexion in architecture of the progress our own period has 
made towards consciousness of itself - of its special 
limitations and potentialities, needs and aims. Architecture 
can give us an insight into this process just because it is 
so bound up with the life of a period as a whole ". (Giedion, 
1967. p. 19). 
Although this statement may clearly serve as an indication of 
what the informational content of an artefact may be expected 
to be, it still does not provide with a model of the steps 
that need to be taken to reach a similar formulation for the 
case of "any" environmental form. And, since, additional 
care should be taken in the present context to retain the 
richness of this content, such a model should be based on 
several notions on the theory of the production of environmental 
forms. Ideally, this would have meant that what is needed is 
an outline of the rules according to which the afore -mentioned 
analogical similarities are allowed to take place. 
One could argue that this may lie beyond the scope of the 
study of history of art and architecture. Yet, as early as 
1964, Peter Collins, himself an historian, postulated that 
the contribution of history to theory of architecture should 
be based on the laws and rules which have been observed to 
allow form to be influenced (Collins, 1964). It seems that 
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although significant research has been done since then, 
the problem of attempting a theoretical construct based on 
analytical observation of the production of environment 
remains as it was. Very recently, Porphyrios put the 
question in a slightly different manner by postulating his 
conception of the "other" history of architecture as having 
to be based on "[the conception of] the historical relation 
between a result and its conditions of existence as a 
relation of production and not of expression ". ( Porphyrios, 
1981, p. 99, his emphasis). This contention, which in fact 
attempts to put the study of history of architecture in a 
different perspective, may be said to be of particular 
significance as regards the methodological aspects of 
arriving at a satisfactory identification of the potential 
informational content of environmental forms as it puts the 
emphasis on the overall conditions of production of a form 
rather than on the aspects of the Zeitgeist which are 
expressed through the designer. 
The problem of identifying the potential informational content 
of environmental forms as this is stored in them in the process 
of their shaping is not confined only to architecture and its 
closely related fields of study. In anthropology, for example, 
it exists as an empirical problem. The first hand study of 
a considerable number of societies has left the anthropologists 
with a substantial amount of evidence which could be employed 
to the direction of the needs of this study. Most anthropol- 
ogists however, are not concerned with the production of 
environment as such. Furthermore, they seek to examine 
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particular information in man -made environment, such as the 
degree to which the overall spatial organization of a 
village plan corresponds to the concept the settlers have of 
the whole village or, possibly, the world. 
Levi -Strauss saw in this aspect of spatial organization the 
opportunity to study the social structure of villages through 
its projection in space. But his approach was faced with 
unexpected limitations. In his book "Structural Anthropology, 
and, after citing several illustrations, he says, "these few 
examples are not intended to prove that spatial configuration 
is the mirror image of social organisation but to call 
attention to the fact that, while among numerous peoples it 
would be extremely difficult to discover any such relation, 
among others (who must accordingly have something in common) 
the existence of a relation is evident, though unclear, and 
in a third group spatial configuration seems to be almost a 
projective representation of the social structure" (Levi - 
Strauss, 1963, p. 292). 
More related to the production of man -made environment and 
its communicative qualities is the work of Hall and Rapoport 
who deal with more aspects relating to the present context. 
Hall (1961; 1966) emphasised the communicative aspects of 
culture through its projection on spatial form and in 
relation to social and personal space. As he based most 
of his observations on contemporary societies, his work is 
of particular importance. Rapoport, on the other hand, 
being both an architect and an anthropologist, is in a 
position to provide a large amount of evidence to the 
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direction of the examination of the potential informational 
content of man -made environment. Indeed, his book "House, 
Form, and Culture" (Rapoport, 1974) which deals with the 
production of houses in primitive and traditional cultures 
contains a notable collection of illustrations of how 
material and socio- cultural factors affect the form of the 
end product. Yet, he does not attempt to go into the 
formulation of a theoretical construct which would provide 
an explanation for the totality of features in a house and 
which could also be employed in other cases of the pro- 
duction of environment and especially as regards to the 
complexities of modern societies. 
On the whole, research in anthropology may be of much 
relevance to the particular problem of this study as it 
encompasses a large amount of evidence referring to the 
production of environment which is conducted by "non- 
institutionalized"designers. The problems it leaves is 
that it tends to be concerned with particular societies 
and particular kinds of potential information. Although 
by Levi -Strauss' statement it reaches a similar formulation 
as that of the historians, it still does not provide us 
with the menas to explore it in different dimensions and 
as regards different circumstances so that one may have a 
whole picture of the richness of potential information in 
the environment. On the other hand, the same statement of 
Levi -Strauss suggests that the approach which will finally 
be followed in this context should account for divergencies 
in environmental forms as regards their content. 
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Finally, it would have been an ommission if one disregarded 
geographical approaches in relation to the present study. 
It appears though that in regard to the production of 
environment and the question of potential information stored 
in it they tend to be notably selective. Thus, although 
they provide an interesting overview of the matter, this 
can not help as a basis in the present context as it comes 
to faint reference to the question examined. Studies like 
Pocock and Hudson's (1978) deal with the perceived environment, 
whereas studies like Harvey's (1973), although concentrating 
on the relations between social processes and spatial form, 
tend to be concerned with the description of activities 
performed in space rather than spatial form itself. As Harvey 
puts it "[the meaning of space] is helpful in certain respects 
but it is another special view of space and I am not suiethat 
it has any general validity for the examination of social 
activity" (Harvey, 1973, p. 28). 
In sum, and in view of the criteria set, it appears reason- 
able to argue that, although the approaches referred to 
above may prove invaluable in their own right, none of them 
may serve as providing the foundation for the approach 
needed. At this point, it may be necessary to note that 
pure theories of architecture and design, such as Kevin 
Lunch's or Norberg -Schulz's, may not serve as a guideline 
either; at least, not in this context. The reason is that 
the potential informational content of the environment is 
to be explored through analytical observation and not 
through theories which may be either followed or not by 
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designers. As we shall shortly see however, such theories 
may help in the present context only if incorporated within 
a rigid working framework. 
As there is no ready -made solution, the only approach left 
is to examine how the physical environment is transformed 
and to establish functional relationships between factors 
in the mechanisms of change and differentiation in form 
The problem, then, is reduced to the exploration of the 
extent to which such differentiation may seem to be 
accidental, that is: bearing no perceivable relation to the 
conditions of its production or, to put it the opposite way, 
to what extent may the mechanisms of change give an account 
for the variety of forms in man -made environment. 
As this study aims at examining man's cognitive experience 
of the entirety of man -made environment, the scope of the 
present part of the study has to go beyond the scrutiny 
of the so- called "institutionalized" design objects. Thus, 
it is essential that the environment is viewed in as much as 
the total production of environmental forms is concerned. 
This includes the exploration of functional relationships as 
regards "non- institutionalized" design processes. 
1.1 THE COMPOSITE NEED FOR CHANGE IN THE ENVIRONMENT 
Man builds his environment himself, his main aim being to 
use it. As everything else, man -made environment can be 
taken as the result of multiple "cause- effect" situations 
in which the cause is the need which asks to be satisfied 
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and the effect is the environmental form* which, through 
its function (e.g. when used), satisfies the need. This 
appears to be so whatever the scale of change in the 
environment and, indeed, such a change may range from the 
hammering of a nail into a wall to the production and 
implementation of a regional plan. In the same sense, 
environmental objects are produced as a result of a need 
regardless of the nature of this need (f.i. a house, a car, 
a statue in a park, a sign -post, an ice -cream, a piece of 
music etc.). In fact, one may hardly be able to visualize 
a completely "useless" object. Even forms which, by being 
the mere expression of a person's instantaneous feeling, 
seemingly serve no purpose at all (like, say, some graffiti 
on a wall or, "the machine that does nothing') their "use" 
may be nothing but the expression of the very feeling that 
caused them. They may be of no interest once they are 
there; yet, their production corresponded to a certain 
need and they have been "used" accordingly. 
Let us now consider any one of those needs that may serve 
as a cause for the production of an environmental form, say, 
the need for housing (that is: the need to protect certain 
human activities such as sleeping, eating and so forth 
against adversity). One does not have to search around 
the world to realize th.E: immense variety of forms (houses, 
* In the context of this study, the word "form" will be taken 
as "particular kind of arrangement or structure in which a 
thing exists" (Oxford Dictionary). 
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blocks of flats, huts etc.) that have been constructed to 
cover this particular need. Even when some of these 
environmental forms look similar, no two of them are ident- 
ical if one considers all their features. Equal plurality 
in environmental forms can easily be seen to correspond to 
every single need that requires a change in the environment 
that is so even for extreme cases such as the commercially 
dominated production of an object like a pen - which mainly 
because of its size offers limited potentiality for 
variation; nevertheless, objects one uses to write on 
paper abound in shape, colour, image and even specification. 
This plurality of forms around us suggests that the opening 
sentences of this section (and especially the notion on the 
use of man's environment) are not as straight- forward as they 
sound. Although the statement of "cause- effect" stands, 
flexible as it may be since it operates at many different 
levels, it still is inadequate to provide us with a satisfying 
explanation for the immense variety of forms. 
One reason to explain the variety of forms is that the "cause - 
effect" relation never stands on its own; it is always a 
relation within a given context. In real life situations, 
the need for environmental change, which in this context is 
assumed to generate the mechanisms of change, typically 
arises within a particular configuration of social relations 
at a given moment in time. As such, it inevitably incorpor- 
ates a body of "by- needs" which. stem from problematic 
situations, included in or "surrounding" the original need 
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and demanding solution. The end product is required to 
function in a number of ways which will have to correspond 
to these needs. To state Alexander's example, the design 
of a kettle apart from satisfying the need for heating 
drinking water, must also be handy, safe, economical and so 
on (Alexander, 1966, p. 60). Thus, the widened need 
for change, the composite need, comprises not only the 
original need, or needs, which we may call "primary ", but 
also a series of "secondary" needs. 
1.1.1 Design Methods and the Composite Need for Change 
It is sad that there is very little research that has been 
conducted on the subject of unfolding the composite need 
for change. What is needed for the purposes of this section, 
would be theoretical formulations based on analytical 
observation of the process of environmental change that has 
already taken place.* Yet, as noted above, historians very 
seldom touch the subject of the mechanisms of change as such. 
And, if this is the case for, say, outstanding pieces of 
architecture, there appears to be practically nothing to be 
expected to refer to "ordinary ",small- scale, every -day 
production of environmental form conducted by laymen. 
In the attempt to explore the dimensions of the composite 
need for change in order to examine the relationship between 
need and form the only available material that may serve as 
a guideline appears to be found in design methods of the last 
* There is no need to go into aspects of problem -solving theory 
at this stage as the interest of this section lies in 
describing the problem the producer of environmental forms 
faces and not the mental processes through which he reaches a 
conclusion. 
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twenty years (f.i. Alexander, 1966, RIBA, 1965; Matchett, 
1968; Broadbent and Ward, 1969; Jones, 1970). These studies 
usually refer to industrial design, architecture and urbanism. 
It appears logical to assume that the problems dealt by design 
methods are generally more complex than other production of 
environmental forms, such as everyday change in the environ- 
ment. This may be expected to be so, at least in as much as 
the definition of the composite need for change is concerned. 
On the other hand, this line of approach may enclose several 
methodological errors. Firstly, design methods are basically 
theories and not analyses of existing situations. Yet, they 
would possibly not be of much use if they were not digested 
and turned into practice by the majority of architects even 
to the present day. As such, they fitted the circumstances 
(low budget, commercialised production, fairly quick 
"solutions" to problems etc.) and concretized the concept of 
functionalism to such an extent that they may be considered 
to be fairly close to describing how the majority of designers 
really think (Lawson,1980). 
Secondly, being a product of their time, they are generally 
characterized by a certain philosophy which limits their 
scope in that of the utilitarian aspects of the design 
problem since they generally deal with needs which are 
expressed in observable behaviour. There are criticisms 
aimed against these studies which refer both to this and 
to the whole idea of a design method at this stage of the 
development of design research. In the context of the 
present section however, the interest lies in the examination 
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of the composite need for change and its relationship to form. 
Therefore, criticism in the present context should concentrate 
on this aspect and, only when arguments on the overall 
philosophy or context become crucial, will they require 
further attendance. 
Finally, the problem of the overall production of environmental 
forms (that is: including "non- institutionalized" design or 
other changes in spatial configurations) still remains an open 
question. It appears that there is little to be done at the 
moment apart from bearing it in mind until the end of the 
section where there will be an attempt to reconsider the 
description of the composite need for change, and the require- 
ments it sets, in a wider context. 
Let us now consider design methods in respect to their 
systematical view of the analytical stage of design. The 
most suitable for our purposes is the one based on Alexander's 
early work on the decomposition of the design problem, a study 
which proved to be highly influential for a significant period 
of time. According to this study, the design problem can be 
broken down to its constituent parts. Thus, it forms an 
inverted pyramid which starts from the function needed and, 
going through "by- needs" corresponding to functions or 
activities, ends up in listing the requirements which the 
components of the end product must satisfy (Alexander, 1966, 
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As the composite need for change stems out of a particular 
real life situation, "by- needs" and their resulting require- 
ments are a function of the users' "physiognomy" (e.g. their 
social and psychological characteristics). Consequently, 
the constituent parts of the composite need may be defined 
and solved in a number of ways and this can be limited as 
we bring together requirements set by "by- needs" referring 
to the same part. This can be achieved by implementing an 
interaction matrix of activities or functions which are 
required by such "by- needs" (Hanson, 1969). 
The users "physiognomy" and the particular situation may, and, 
depending on the nature and scale of change, it usually does, 
influence all "by- needs" and requirements contained in the 
need for change. For example, a house which is supposed to 
satisfy the housing needs of middle -class people, apart from 
doing so, should provide a certain amount of privacy (this 
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has been put into measurable terms by Hall, 1961), a certain 
standard of decency in spaces within the house, adequate 
ground for gardening outside, a certain quality of finishing 
and so forth. There may even be discrepancies within 
basically the same kind of people (f.i. young couples, 
pensioners, immigrants etc.) possibly requiring further 
determination or specification. Even in commercially 
produced houses, where the users are not known in advance, 
a number of factors, such as sex, age, class, occupation 
and so on, are taken into account in an attempt to predict 
the users' particular needs (Tzonos, 1978, p. 39). 
1.1.2 Basic Human Needs and the Composite Need for Change 
Design methods, as they appeared mainly during the late 
sixties, aimed at reducing arbitrariness in design as much 
as possible. The end requirements were attempted to be 
so definable and, at the same time so natural (stemming 
from the supposedly objective nature of function or analysis) 
that they came to be accused of bio- technical determinism 
(Colquhoun, 1969, p. 268). Today there appears to be no 
need for fierce attacks (as f.ì. Daley, 1969) as the 
alleged objectivity of observable behaviour is no longer 
carried to such extremes; Alexander himself has removed 
the deterministic element from his early theories in his 
recent work (Alexander, 1977; 1979). 
Alexander's study on the decomposition of the problem, and 
the need for change, as described above, appears to be 
valid in as much as the utilitarian needs of the people 
involved are concerned. Nevertheless, as we will see 
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shortly, even these "by- needs" are affected by recent 
developments in research as regards certain aspects of 
man's experience of the environment. Such studies were 
based on the communicative properties of man's surroundings 
and emphasized the point that the environment has to be seen 
as functioning through its (not necessarily visual) image 
in a number of ways in response to different human needs 
varying in nature. Thus, Lynch, as early as 1960, 
referred to environmental clarity in relation to man's 
needs for orientation (Lynch, 1960, p. 7f; see also 3.3 
for an extensive discussion of Lynch's thesis), Norberg- 
Schulz pointed out that environmental forms should contain 
existential meanings ( Norberg- Schulz, 1963, 1971, 1980), 
Rapoport, amongst others, stressed the importance of keeping 
complexity in design at such levels that would be in 
accordance with an optimal perceptual rate (Rapoport, 
1969, pp. 141 -142; Rapoport and Kantor, 1967; Broadbent, 
1973), Smith emphasized the importance of designing in 
accordance to the functions of the limbic brain (Smith, 
1974, 1977) and so on. Furthermore, most of the recent 
developments in the field of semiotic and environmental 
psychology, as well as the concept of the cognitive needs 
developed in the present study, are either based or deal 
with human experience of the man -made environment. 
The emphasis on man's experience of man -made environment 
and the significance of the function of its image in this 
respect is an attempt for a holistic approach to design. 
According to the design methods we mentioned, man was taken 
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as if it was possible to be described as a whole by merely 
employing his very apparent "physiognomic "characteristics 
(age, class, education, culture, sub -culture, apparent 
personality traits and so on). The analysis of the 
composite need for change was to take into account such 
variables and aim at producing a form by relating these 
to the "by- needs" which derive from the nature of the 
primary function. Yet, there is enough evidence to suggest 
that what man needs from the environment cannot be limited 
to the satisfaction of the practical aspects of his immediate 
needs. If this is so, it appears that one has to go far 
deeper into the psychology of the person to get a more 
accurate picture of man's needs and then relate them to 
the composite need for change. 
In psychology, various theorists of personality have 
attempted to sketch an outline of basic human needs in 
the direction of establishing a theory of motivation. 
Abraham Maslow (1970) observed man in what he called an 
holistic - analytic fashion as opposed to the reductive - 
analytic behaviourist orientation, according to which the 
attitude of the physical scientist was assumed and man 
tended to be viewed as a passive reactive object whose 
needs strive for their own obliteration (f.ì. H.A. Murray 
1962, pp. 192 -266). Maslow suggests that basic human 
needs are instinctoid and, to some appreciable degree, 
they may be innate and can be arranged in a hierarchical 
way. His hierarchy, in descending order, is as 
follows: physiological needs, such as hunger or thirst; 
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safety needs, such as security and protection from physical 
and psychological harm; belonging or love needs, which 
concern the relationship of responsive, or affectionate, 
and authoritative needs; esteem needs, or those needsof an 
individual to be held in high esteem by others; actualiz- 
ation needs, representing the desire to fulfill one's total 
capacities; and cognitive and aesthetic needs, such as the 
thirst for knowledge or the desire for beauty for its own 
sake, which are interrelated with the preceding categories. 
These steps - the exact nomination of which has been 
argued by writers (Warr, 1978, p. 258) - along the need 
hierarchy should not be considered a rigid, all -or- nothing, 
step -wise order of needs but rather an arrangement of 
relative satisfaction and emergence. In fact, Maslow 
suggests that "most people are partially satisfied in all 
their basic needs at the same time ". A more realistic 
description of the hierarchy would be in terms of decreasing 
percentages of satisfaction as we go up the hierarchy of 
prepotency (Maslow, 1968, 1970). 
It is beyond the limits of this section to go further into 
the implications of research conducted on the problem of 
human needs by other disciplines. What is interesting in 
the present context however, is to note two things. The 
first and most important one lies in the realization of 
the mere existence of such needs (whether innate, partially 
innate or learned) as being part of the human nature at 
some stage of the development of the individual's personality. 
The significance of this is reinforced if one assumes the 
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existentialist methodological approach of emphasizing the 
identity of the individual involved - as it is done by 
Maslow in his introduction of "Toward a Psychology of 
Being" (1968). Then, the individual is approached as a 
person in his own right and not as an organism merely 
responding to his environment in a stimulus -response 
fashion (Laing, 1965, p. 20). This viewpoint makes it 
clearer that it would be a serious omission to disregard 
the implications of man's basic needs whether as defined 
by Maslow or by anybody else. This evidently relates 
to the identification of the constituent parts of the 
composite need for change. 
The observation above carries the argument to the second 
notable point which relates to the exploration of the 
instrumental (operational) character of a number of "by- 
needs" already identified. By definition, operational 
needs are purposive, functional steps in the direction of 
the satisfaction of a certain end, the primary need. 
They may be considered to be "quasi- needs" (Lewin, 1964, 
P. 109) in the sense that, on the one hand, they are 
subordinate to the dominant need while, on the other hand, 
they still function as though they were needs themselves. 
As it has been generally agreed that behaviour in any 
particular situation usually results from a combination of 
several needs (Lewin, 1964 p. 280), it does not seem 
unreasonable to suggest that the needs in question may 
retain the possibility of relating back to the basic human 
needs, even if this relation may sometimes be so remote 
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that it is apparently impossible to trace. 
Based on the above, it appears that, in all "by- needs" 
identified in this section (and this includes needs 
identifed by design methods as well as needs referring 
to the function of the image) it is reasonable to 
distinguish two components. The first is instrumentality 
as regards the primary need for change and the second 
transcends the scope of the particular function and relates 
directly to the basic human needs. Therefore, needs 
constituting the basic need for change appear to fluctuate 
between two poles from being basically operational to being 
closer to the basic human needs. For example, the need for 
the living room to be spaced so that it facilitates the 
activities required is mainly operational while the need 
for balanced homeostasis and tension for the individual user 
may be expected to affect all different cases of production 
of environment since it is closer to man's basic needs. 
Naturally, several "by- needs" may appear to be in the 
middle as both components may be equally stressed. The need 
for a directional traffic sign to be clear, for instance, 
refers both to the particular function of directing the person 
quickly and efficiently and to his safety and cognitive needs 
in the sense that it should not be confusing or produce 
anxiety. 
The different constituent parts of the composite need can not 
be easily classified and structured accouding to their 
relative significance for man in relation to the particular 
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function. Although a lot of research has been done in 
psychology and psychodynamics, there is still no clear 
theoretical formulation as needs are very complex in 
origin, structure and nature. Furthermore, such a 
differentiation should be expected to vary according to 
culture, nature and scale of environmental change and so 
on. Nevertheless, in as much as they describe the 
problem and indicate the dimensions of the composite need 
whether as the means to an end or else, such needs may be 
considered to be of equal importance. 
1.1.3 The Composite Need for Change Seen In a 
Wider Context 
Let us now attempt to relate the composite need for change, 
as it has been identified based on experience from 
"institutionalized" design theory and practice in present 
day societies, to the much wider context in which production 
of environment takes place. Maslow suggests that basic 
human needs appear to be similar for different cultures 
even though their expressions may vary widely. He also 
notes that his classification of basic needs is in part an 
attempt to account for this unity behind the apparent 
diversity from culture to culture. At this point, one has 
to assume that the outline of the composite need presented 
above is fairly close to reality and thus covers the 
problem (primary need for change and function, operational 
needs to the function and more basic needs which also have 
to be satisfied). Then, it appears reasonable to suggest 
that in a different context with different norms, standards, 
values and so on, people have been and will continue to 
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produce environmental forms in response to their degree of 
gratification of similar basic human needs. In close 
interaction with this individual gratification is the social 
and cultural dimensions which, in the case of primitive 
peoples for example, required the production of intensely 
symbolic (religious, cosmic, mythical) environmental forms. 
Such discrepancies in the need for change, arising within a 
particular configuration of social relations, are to be 
expected from such a different context. Yet, as can be 
seen from illustrations in studies such as Rapoport's (1974), 
the implications referring to needs deriving from the 
function (whatever that is) or to basic human needs follow 
the general lines of the outline given above. 
The same can be said to hold for cases of everyday "non - 
institutionalized" production of environment. The basic 
difference may be that there appears to be a significant 
degree of abstraction in several aspects of the composite 
need for change depending on the case and, naturally, the 
scale of environmental change. When a housewife arranges 
the furniture in her living room for example, the "by- needs" 
are not usually attended to one -by -one. Yet, it appears 
that they are all potentially there (f.i. operational needs 
such as dining area next to the kitchen or some space to 
be left behind this chairfor people to pass through, or needs 
for privacy, say, to block the neighbour's vista, and aesthetic 
needs, in the form of "it just looks nice "). How the "doer" 
acts upon the composite need exceeds the scope of this 
section. 
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From the above it can be seen that when the need for change 
is widened as it actually is in reality, (that is: compr- 
ising "by- needs" which may fluctuate from being basically 
operatonal and instrumental to being more directly related 
to man's basic needs) it may account for a much wider variety 
of forms than what the original abstract concept does. If 
one considers how the composite need is structured in terms 
of "by- needs" and requirements which correspond to functions 
which are to be performed by the end product, then one may 
argue that the composite need may be regarded as a system 
of hierarchically ordered "cause- effect" relations which 
operate at different levels. This is not meant to be a 
determinist stance as the purpose of this statement is to 
attract attention to the "cause" rather than to imply that 
there is only one "effect ", or end product, which can 
satisfy it. In this sense, it appears reasonable to agree 
with the view that constraints, which are exerted on the 
designer by the particular situation he faces, may act as 
generators of form (Lawson, 1980, p. 77). 
But if this is so, the question that arises is how much does 
the composite need for change end in requirements as regards 
the features on the end product and to what extent does it 
generate these features. In other words, to what extent 
may the concept of the composite need for change, in its 
most widened form, provide us with a reasonable explanation 
for the variety of environmental forms. 
1.1.4 The Composite Need for Change in View of the 
Variety in Forms 
At this point let us go back to the examination of a single, 
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isolated change in the environment. One may postulate 
that in the production of a single environmental form one 
or more people (acting by and large as a group) with a 
range of ideas, ideals, experience, behaviours and techniques 
(either concrete or vaguely formulated) interpret a given 
situation which consists of a certain configuration of social 
relations and has somehow become problematic. This 
interpretation is carried out according to their past 
experience and their overall motivation in life, both of 
which inevitably have to do with their position in society, 
their values as well as their particular interests as 
regards to the given situation. They find that something 
needs to be done, they identify this composite need 
depending on their interpretation of the given situation 
and they implement its solution. Naturally, the end product 
is asked to satisfy the need that triggered its creation as 
well as the "by- needs" that have been identified by the 
designer. Nevertheless, as one can readily see in the 
above description, this end product remains the result of 
a complex process. 
Depending generally on the scale of environmental change, 
one can identify a variety of parameters which interfere in 
the production and may mark the shaping of the form. Along 
with parameters having to do with the doer, or doers, such 
as personality traits, aims and objectives, conflicting 
interests amongst the people involved and so on, one may list 
a series of external ones, which may range from available 
materials and technology to legislation and era or class 
models. (Fig. 2). 
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Although a kettle is a mainly functional object with 
some degree of specificity, these contemporary 
(18th century) kettles vary notably ìn form. 
FIGURE 2 
It is interesting to note some differences between modern 
designers, on the one hand, and traditional or "non - 
institutionalized" producers of environment, on the other, 
in as much as their approach to the problem is concerned. 
Alexander argues that traditional form - makers learned 
their skill through imitation and correction (Alexander, 
1966, p. 36), while Jones gives examples of craftsmen 
who were not aware of why they had tackled a particular 
problem the way the had done (Jones, 1970, pp. 17 -18). 
Rapoport on the other hand, having studied a remarkable 
number of anonymous, primitive or not, settlements, 
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appears to suggest that this is to be accounted on the 
relative significance of social factors in general and 
not imitation as such (Rapoport, 1974, p. 73). 
Furthermore, in everyday production of environment, not all 
"by- needs" for change are creatively attended to. There 
appears to be a tendency to what problem solving theory has 
termed "functional fixation or functional fixedness" 
according to which, if an object has to be used in a novel 
way to solve a practical problem, it is less likely to be so 
used if the doer has already seen it used, or used it for a 
different prupose (Duncker, 1945, pp. 85 -110). (Fig. 3). 
It seems reasonable to argue that, if one visualised all 
possible forms which could result from the requirements of 
composite needs, this tendency from the doer's part would 
reduce them considerably, as it presumably does in real 
life situations. 
The first cast -iron bridge of Abraham Darby at Coalbrookdale in 
1779 is very reminiscent of the stone arch. 
FIGURE 3 
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Even in societies where considerable time is spent in 
life- sustaining tasks, there is still a great amount 
of time devoted to "frivolous" nonfunctional tasks, 
such as ornamenting functional objects like this Maori 
canoe from New Zealand. 
FIGURE 4 
Additional complexities arise from phenomena such as the 
division of labour in present day societies, the emergence 
of producers, distributors, systems operators and so on 
(Jones, 1970, p. 7), the role of marketing and advertising 
in creating new needs or giving shape to latent desires 
(Schmittel, 1975, pp. 173 -175), the increasing tendency 
for the consumption of the image of objects rather than 
their function in the conventional sense (Debord, 1971; 
de Ventos, 1980, pp. 183 -190) and so forth. On the 
architectural level, Hillier appears to be well aware of 
this as he suggests that a building has to be seen as 
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operating at certain levels (by being a climate, behaviour, 
cultural and resource modifier) rather than concentrating 
on the functions alone (Hillier et al, 1972). In a similar 
sense, Rapoport approaches design as having four properties, 
namely: the organisation of space, meaning, time and 
communication (Rapoport, 1977, pp. 10 -12). 
It was the belief of functionalists that "not only the 
form of an object or building should express its function, 
but the form should be inevitably and uniquely determined 
by that function" (Brolin, 1976, p. 36). Yet, even in 
technical objects, which according to Bense require the 
highest degree of specificity or criticality (Krampen, 1979, 
p. 10; Rapoport, 1974, p. 87 -89) this determination is not 
attainable (Fig. 4). It has been said that even in the 
spaceship capsule, which is unique for its complexity and 
specification, the designer was still left with several 
choices. Even if the requirements of the composite need 
sometimes appear to be unlimited (Lawson, 1980, p. 71), 
there still seems to be wide area of choice in the final 
configuration (Colquhoun, 1969, p. 270). 
It seems that the composite need for change, however 
generative of form it may be, can not determine the end 
product. The "cause- effect" relationship between need 
and form (or, function, which this form is to facilitate) 
proposed earlier appears to be furnished with a notable 
number of parameters which also take part in the shaping 
of the resulting spatial form. Although the composite 
need for change, and especially the primary element in it, 
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demands the production of environment and, as such, generates 
form, the end product, in the totality of its features, will 
only be a function of this need. 
1.2 THE REPRESENTATION OF SOCIAL RELATIONS 
ON ENVIRONMENTAL FORMS 
1.2.1 The Alternative Approach and the Concept 
of Social Relations 
For a comprehensive analysis which may lead to an adequate 
explanation of a much wider range of environmental forms 
than can be accounted for by the composite need, one is 
impelled to approach the problem at a different level. 
Such an approach should provide the means for the examin- 
ation of the way in which the widest body of parameters, 
which somehow are involved in the production of environment 
may affect the particular shape of the end product. The 
general view that the built environment is a reflection of 
the social environment may serve as an indication of this 
direction. 
After exploring the implications of the composite need for 
change and the problematic situation itself, the above 
stance may also help on shifting the level at which we 
approach the problem. Therefore, the new approach should 
be based on a somehow universal point of departure so that 
it may incorporate all the complexities of environmental 
change, while, at the same time, it should be sharp enough 
to penetrate in such a complex domain to meet the particular 
aims of this study. 
The statement which is to serve as the universal point of 
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departure is that a major way in which man adapts to the 
natural environment is by transforming it physically* to 
meet his needs. The two large domains that interest us 
are "man" on the one hand, and man -made environment, for 
the production of which the natural environment is employed 
as its raw material, on the other. What is needed is a 
concept that will give a measure of "man" and, at the same 
time, without losing its global scope, may prove useful to 
give an account for differentiations, e.g. "bits" of 
potential information, in man -made environment. 
The proposed concept in this context is the concept of social 
relations and the working hypothesis which is going to be 
tested against non -experimental analytical observation is 
that "in the process of production of man -made environment, 
social relations which have to do with this production may 
become represented, or objectivated, on the end product ". 
The problems of this part of the study is then transformed 
(or reduced) into exploring the extent to which the above 
function may be held accountable for the variety in forms 
and the potential informational content of man -made 
environment. 
What is meant by the term "social relations" is all possible 
* Apparently, the physical way is not the only way in which 
man adopts to the natural environment. In primitive 
societies, man applied meaning to natural phenomena and 
identified them with the forces of "good" and "evil ". 
There is also the well -known example of a tribe in Western 
Australia, the Pitjendadjara, who, although, they still 
carry on leading a religious and moral life of great 
intensity, employ minimal physical transformation of the 
natural environment (Redfield, 1953, p. 16). 
34. 
relations in society, everyting that stems from man's being - 
in- the -world. They are structured in a hierarchical order 
and operating at many different levels so that they might be 
seen as spreading from the field of psychology, through 
social psychology, to that of sociology. Such relations 
may be relations between individuals, groups of people, 
between individuals or people and things or concepts, even 
a single person's attitude to the rest of the world and so 
on. The concept of social relation evidently incorporates 
at least a notion of both its poles and it may happen that 
one of these poles may not be obvious, nor the relation 
"established" in the strict sense of the word. For example, 
the fact that a single person may be depressed at a given 
moment in time may not seem to be a "social relation" 
generally, but it will be taken as one in the present 
context since, if the person is one pole, the other pole 
may be society in general, or some aspects of it or the 
person's prior experience of his social environment. Thus, 
the form "social relations" in this context is used in a 
much wider sense than it is used by Levi- Strauss (1963, p. 279, 
for example) as it operates on the psychological level, 
including the functions of the unconscious part of the mind. 
But the definition of the concept of "social relations" is 
not enough to set the approach. What is also needed is a 
conception of the channels through which social relations 
are hypothesized to pass so as to become represented on man- 
made environment. Such a conception should be required to 
fulfil the criteria set in 1.0. 
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Following the problematic which led to the present approach, 
the examination of the representation of social relations 
on environmental form has to be separated in two stages. 
The first stage deals with social relations which are 
channeled through the composite need for change. Although 
this stage will be based on the discussion in 1.1, it will 
still have to be typically different as it is put in a new 
context. The separation in two stages is fundamentally 
important in order to retain the relative significance of 
the need for change in respect to other parameters affect- 
ing the production of environment. 
During the second stage, the interest lies in examining 
how a whole range of social relations which may have little 
or nothing to do with the need for manage 
represented on the end product. To trace such social 
relations in a systematic way, one is forced to shift one's 
point of attention from the user to the doer, that is the 
person or persons who finally produce environmental forms. 
There are two, fairly distinct, channels through which 
social relations from the whole social environment (apart 
from the composite need for change which describes the 
user and the particular situation as such) may become 
represented on environmental form: one of them is internal, 
and the other external to the doer (Heider, 1958, p. 82; 
Hillier, Musgrove and O'Sullivan, 1972). That is: they 
are either channeled through him and this makes him somehow 
responsible for the outcome, or they lie beyond his reach. 
The first case we can call the "internal factor" and the 
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latter will be the "external factor" in the representation 
of social relations on environmental forms. 
Now that the working hypothesis and the methodological 
means through which it will be tested have been laid, let 
us consider a few aspects of the issue which appear to be 
needing further clarification. Firstly and in reference 
to this alternative approach as a whole, social relations 
will be treated as the independent variable since what is 
studied is the shaping of man -made environment. Even in 
cases in which a particular social relation may be a 
function of an existing spatial form (and this may be 
expected as such a social relation may be a relation between 
an individual or people and a thing, in this case the form), 
it may again be considered an independent variable in the 
face of the forthcoming environmental change in which it 
takes part (Harvey, 1973, p. 40). 
Secondly, it appears reasonable to assume that all product- 
ion of man -made environment results from the transformation 
of natural environment which is treated as raw material to 
this end. Yet, environmental change does not necessarily 
begin from scratch. In this sense, the redecoration of a 
room, in which existing pieces of furniture have been 
arranged differently, is again a case of production of 
man -made environment. In a totally opposite sense, the 
same can be said for the landscaping of or, even, the 
intrenchment of a large park within the city. 
Furthermore, when one deals with modern societies one should 
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take a closer look at the implications of the division of 
labour and the fragmentation of the production -use relation, 
which has been mentioned above. Commercialized production 
depends heavily on demand and, in fact, as elementary text- 
books in economics will readily underline, it is a function 
of demand. In the context of the present study, it 
appears reasonable not to confine ourselves to the first leg 
of the above relation only, e.g. the process of designing 
and producing an environmental form as such. The process of 
selecting and purchasing such a form may be considered to be 
of equal importance as it reproduces the original production. 
In addition to this, the purchaser, apart from bringing his 
purchase into a different context, retains some of the 
characteristics of the producer -user since he interprets 
his own needs and covers them by the acquired product 
after careful selection which is a function of his 
interpretation. 
Lastly, several channels through which social relations become 
represented on environmental forms may appear as overlapping 
with channels of a different category. This is to be 
expected since the actual production of environment is a 
complex whole which is dealt with in isolation in the present 
context for methodological purposes. A woman, for example, 
may buy an expensive elegant dress and wear it every day for 
at least two reasons: either she thinks that this is the 
kind of dress that really suits her personality or, understand- 
ing that for some reason she does not suit it, she wants to 
convince the others that she does. Either could have 
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happened and one has to know the person to have a chance of 
really knowning. A similar situation may have been expressed 
through two different channels simultaneously. A theoretical 
model like the one proposed in this context can not do else 
than isolate each functional relationship. This must not be 
expected to affect the validity of the approach which is not 
concerned with the measurement of potential information or 
with the identification of all channels through which social 
relations manage to become objectivated but with examining 
the functions which sustain the richness of the content. 
1.2.2 Social Relations and the Composite Need 
The first group of social relations which may be reflected 
on environmental forms are those which have to do with the 
composite need and the corresponding use -value that lies 
behind objects. As we have seen in the previous part of 
the chapter the part of the composite need which constit- 
utes the primary need is the one that calls for the object's 
production. The object by its form is asked to help take 
place, or to facilitate the function the need requires 
that is, the primary function. 
Nevertheless, in its essence, the primary need alone remains 
a theoretical construct* since it arises without being yet 
furnished with other "by- needs" which would readily provide 
it with dimensional perspective in space. Consequently, 
* e.g. an abstract, rather than sustantive, entity. 
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social relations of the primary need get represented by the 
mere existence of the environmental form. 
These social relations can be seen in two levels: those 
social relations that have to do with the need which led to 
the production and use of a particular environmental form 
and those which define the significance of such objects' 
use for man in general. For example, the existence of a 
bar of soap or a collection of cosmetics in somebody's 
bathroom is a result of both the idea of cleanliness or 
cosmetic treatment seen within a given broad social context 
and of the fact that this person in particular seems to 
conform with this thought for certain reasons that have to 
do with the way he /she sees himself, or herself in society. 
(Fig. 5). If cultural norms, or the person's attitude to 
these, were different, then those objects wouldn't have 
been there and their absence would have constituted one 
objectivation of these social relations. 
In the same sense, the fact that New Towns have been built, 
and exist, in the pariphery of Glasgow or London is the 
result of, and consequently represents, an extended complex 
configuration of social relations such as the condition of 
inner city areas, certain requirements of industry, 
priorities set by decision- makers and so forth. This 
configuration of social relations, naturally, is represented 
by all environmental objects it give birth to, and in their 
totality of physical features; that is, not only the houses 
of, say, Cumbernauld, but also the headings of buses which 
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have been introduced for servicing the town, the change 
the emergence of Cumbernauld brought in the country's maps 
etc. correspond to the afore -mentioned social relations. 
(Fig. 6). 
FIGURE 5 
Let us now proceed to the scrutiny of the rest of the 
elements in the composite need in terms of the social 
relations they allow to become represented on environmental 
objects. In the preceeding sections, we have seen that 
primary needs are furnished with a number of secondary 
"by- needs" which stem from the social relations concerned 
with the user, or users, and the problematic situation. 
The social relations that lead to the production of a chair, 
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Any feature in Cumbernauld may serve as a source 
of information about the social relations which 
led to the emergence of the town. 
FIGURE 6 
if taken in their entirety, as is always the case of real 
life situations, will not produce just any chair. Instead, 
they will lead to the production of either a kitchen chair 
or an "electric chair ", and so forth (Fig. 7). As far 
as 
these aspects of a chair's form are concerned, they 
are a 
typical result of the operational needs involved in 
the need 
for sitting. As such, they constitute objectivations 
of 
the user's "physiognomy ". As noted before, different 
users 
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have been introduced for servicing the town, the change 
the emergence of Cumbernauld brought in the country's maps 
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FIGURE 5 
Let us now proceed to the scrutiny of the rest of the 
elements in the composite need in terms of the social 
relations they allow to become represented on environmental 
objects. In the preceeding sections, we have seen that 
primary needs are furnished with a number of secondary 
"by- needs" which stem from the social relations concerned 
with the user, or users, and the problematic situation. 
The social relations that lead to the production of a chair, 
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will "fit" differently into the function of, say, housing. 
This will have its effect in concrete spatial form whether 
the user is the builder of his own house or whether he is 
choosing one from those which exist in the market. (Fig. 8). 
Apart from letting social relations of the user's "physiog- 
nomy" become represented on spatial forms, "by- needs" still 
retain their character as needs (f.ì. windows in a unit 
such as a house may be seen as autonomous units since they 
satisfy the need to let air and light come through and not 
to isolate the inside from the outside). Consequently, 
they also serve as channels for social relations, similar 
to those of primary needs, to get through and become 
represented by the object's more existence. A house with 
few or no windows may be the result tendancy 
for seclusion of isolation (Fig. 9). George Megas refers 
to examples of houses in Thrace in which, for reasons of 
security, i.e. because of the need to isolate the inside 
from the outside, have more holes in the roof to allow air 
and light come in (Megas, 1969, p. 22). 
A. combination of the two roles of operational needs in 
functioning as channels for the objectivation of social 
relations can be seen in cases of spaces which consist of 
many small objects and are used intensively as a whole. 
A student's room may serve as an illustration in this case 
as one may say thE.t production of environmental form takes 
place continually since there is a constant rearrangement 




Doing one's washing may be 
carried out ìn a number of 
ways which result in the 
employment of different 
environmental forms and 
arrangements. Whether one 
will go for the more labour 
intensive or the more 
capital intensive solution 
is a function of one's 
priorities in view of the 
money available. 
FIGURE 8 
Windows and openings are scarce in the tower -like structures 
of Vatheia, Greece. The settlers' adverse relations with other 
villages resulted in the need for security taking precedence 




Social relations, concerningthe user's "physiognomy, or even 
personality or degree of gratification of basic needs, and the 
wider social context, are highly involved in all these 
environmental changes. The mere fact that this situation as 
a whole occurs is a result of a complex set of social relations 
such as: high rents, students are generally poor, students are 
in between being supported and protected by their parents and, 
on the other hand standing on their own economically, man may 
suffer living in such conditions in order to achieve something 
and so on. Furthermore, each and every book or article on 
the studying desk or elsewhere owes its appearance to the 
particular mode, in which this particular student (who has 
had a certain experience of the world so far and a certain 
conscious and unconscious motivational content towards life 
and things) in the particular context that he finds himself 
in, attempts to solve his problems either practical and 
immediate or more abstract and long -term. 
What we have seen up to this point suggests that social 
relations are represented on environmental forms by the very 
fact that the form as a whole, or a functional part of it, 
exists regardless of its shape. The task of letting "objects ", 
which are still merely concepts, acquire dimensions, shape 
and texture rests on certain aspects of the basic human needs 
and especially Maslow's first category of them, the physiol- 
ogical needs. Several of these needs, which have to do with . 
the human body or the use of materials, can easily yield stan- 
dards to be met. One aspect of such standards can be seen in 
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handbook manuals, such as Neufert's, where they have been 
codified. They are usually taken for granted as their 
validity is supposedly absolute. 
Yet, to a certain extent they fluctuate and by doing so 
they allow additional social relations to become represented 
in concrete spatial form. Hall's (1961,1966) and Gehl's 
(1978) theories on physical and psychological dimensions 
indicate the role of personal factors in this. For example, 
a spacious bathroom and a soft of stylish armchair are on the 
luxury side whereas a bed carved in rock is not. In a 
similar sense, the spacing of tables in French cafes is 
different to what it would have been in England although 
manuals would have given one measure for the distance between 
teh. backs of two chairs, as far as the operational need of 
getting through is concerned. (Fig. 11). Different 
conceptions of the idea of man's personal space has resulted 
in the objectivation of this discrepancy. This includes 
social relations such as the relationship of an individual 
with other members of his culture as a whole, the threshold 
beyond which he would be threatened as a person (and this 
comes in close relation with the gratification of safety 
needs) and so on. 
There may be numerous illustrations of discrepancies in 
dimensions, shape and texture of forms, from that which 
could be said to be the "standard" and, as these are a 
function of the users' "physiognomy" in the deepest sense 
of the word, this involves social relations of both 
psychological and socio- culture nature. Differences 
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The crowded spacing of cafe tables in France 
indicates the French tendency to pack together 
more closely than do northern Europeans, 
English and Americans. 
FIGURE 11 
between Spartans and other citizens of ancient Greek cities 
or between the Incas and the Pueblos as regards standards of 
comfort (Rapoport, 1974, p. 91) or Americans and others as 
regards noise levels (Baranek, 1966) and their objectivations 
in spatial form may illustrate this point. 
As such needs move from the physiological to the purely 
psychological, however, the absence of concrete dimensional 
standards makes the objectivation of social relations hard to 
trace. This can be seen in the case of the problem caused 
by the "open door" policy of a branch of an American firm in 
Germany in regard to the safety needs, primarily, of the 
people involved. "In this company ", Hall writes, "the open 
doors were making the Germans feel exposed and gave the whole 
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operation an unusually relaxed and businesslike air. Closed 
doors, on the other hand, gave the Americans the feeling that 
there was a conspirational air about the place and that they 
were being left out ". The difference between cultures in 
their conception of personal space is further objectivated 
by the fact that Germans tend to produce heavier chairs and 
more solid doors, than, say, Americans do, to give a more 
distinct indication of hereness and thereness as regards 
their personal space and the personal space of others (Hall, 
1966, pp. 127 -128). Most psychologists, whether they follow 
the Lockean or the Leibnitzian tradition, would agree that 
psychological constructs, such as the conception of personal 
space, are to a degree learned. Consequently, as Germans 
have been experiencing doors being closed and chairs being 
solid (these characteristics in this case forming something 
like a code) in relation to their basic needs, and especially 
safety needs, their interrelation seems inseparable to them 
and they will tend to reproduce it in every production of 
environment. (See 1.2.4 for the doer's input). 
Another interesting illustration of "by- needs" which relate 
to the basic human needs may be seen in the way the need for 
privacy affects the way doors actually open (Fig. 12). 
From what can be observed in Britain, doors tend to be 
designed so that the person who enters a room faces the 
nearby wall. One may presume that this solution, which 
is typical of older buildings, is a response to the need 
for privacy of the occupant of the room. Yet, in other 
cultures, in Greece for example, this need is not considered 
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to be so important as to demand any requirements for design 
in relation to this particular problem. The operational 
need of attaining maximum space when the door is held open 
is left to determine the solution. Different social 
relations in each case set different priorities. The idea 
of privacy was so developed in Britain that it constituted 
an essential constituent part of the composite need for 
change. 
The illustrations above describe how discrepancies in the 
users' basic needs may serve as channels to objectivate 
different social relations, which have to do with these 
needs, on specific components of the end product. Let us 
now see how such needs may leave their traces on the end 
product taken as a whole. Levi -Strauss maintains that 
a large number of native societies have consciously chosen 
to project into space a scheme of their institutions (Levi - 
Strauss, 1963, pp. 331 -332). From what has been discussed 
in the previous section, it does not appear unreasonable to 
suggest that such societies realized, to an extent, the 
function of the image and acknowledged the need for the 
overall spatial form of their settlement to attain symbolic 
meaning. Then, at least in as much as the overall layout 
of the settlements is concerned, the design corresponded to 
the people's cognitive needs in relation to the needs for 
safety and the needs of belongingness, as its hierarchical 
organization was an image of the world for them. 
The village plan of Omarakana in the Trobriand Islands of 
North Western Melanesia, (Levi- Strauss, 1963, pp. 136 -137), 
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The way doors open in Britain (Left) 
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for example, shows such an organization (Fig. 13). The 
chief's hut is located in the middle along with certain 
important communal activities, such as the dancing ground 
and the place where the dead are buried. Around them, in 
a neat circle, are the yam storehouses which are elaborate, 
sacred in character and the object of many taboos. Beyond 
a circular street and in the same concentric pattern, the 
huts of the married couples were built in what forms the 
outer edge of the village. It is interesting to note that 
although food is stored in the inner ring, cooking and 
consuming it takes place only in or around the family dwell- 
ings of the outer ring. The significance of this illustration 
in this context however, does not lie in observing various 
social relations which characterize the culture as such, but 
in the fact that the villagers felt the need to turn these 
relations into symbols in space. Therefore, amongst all 
other social relations, their consciousness of the hierarch- 
ical organization of their village and the world and the 
strong desire to turn it into concrete, as well as rather 
strict symbolism, is also objectivated in the end product. 
Similar illustrations, relating not only to villages but 
houses as an "imago mundi" in a smaller scale, may be found 
in Rapoport (1974, pp. 76 -87). 
It is hard to trace projections of the need to make sense 
out of one's environment in the context of contempory 
societies because of the division between "user" and 
"doer ". As this section refers to how the composite 
need, as it really is, may serve as a channel for the 
53. 
representation of social realtions on environmental form, 
problems arising from the interpretation of the need from 
the doer's viewpoint will be dealt with later. Still, in 
as much as the everyday production of environment is 
concerned, one may note people's reactions in modifying 
the environment in which they live. (Fig. 14). 
In Britain, the front garden has traditionally been the area 
on which residents express themselves. In Greece, it is 
typical of families occupying a flat in a working -class 
apartment block to paint the walls of their balconies in 
strange colours, wherever the law accepts this. The reason 
behind this is to give some identity to the place which 
would otherwise be neutral and bleak. "Their" flat has 
to stand out. In the end, the whole apartment block is 
characterized by a series of patches of different colours, 
as though there were a hidden competition amongst the 
families to outdo one another. This confusing but, in a 
sense, amusing activity helps as a channel to objectivate 
the relation between the need for preserving, transmitting 
and re- esperiencing one's identity and the extent to which 
this may be supressed by an architectural scheme. These 
people felt that the need for housing involved more 
"by- needs" than what the designers thought. 
To conclude, this section, it appears that social relations, 
which may be represented on environmental forms through the 
composite need for change, are relations which refer to the 
user or the problematic situation (when the user coincides 
with the doer, they refer to the qualities of him as a user, 
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There are a number of ways through which people express identity 
in 
relation to their homes. As it can be seenin the illustrations 
above 
taken from Athems, this may be achieved by means of some 
paint or 
flower pot by the entrance on the one hand, or by features 
such as the 
imposing dome of the impressive suburbìan villa, on the other. 
FIGURE 14 
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as opposed, for instance, to his expressive behaviour when 
producing). Since the user on the problematic situation 
can not exist independently of the broader social context, 
they inevitably refer back to this, as for example in the 
case of the bar of soap and the concept of cleanliness 
where amongst the social relations represented on the bar 
of soap was that of the overall significance of the idea 
of cleanliness for mankind. 
Furthermore, in as much as the purely operational needs are 
concerned, at first it appears that only the user's 
describable "physiognomic" characteristics may affect the end 
product. Yet, when one looks closer at the user's basic 
needs, one may observe that they, too, may affect it and serve 
channels for the objectivation of social relations concerning 
the users inner psychological development. In a generic 
sense, such social relations may be what characterizes cultural 
attitudes. 
Social relations, which are represented on environmental forms 
through the composite need for change, are singularly signif- 
icant as they appear to be responsible for the broad outline 
of the dimensions, shape and texture of spatial form, to say 
nothing about their mere existence. When operational needs 
are seen as functioning as needs in their own right, this may 
be said to happen as regards to the components of the end 
product, which then becomes a system that can be further 
divided into subsystems. "By- needs" which relate to the 
basic human needs may affect all such subsystems, since a 
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function of them may be found to be a subsidiary component 
of operational needs. When approached as functioning in 
their own right, such "by- needs" may still leave their trace 
as spreading all over the spatial forms, as they may also 
affect the shaping of specific elements in it. 
1.2.3 The External Factor in the Representation of 
Social Relations on Environmental Forms 
As noted above, the variety of features in environmental forms 
can not be explained by the composite need alone. The super - 
flous complexity, if not accidental, appears to be sustained 
by a series of social relations which have little, or even 
nothing, to do with the user and the composite need. In 
1.2.3 and 1.2.4 the aim is to examine how a whole range of 
such social relations may manage to become represented on 
environmental forms as well as what kind of social relations 
would these be. 
For this, and in accordance with the methodological model 
outlined in 1.2.1, it is essential to shift our point of 
attention from the user to the doer, that is the person, or 
persons, who produce environmental objects. In the product- 
ion of environment, the doer is subjected to a series of 
limitations, (Banham, 1964). These limitations which lie 
beyond his reach constitute the external factor in the 
production of environment. As this factor originates from 
either natural or social phenomena, one may distinguish two 
aspects of it: the natural and the social. 
The natural aspect of the external factor has its origins 
in the natural environment to which man adapts himself 
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through environmental change. In a strict sense, materials 
as well as all natural phenomena are by definition devoid of 
any social relations. As such, they can not represent any 
social relations by their mere existence. The fact that 
Scandinavian houses are made of timber, or that in Britain 
one may build high using elementary structures since there 
are no earthquakes in this part of the world, is a natural 
consequence of availability of materials or topography and 
is not expected to portray any social relations. 
Yet, this is not exactly so, for two reasons. Firstly, 
both materials and phenomena get infused with social 
relations following their use and subsequent significance - 
some of which may have nothing to do with their use as such, 
as for example in the case of primitive peoples - both in the 
history of mankind and for a particular configuration at a 
given time. Secondly, in the production of environment, in 
real life situations, there is always a certain degree of 
availability of materials, a certain array of locations where 
one can build a house without travelling very far and so on. 
These restrictions, naturally, limit the doer's scope to 
such an extend that this has given rise to views of material 
or topographic determinism of theorists, (f.i. Evans - 
Pritchard, 1960, p. 63 - 69), especially with reference to 
primitive or traditional cultures it is exactly how the doer 
reacts when confronted with such limitations, and in view 
of the fact that materials and natural phenomena already 
have attained some value, that allows social relations to 
be objectivated in environmental forms. 
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Ancient Britons had to travel far (by their standards) to 
find and collect the stones for Stonehenge, the willingness 
to fight against nature evidently revealing a certain system 
of values (Fig. 15). In a similar sense, out of all locations 
in Greece, ancient Greeks chose Delphi, which they called the 
navel of the world, as the most sacred location for a shrine 
representing "a combination of the unconscious with an open - 
eyed intelligence (Mumford, 1979, pp. 170 -198) (Fig. 16). 
The choice of the particular site has allowed us to understand 
what their values were both in relation to the landscape and 
the human mind. (Scully, 1979, p. 4). In his book "House, 
Form and Culture ", Amos Rapoport presents a remarkable body 
of illustrations as a criticism to the afore -mentioned 
determinist views. (Rapoport, 1974, pp. 38 -72) A similar 
approach referring to topography, to the limitations that the 
Greek landscape presents, as well as to how the problem has 
been dealt with, is offered to us by Kyriakidou -Nestoros 
(1974, pp. 16 -24). 
It appears that although the natural environment poses several 
limitations to the producer of environment, it is mostly how 
these limitations are treated (and it seems that a certain poss- 
ibility of choice is often to be expected) in relation to the 
value invested in natural elements that allows social relations 
to be represented in environmental forms. Such social 
relations are referring to the value systems and priorities of 
the producers in view of the composite need for change and 
what actually objectivates them is the particular decision 





Stonehenge. Not only does 
the end design obey cosmic 
rules, but also, for some 
reason, the site had to be 
the chosen one while the 





The temple of Athena at Delphi. 
the two mountains in the picture 
The valley emerging between 
provides a breathtaking view. 
FIGURE 16 
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timber house may be a natural consequence of the abundance 
of timber in the land. Yet, since timber is of a certain 
high value in the world market, such a house would also be 
a consequence of (and, hence, reflect) the land's economy 
and the countries' social and economic priorities both 
today and in the past (Fig. 17). 
Similarly, the peaceful and continuous natural phenomenon 
of the ageing and deterioration of buildings with time (a 
facet of the natural aspect of the external factor which is 
often ignored) means different things and, accordingly, is 
treated differently in different social contexts (Fig. 18). 
Old buildings, artefacts or settlements do not merely 
represent the obvious fact of their age. Instead, they are 
particularly dense in their objectivatìng of social 
relations since these social relations comprise those of 
the societies* that build them, those of the attitudes of 
other societies that used them and those of today's society 
(either as a whole or at an individual level) either as a 
whole or at an individual level) which has chosen either 
to respect or to ignore them. 
A similar degree of choice appears to exist when dealing 
with the availability of technology, although a recurrent 
themein modern architectural theory has been treating 
technology, as being a determining factor in the production 
* Even so, as the level of knowledge and available technology 
is a function of the particular society, and consequently, 
an expression of social relations (more direct than value 
invested on natural elements), this product inevitably 
portrays social relations in the form of a deep trace left 
on it by the particular stage society was at at the time. 
61. 
The abundance of timber in Scandinavia and its socio- economic 




of forms. Admittedly, artefacts, which because of their 
nature had to be based on the maximum exploitation of the 
existing level of knowledge, were determined to a significant 
degree of technology. A 15th century map, for example, can 
not be very accurate due to the inefficiency of geographical 
instruments at the time and in spite of the designer's and 
the researchers' efforts (Fig. 19). 
In cases where accuracy or specificity is not that critical 
however, the doer may choose the technical means he wants to 
arrive at the end product he wishes (Rapoport, 1974, p. 46). 
Although the ancient Greeks were aware of dome structures, 
for example, they reserved it for tombs (Orlandos, 1960, 
p. 393) (Fig. 20). This choice, apart from representing 
certain social relations referring to this distinction, 
allowed a certain vocabulary of codes to be formed in respect 
to the technology and shapes employed. Thus, when they 
wished to give rise to emotive experiences of the environment 
which would appeal directly to the unconscious they chose the 
dome which was reserved for places where the difference between 
the living and the dead would be accentuated. A similar 
observation may be said for differences in the employment of 
the circle, the square or other shapes when dealing with 
churches, civic or other buildings. (Eco, 1980, p. 26; 
Zevi, 1957, pp. 187, 193). 
As the methodological line of approach in this section gradually 
shifts from the natural aspects of the external factor to the 
social one, it may be observed that an increasingly wide body 
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The way an ageing building is treated is a function of the users' 
characteristics. The illustrations on top are taken from the 
commercial centres of York (left) and Athens (right). In the 
first case, the users tried to make the most of the building by 
preserving its image while the owners of the Athenian neoclassical 
building found the absence of strict conservation laws handy and 
allowed it to decay. The entrace of the National Technical 
University of Athens, below, is covered in political posters the 
years following the fall of the military dictatorship in Greece; 
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FIGURE 20 Plan and sections of the tomb of Agamemnon (the 
Treasury of Athens) at Mycenae. 
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The way people behave 
as regards the tremend- 
ous technological 
achievements of our age 
has changed the image ' 
of cities considerably 
FIGURE 21 
of social relations is allowed to become represented on the 
end product. This is to be expected since the external 
factor (whether level of knowledge, or legislation of else) 
because of its nature contains social relations of the 
overall social framework. 
To take a look at the development and use of technology in 
life, one may argue that socio- economical trends in our 
societies, together with changes in the psychology of modern 
man that resulted from them, have led to and sustain the 
development of telecommunication and are expressed through 
it in a variety of forms in the environment (Fig. 21). 
Such changes in the environment are typical of the twentieth 
century and range from the prominent positioning of the TV 
set in modern living rooms to the dispersal of large scale 
activities, as current trends in population and land use 
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show. (Holliday, 1977). 
Legislation is another way through which the social context 
affects building form. Since they are issued to help society 
cope with problematic situations, building regulations can 
not help but express a certain philosophy of the social 
framework. This can be seen both in over -protected areas 
as well as in cases where state control is practically non- 
existent; the anarchic Manhattan skyline is the manisfest- 
ation of the omnipotence of free market forces. (Fig. 22). 
Naturally, legislation on building did not always have to 
be in the rigid written form that has been established today. 
In societies of the past, people had to follow certain unwritten 
codes, a product of agreement between villagers through 
experience over the ages. Rapoport refers to Indian rules 
in Spanish Latin America, which were concerned with narrow 
lanes to provide areas of shade, and to chinese codes in 
Peking as regards to the hierarchy of the colours used 
(Rapoport, 1974). In the island of Naxos, in Greece, a 
traditional code of building regulations set height limits 
to ensure access to the view, exposure to the winder sun and 
ventillation for all the houses. Furthermore, it established 
the practice of floor- ownership, allowing a person to own 
the ground floor while someone else owns the first floor and 
still a third party may own the terrace (Polychroniades, 1974). 
The degree of kinship and the feeling of belongingness that 
existed in a certain community at a certain time are social 
relations which managed to register in built form through such 
common codes which builders agreed to follow (Fig. 23). 
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The image of Manhattan skyline in 
contrast to Nash's Park Crescent (.top). 
FIGURE 22 
68. 
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Another facet of the external factor which poses limitations 
to the doer is that of the economics of change. As noted 
above, Alexander considered it to be highly significant in 
the definition of the composite need (See 1.1.1). It is 
no wonder that amongst the most fundamental social relations 
objectivated by the modern international style architecture 
is the struggle to achieve maximum efficiency at minimum 
costs. Again, the doer's decision (within the framework 
that the client, if any, allows) to go for a more expensive 
form to achieve something particular, whether this is status 
or the satisfaction of as many human needs as possible or 
else, will let more social relations of the doers' and users' 
"physiognomy" and the particular situation mark the end 
product (Fig. 24). 
Furthermore, there appears to be little doubt that culture 
may be included in the external factor, although several 
writers have explicitly expressed different views (as f.i. 
Kubler, 1962, p. 9, who denounced the importance of analyz- 
ing culture when dealing with the history of architecture). 
The prominent anthropologist Ruth Benedict maintained that 
in different cultures the emphasis may be put in different 
aspects of life, as for instance, economics, religion, sexual 
relations, maturity and so on (Benedict, 1952, pp. 15 -32). 
The difference in religious attitudes between our society 
and medieval society is objectivated in the prominent position 
of the church in a typical town of the latter period. (Fig. 25). 
But even within contemporary society, if one takes a closer 
look at social relations as these are represented in spatial 
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FIGURE 24 In an attempt to avoid building a drab housing estate, like 
the one pictured on top, Erskine employed his ingenuity 
along with a mixture of mainly cheap materials and the 
consultation of the community of Byker, Newcastle (bottom). 
The result portrays characteristics of both the designer, as 
he struggled for a good design in view of a limited budget, 
and the users in as much as they participated in the design 
by explaining their individual needs. 
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The fact that il Duomo dominates the skyline of Florence is 
consistent, on the one hand with the importance of religion 
at the time the city took shape and, on the other hand with 
the society's present respect for the country's cultural 
and architectural heritage. This latter factor, which may 
perhaps have something to do with tourism, can seldom be 
seen in modern western environments. 
FIGURE 25 
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form, one may identify numerous discrepancies (see 1.2.2 
and Hall, 1961, 1966). An interesting study of the American 
bathroom as reflecting the particular society's conceptions 
of the body, comfort, and privacy has been presented by 
Kira (1966, p. 7). The way in which the particular doer may 
react to the socio- cultural aspect of the external factor 
will be reserved for discussion in the following section. 
Finally, it would be an important ommïssion to ignore the 
effect of the particular conjuncture on the end product. 
The element of time may act on the production of environment 
in a number of ways. The continuous deterioration and ageing 
of built form, and man's reaction to this, has already been 
discussed. In the present context however, the temporal 
aspect of the external factor is seen as a combination of 
circumstances, in the form of sychromìcity of events, which 
occur either before or at the time of production of environment. 
Features on environmental objects may be marked by events as 
varied as somebody's accidental death which left the object 
unfinished or a change in the ideology trends of a particular 
society seen as a whole (Fig. 26). For this reason, the 
temporal aspect of the external factor may be seen as operating 
as a channel for the objectivation of social relations in a 
number of ways. When one looks at the whole body of social 
relations in a particular society at a given time and the 
influence it may have on production of environment, then one 
is actually considering the influence of the "Zeitgeist ", or 
the "spirit of time" (see p. 6). There is still a debate 
among historians as to whether Zeitgeist determines architectural 
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Reflecting changes in society, 
and its standards and values, 
the painter is characterised 
by different attitudes in the 
way he regards, on the one 
hand,natural landscapes, as a 
point of departure for art- 
istic creation, and on the 
other hand, his relation to 
the artefact he produced. 
In the painting on top, he 
tries to capture nature within 
a measured orderly framework 
( "Landscape with t he Burial of 
Phocion ", by Poussin, 1648); 
in the one in the middle, he 
tries to represent nature's 
vitality without loosing 
control of its underlying 
structure ( "Lac d'Annecy ", 
by Cezanne, 1896); finally, 
he uses nature as a source of 
plastic forms that can be 
liberally transformed to fit 
into his vision of the 
universe ( "Nudes in the Forest 




production and many writers have adopted a deterministic 
viewpoint (as f.i. Pevsner, 1979, p. 17). 
It lies beyond any doubt that the trace left on the end 
product by the particular conjuncture (whether this is 
"the spirit of time" as a whole, or seen in some aspects of 
it, or a mere sequence of events) may lie beyond the doer's 
reach; at least, to some notable extent. One may expect 
this to vary, however, depending on the nature of the con- 
juncture. In any case, it lies beyond the scope of the 
present study to adopt a stance as regards the question of 
the influence Zeitgeist may have on the production of 
environment. In the present context, the interest lies in 
examining the functional relationships between social 
relations and form as such rather than coming into conclusions 
about the type of this influence in a generic sense (see also 
1.2.4). 
When one looks back at history, the effect that the particular 
conjuncture may have had on the production of environment 
often tends to be taken for granted. Environmental change 
may be largely influenced by established models and prototypes 
(Rapoport, 1974; Broadbent, 1973, and, especially "iconic" 
design, p. 418; see also 1.1.4 for the idea of functional 
fixation). And although everybody would be in agreement as 
regards this fact, the implications it contains are not always 
perceived. Such could be the question of why did a particular 
doer, seen in his socio- temporal context, choose this prototype 
and not the other, in view of the social relations that each of 
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them contained; and, carrying the arguement further, what 
options did exist at the time. 
The form of Edinburgh New Town in its entirety, for example, 
was not a mere result of the fact that the aristocracy and 
the prosperous professional classes wished to improve their 
living conditions, but it was also influenced by the 
particular conjuncture and the attitudes of the time from 
those responsible for design. 
Firstly, there was the appreciation, from the part of the 
social groups interested in the remaking of Edinburgh, of 
developments in contemporary France and England. French 
influence led to Craig's inspiration from the development 
of Nancy which was accomplished in the years between 1751 
and 1755 (Adams, 1978, p. 76). It registered on the envir- 
onment in the form of th.e general layout of wide boulevard - 
like streets. As in French architecture of the time, the 
emphasis is put on the street and the elevations facing it 
and interior spaces are merely fitted in the overall plan 
(fig. 27). Furthermore, apart from the ideological 
influence which. England expressed on the Scottish upper 
middle class, their link with the English was tightened by 
the events following the 1745 Rebellion. The reflexion of 
this bond is to be seen not only in street names (Rose 
Street, George Street, etc.) but also in the kind of living 
that the New Town was asked to promote and which, as Smout 
puts it, was like London (Smout, 1969, p. 348). 
To recapitulate, it has been examined how th.e external factor 
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The drawing above left depicts Fleshmarket Close, in Edinburgh Old Town 
before the expansion. Living conditions were similar to those in a 
number of residental quarters in Paris. An exaggeration of the solution 
adopted for the French capital is given in the drawing above right. 
Although, in the case of Edinburgh, the problem was treated through 
expansion and not renewal, the design of the New Town was influenced by 
the French in many ways. 
FIGURE 27 
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in the production of man -made environment influences the end 
product. It appears that every aspect of this factor poses 
its own limitations to the "doer ". Natural aspects of the 
external factor do not contain social relations, only in as 
much as society has embedded them, whereas social aspects 
do so by definition. The composite need for change, which 
refers to the requirements set by the users, can be regarded 
as belonging to the social aspect of the external factor, 
if one's attention is focused on the "doer ". Technology 
may be considered to lie in between since it functions as 
the natural aspect of the external factor would, while it 
is typically a social product reflecting the level of 
knowledge of the particular society. 
The result of this discrepancy between the two aspects is 
that the social aspect is more susceptible to becoming a 
channel through which social relations will be objectivated. 
Such social relations typically stem from society, either seen 
as a whole, or as the micro- society of a certain group of 
people (class, sub -culture, neighbourhood and so on). One 
may postulate that since behind all such social relations 
mankind, as a whole, is to be found (either in a diachronic 
or in a synchronic sense), it appears reasonable to argue that 
the social aspect of the external factor, seen in a holistic 
sense, objectivates this mere fact; namely, that there exists 
a world of man, in all its norms, rules and complexities. 
The natural aspect of the external factor is more rigid. It 
appears that there has to be the "doer's" choice over the 
limitations he faces so that social relations of his values, 
78. 
and his construction of the world in general, in relation to 
the composite need may become represented on the end product. 
In the case of the social aspect, this element of choice, 
although always there and fundamentally important, is in a 
sense diffused in the plurality of social relations which are 
to be found in the limiting factor itself. Still, in a 
holistic sense, the natural aspect represents the natural 
environment; in this case, the raw materials, to which man 
adapts himself. And these can not do else but be, in some 
respect, limited whatever the scale of the production of 
environment. 
Lastly, let us consider the features to which social relations 
channeled through the external factor may correspond to. If 
to for has been 
held responsible for generating and setting the standards of 
the shaping of environmental forms), it is clear that the 
external factor operates at another level which allows it to 
influence any of the physical features in the form. It is 
possible that spatial forms corresponding to the same need 
for change may appear extremely different, if compared to 
one another, due to the effect of the external factor. In 
this sense, it is not surprising that all the deterministic 
views, as regards the influence of the various aspects of the 
external factor on environmental form, have been formulated. 
Since the composite need generates forms however, it would not 
seem unreasonable to suggest that it is this need which must 
be expected to be satisfied first - i.e. not necessarily temp- 
orarily, but as a matter of importance. It has been shown 
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hat, while this satisfaction appears like a prerequisite to 
the production of environment, there will generally be enough 
room left for social relations to pass through the external 
factor and mould the end product to some considerable extent 
and in whatever component of it they are direct to. 
1.2.4 The Internal Factor in the Representation of 
Social Relations on Environmental Forms 
To conclude the examination of the channels through which 
social relations become represented on environmental forms 
one must consider the influence of the internal factor, Cin 
other Rords what is channeled tLrough the "doer", or "doers". 
Apparently, this includes all those who shape environmental 
forms, whether they design environment at a certain initial 
stage of its production, or whether they actually construct 
it. In the present context however, what matters is the 
person, or persons, who are in control of the form of the 
end product, at least in its basic and most important 
dimensions. For this reason, the representation of social 
relations will have to be seen as being channeled through 
the designers of environment rather than the executers of 
instructions in drawings - without this meaning that the 
latter may not be important in particular cases since they 
may also add a certain body of social relations in the end 
product. 
Several aspects of the influence the "doer" may have on the 
end product have already been mentioned in the preceeding 
sections. It has been shown for example, that certain 
social relations involved in the shaping of man -made 
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environment may lie beyond the "doer's" reach. The "doer ", 
then, can not do else than allow these social relations to 
become represented in the forms he designs. Such is 
usually the case for the users' or clients' requirements, 
building regulations and so on. 
It has also been noted that, in many cases, there may be a 
varying number of choices allowed by the external factor. 
In these cases, a decision is usually taken in two stages. 
Firstly, the designer brings the possibilities open to him 
in relation to requirements and limitations presented by 
other elements of the external factor. After eliminating 
some possibilities in this manner, he finally makes his 
decision as to the design on the basis of the remaining ones. 
While the solution will carry representations of social 
relations of the composite need for change and the external 
factor as it has been previously discussed, the element of 
choice requires further attention since it clearly involves 
aspects of the internal factor. 
Up to this point, the "doer" has basically been regarded 
as the "bottleneck" through which social relations external 
to him, pass, so that they result in differentiations in 
concrete form. To acquire a picture of the social relations 
which may be objectivated by the internal factor, a different 
viewpoint is needed: elements from the "doer" seen as a 
person in his own right are to be taken into account. 
Any person in society will typically be based on his prior 
experience and motivation in life when he considers a problem 
he faces. Designers of environment who consider design 
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problems can not form an exception to this rule. For this 
reason, not only knowledge over the conditions of the problem 
and the ways through which solution is achieved are expected 
to vary between different designers, but this also applies 
to their attitudes, interests and intentions as regards the 
problematic situation. In a sense, it can be argued that, 
at least in theory, there will always be a certain personal 
dimension in the way any "doer" approaches and tackles a 
design problem. Saussure's distinction between "language" 
and "speech" (Barthes, 1967, pp. 13 -22) can be regarded as 
being based on the uniqueness of different individual 
approaches. 
This forumulation, however, does not necessarily mean that 
the social relations which sustain this uniqueness will 
always be objectivated as distinct features in concrete form. 
Functional fixation as well as similarities in the psychol- 
ogical characteristics of different "doers" may partly be 
accounted for this. Yet, it appears that there will always 
be a potentiality for differentiation in form as a result 
of discrepancies in individual approaches. 
The aim of this section is to trace the relationships between 
social relations of the internal factor and features on the end 
product. As noted above, these social relations have to do 
with the "doer's" prior experience of the world and his 
overall motivation in life and they become particularly 




In many cases, designers have given explanations as regards 
their intentions in a particular project. Bernini said that 
when he designed the Piazza of St. Peter in Rome, he aimed 
at conveying the image of the mother -like Church embracing 
Catholics who are united in their faith (Norberg -Schulz, 
1980, p. 150). His design objectivated his deep religious 
feelings as well as his conception of the role of the mother 
in relation to that of religion (Fig. 28). 
The relationship between the internal factor and the end 
product, however, can not always be easily traced since this 
search typically involves an analysis of internal processes 
which may be unknown even to the designer himself. From 
what has been discussed in the preceeding sections, it seems 
that social relations, which the designer allows to become 
represented in his designs, may be notably numerous (if they 
could ever my measured). Furthermore, as we will later see, 
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they may even entail a strong possibility for discrepancies 
in interpretation from those who will perceive the end 
product. It is reasonable, then, to argue that, in 
choosing among all the possible solutions to a particular 
design problem, a designer can not generally be expected to 
consider the fuller dimensions of the content of all 
alternatives. Even if he consciously did so, it may be 
expected that some of the reasons which led him to his 
decision, as regards the final design, will still remain 
obscure (Lawson, 1980). 
It follows that, because of the nature of the problem, the 
examination of the representation of social relations on man- 
made environment through the internal factor will often have 
to be suggestive in character. Whether they lead to a 
decision over a number of alternatives or influence the "doer's" 
expressive behaviour, internal processes may involve complex 
interdependencies of many social relations. These processes 
may be so obscure that, in some cases, what is merely 
identified as the "doer's" personal input in a particular 
design, may be his identity as a whole. 
In any case, a complete investigation of the social relations 
which become represented on forms by the internal factor 
appears to be impossible to be conducted. Moreover, as this 
study is concerned with identifying potential information in 
man -made environment, untraceable relations between designer 
and form lie beyond its scope. Yet, the fact that the 
emphasis in the present context is concentrated on the richness 
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of the environment's potential informational content appears 
to ask for an attempt to review aspects of the "doer's" 
input which tended to be taken for granted. 
Bearing in mind the limitations involved, let us now proceed 
with the examination of the representation of social relations 
of the internal factor on man -made environment. In view of 
what has been discussed so far, the act of producing environ- 
ment can be divided in two fairly distinct stages, as far as 
the "doer" who is in control of the production is concerned. 
The first stage comprises the interpretation of the problem- 
atic situation and the definition of the composite need for 
change (analysis) and the second is the process of designing 
the environment form (synthesis). 
The Interpretation of the Situation and the 
Definition of the Composite Need. 
Up to a certain degree, what needs to be done in a situation 
is dictated by the situation itself. It is only beyond this 
degree thatthe individual "doer's" experience and motivation 
start to interfere. But even within this limited range of 
their possible interference, the discrepancies between the 
interpretations of a given situation by different people 
can be tremendous. An illustration of what can result from 
a misunderstanding originating from the disagreement between 
the doer's prior experience and the particular situation has 
happened in a new housing estate for the rural population in 
the south of Italy. The toilet bowl (Fig. 29) was being 
used as a cleaning tank for grapes; the peasants suspended 
a net inside the bowl and then flushed water at the grapes 
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until they were clean (Eco, 1980; Jencks, 1980). The fact 
that the "doer" was unaware, or ignored the peasant's under- 
standing of the world, as well as the fact that the peasants 
showed notable plasticity of cognitive schemata by converting 
the unknown object in their bathroom into something useful, 
were objectivated by the end product (toilet bowl and net). 
It appears that the definition of the composite need involves 
more than subjective value judgement, as it has been argued 
(Lawson, 1980, p. 90). Whatever the degree of necessity 
in the particular situation, its interpretation has to 
undergo (both consciously and unconsciously) the "doer's" 
prior experience and motivation. Hillier's idea of "pre - 
structuring" the problem can be seen as being involved in 
this (Hillier et al, 1972). No action is to be taken before 
the function of the definition of the composite need is 
completed to a satisfactory degree, in so far as the "doer" is 
concerned. 
In the main village of the island of Kea, in Greece, the 
steeply rising major street curves into a well -kept square, 
with a statue in its centre, one side of it offering a very 
good view of the village which spreads over the hillside 
(Fig. 30). The whole image gives rise to the thought that 
two or three houses were knocked down, by a recent decision, 
to form this space. Despite the spectacular view, the square 
is left empty of people who do not even use the chairs of the 
nearby cafe. Instead, they congregate around the corner of the 
approach street where some steps lead to the other side of the 
village. Some sit on top of the steps and some on chairs facing 
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FIGURE 29 
Kea, Greece. The square Cabove left), the view from it Cbe'ow) and 
villagers sitting on the steps opposite to the cafe (above right). 
FIGURE 30 
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the street. They are not interested in the view offered from 
the veranda of the cafe on the square but in observing movement 
and activity and socializing with passers -by. The way the 
beautiful, but unnatural in this context, open space is used 
reflects the misinterpretation of the need for change by who- 
ever decided to build the square - presumably a higher 
administrative official with little contact with the village. 
In Chandigarh, and especially the commercial and housing 
quarters, this was made very evident (Hall, 1966, p. 101). 
Brolin provides an interesting description of how the designers' 
conception of the composite need would not suit the demands 
of the real situation (Brolin, 1976, pp. 88 -103) (Fig. 31). 
Apart from the obvious social relations, what was further 
represented in the end product was the implicit insistence 
from the designers' part that their culture was to an extent 
"better" than the one they were designing for. In addition 
to this, comes the fact that such misconceptions may occur of 
the scale of this project which obviously involves a lot of 
responsibility. Maslow has suggested that coping behaviour 
(that is: purposive behaviour) is generally conscious (Maslow, 
1970, p. 132). Bearing in mind that the designers were 
probably educated according to the functionalist principles 
(design methods as such were introduced later), it must be 
very difficult to suppose that they were unaware of the 
functional implications of their end products - especially so, 
from the layman's point of view. 
One does not have to go very far though. The way people dress, 
the way they decorate their living -rooms or their front gardens 
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A number of the users' needs were misinterpreted by the designers of 
Chandigarh. The lack of provision for a place for the family shrine 
forced the Indian family to use the closet Cleft). In the same sense, 
windows, such as these at right, are sometimes papered over to assure 
privacy in the house. 
FIGURE 31 
The house on the right employs elements which are taken from middle -class 
houses(elaborate front door in metal, French shutters for the windows, 
orthogonal overall design in smooth finishing) and, by doing so, it attains 
an authoritative image that does not easily blend with the street, and the 
district in general. Most of the houses in the district are like the 
adjacent one on the left of the picture. 
FIGURE 32 
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is, among other things, a function of how they interpret their 
own needs. Many houses in Athens, for example, contain living - 
rooms which are decorated to the last detail and are practically 
never used; especially as they were supposed to, i.e. as a 
sitting room for the family. The occupants feel as though they were 
sociable families and consequently they try to have the room 
ready for the occasion which, in reality, seldom comes. The 
room then is not actually to be "used" as a proper living -room, 
but to be consumed as a symbol. In as much as it concret- 
izes a certain kind of status, its mental consumption 
revitalizes this notion in the occupants' minds. 
Similarly, in squatter- settlements in the outskirts of Athens 
and Salonika, it is common practice to decorate the external 
appearances of the houses using as many and as varied techniques 
as possible. Research has shown that squatters loath. their 
neighbourhood and they tend not to identify with it basically 
because of its social position as regards to the rest of the 
city. It is not surprising that the architectural elements 
most widely used belong to the vocabulary of a typical middle - 
class suburbian house (Malaspinas, 1981, see also Duncan and 
Duncan, 1976, for a similar study in Hyderabad) (Fig. 32). 
Whether "doer" and "user" coincide or not, the "doer's" 
past experience and motivation and their influence over the 
representation of social relations on environmental objects 
throws the additional light needed to complete the picture 
of "social relations and the composite need "(1.2.2.) 
As it can be seen in the above illustrations, in cases of 
non -institutionalized production of environment, in which "user" 
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and "doer" coincide, the end product may give a fairly 
accurate idea of the person's needs and social and psychol- 
ogical characteristics. 
As the designer approaches the problematic situation, his 
attitude towards it, in relation to his overall motivation, 
may be regarded as entailing the potential to widen the 
composite need for change which originally referred to the 
users. The "doer's" personal needs may mix with the 
composite need so that the end product is required to 
function at an additional level. In this sense, when a 
designer is to build a house, it may be essential for him 
that the design of the end product enhances his reputation 
as an architect. And, although this need does not 
necessarily always result in drastic changes in the features 
of the final form, in some cases, it may indeed do so. 
When a designer sees himself as being part of a particular 
movement or as criticizing certain trends in design, then 
the need to come to a definite statement may appear as 
important as the original composite need for change. Many 
architects, such as le Corbusier or Venturi (Fig. 33), 
clearly saw their work as functioning at this level (le 
Corbusier, 1947; Venturi, 1977). This observation however 
is not meant to be an underestimation of the role of design 
artefacts in enriching and changing the language of 
architecture, but is merely pointing at the fact that there 
may be additional needs which the end product may have to 
satisfy and these stem from the "doer ". 
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In many projects, such as "the City of Towers" by le Corbusier (above) 
and the House for the Elderly in Philadephia by Venturi and Rauch 
(below), there has been a particular intension, from the designers' 
part, to objectivate their views on the theory of design. Later, 




In the process of identifying the composite need for change, 
the "doer" is obliged to go into the conscious examination 
of what needs to be done. As it can be seen from the 
illustrations listed above, the extent to which this may 
happen varies but it is certain that a considerable degree of 
awareness over the problematic situation is necessary. In 
several occasions designers have tried to be particularly 
perceptive in relation to the needs they should satisfy. To 
a certain extent, Erskine's attitude in Byker may serve as 
an illustration of this point (Fig. 34). The growing body 
of research currently being conducted in social and 
environmental disciplines with reference to design can be 
regarded as aiming to provide the background knowledge needed 
to ensure a more accurate identification of the user's needs. 
The Actual Production of Environmental Objects 
An environmental object is never created magically just at 
the time that somebody has identified a need for its existence. 
Although the definition of a problem is very important, the 
actual implementation of its solution (both in space and on 
paper, if needed) is of equal importance. 
We have seen that, as the time passes and the "doer" con- 
centrators further on the problematic situation, he discovers 
an increasing number of tangential "by- needs ". At this 
stage, while he is making up his mind upon considering their 
relative significance, an image of what the end form may be 
starts to loom up in his mind (Hillier et al, 1972) (Fig. 34). 
Such an image usually starts from specific yet random elements 
and ends up as a whole. These two generally go together and 
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demand a compromise *. At this point, he starts disentangling 
himself from the dominant problem of analyzing the composite 
need and enters the field of synthesis which conceals new 
qualities. Evidently, analysis and synthesis do not generally 
carry a temporal gap between them. However, we can consider 
them as two fairly distinct functions which are in a complex 
way complementary to each other; the main bulk of the first 
(i.e. analysis) preceeds the second whole. 
Einstein Tower in Potsdam, built in 1920 -21 by Eric 
Mendelsohn (now destroyed' and an original drawing 
by the designer revealing his somehow sculptural 
approach. 
FIGURE 34 
* As noted before, this generally tends to follow certain 
existing models or prototypes or ways of compromise and 
so on. Citroen designers however, claim that they 
design in a "tabula rasa" state of mind (Schmittel, 1975, 
p. 61). What they mean is, that they attempt to do so 
basically in as much as models or protogypes of car 
designs are concerned (see Barthes, 1981, pp. 88 -91, for 
an appraisal of their design). 
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It is in the process of synthesis that expressions of the 
user's personality are allowed to come to the surface. 
The reason is that, at this stage of the production of an 
environmental object, the centre of gravity of this process 
is shifted from "need arisen and the overall objective 
situation" to "individual who expresses himself ". To a 
notable extent, this behaviour may be an unconscious 
function (Maslow, 1970; see also Coffman, 1969). As Jung 
has argued, creative processes involve the unconscious 
activation of archetypal images and their integration in 
the design (Arndt, 1974, p. 271). 
From this point until the form is finally produced, the centre 
of creation will basically be the "doer" himself. As noted 
before, the way he will treat the composite need for change 
and the limitations of the external factor, as well as the 
way he will choose between alternative solutions to "by- needs ", 
will be a function and, hence, reflect personal characteristics. 
In this sense, social relations from the composite need and 
external factor may always entail the possibility of being 
intentionally or unintentionally paired with social relations 
reflecting the designer's "comments' on them (Fig. 35). 
The question that arises at this point is: to what extent 
does this input, which up to now we have regarded as personal, 
stem from the "doer" himself, and to what extend does it 
reflect knowledge, beliefs or values of a broader social 
group, perhaps society in general. If the relationship 
between the individual and society is to be taken as a two - 
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between its two elements (as, for instance, argued by Fromm, 
1955), then the "doer's" expression can be seen as being of 
two kinds: they may either originate from social relations 
in the broader social framework as these have been experienced, 
"digested ", and sustained by the "doer ", or alternatively, 
they may be his own very personal, individual and, perhaps, 
idiosyncratic reflections, thoughts or evaluations on the 
subject. Poulantzas's concept of "people being carriers of 
ideologies" (Poulantzas, 1973) may serve to illuminate the 
first leg of the above distinction. These shared ideologies 
may range from beliefs and values limited to a small group 
like a family to the Zeitgeist seen as a whole or in some 
aspects of it referring to certain issues. In this sense, 
social relations from a broader social framework do not only 
become represented on environmental forms through the 
channels of the external factor but also through the "doer" 
himself. 
Since the "doer's" personal comments are themselves bound to 
reflect certain ideologies it appears that the boundaries 
between societal and purely personal input are not clearly set. 
In a strict sense, the latter is limited to the way the 
totality of the "doer's" attitudes, beliefs or comments are 
expressed in the particular way the physical characteristics 
of the end product are organized. Therefore, apart from 
examining how particular social relations, channelled through 
the internal factor, become represented on environmental 
forms, the above distinction can be helpful in a different 
sense: it elucidates how the designer's personal input (when 
97. 
taken as a whole as described above) is linked to the 
evolution of systems of expression. 
Styles both in technique and in principle of design, 
although they originate from several people simply following 
the same principles (which at the time might have been rep- 
resentations of the very personal element of the internal 
factor), have the general tendency to become almost 
institutionalized standards (See 1.2.2 for Models or 
Prototypes). People may consciously or unconsciously follow 
them until the time comes when their connection with the 
social framework looses its grip, generally due to the 
evolution of the latter. At this stage they slowly start 
disintegrating, not being able to express the new situation 
adequately. In parallel to this, and depending on the 
broader socio- economical conditions, other individuals may 
manage, by stretching the personal element to its limits, 
to disentangle themselves from these established standards 
and set the pace for new ones. The history of the use of 
codes in architectural design, can be regarded as evolving 
in a similar fashion (Bonta, 1979; de Ventos, 1980, p. 181) 
(Fig. 36). 
The same can be seen as applying not only the systems of 
expression such as painting, fashion or architecture but 
also in the case of systems of thought which are not 
directly objectivated (f.ì. philosophy, political or 
economical theory etc; see, for example, Kuhn, 1970, for 
the role of "paradigms" in the evolution of scientific 
thought). 
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Casa Mila, by Gaudi, 
Barcelona 1905 -10. 
Middle: Steiner House by 
Loos, Vienna, 1910. 
Bottom: Villa Savoye, by 
le Corbusier, Poissy, 
1928 -31. 
When, at the turn of the 
century, a new conception 
of architecture was 
needed in Europe, the 
personal input of Art 
Nouveau designers, such 
as Gaudi did not meet as 
many followers as that of 
innovators such as Loos 
and le Corbusier did. 
The abstraction, lack of 
ornament and emphasis on 
the "house- tool" concept 
propagated by functional- 
ists fitted well into the 
socio- economic require- 









This is not meant to be a statement of overestimation of 
the internal factor in the representation of social 
relations on environmental objects, since the individual 
will always operate within a given social framework and 
under the restrictions of a given situation and the 
requirements of a composite need. 
The distinction between societal and personal input during 
synthesis also gives a good explanation to several large - 
scale environmental changes. We said that the individual 
"doer ", in the process of synthecizing an environmental form, 
objectivates a certain set of social relations from the 
social framework (along with his criticism on it). The 
consequence of this is that, on a more general level, 
collective activity by carriers of similar ideologies may 
lead to a more depersonalized and, perhaps, clearer object - 
ivation of particular social relations on the level of 
sociology. 
An illustration to the above can be given by de Ventos's 
explanation of "the transformation of the objective -idealistic 
Hellenic style into the effectivist, illustionist Roman style 
of architecture ". In "Rome ", he says, "the formal Greek 
repertory is used but its syntactical organization varies. 
Its elements are no longer used for their objective value, 
but for the effect they are able to create in the observer. 
They think now in terms of the consumption of the monuments: 
monuments that are able to be perceived from a great distance. 
And the reason is obvious. Roman buildings and banners have 
to speak now, not only to a polis of cives who share its code, 
but to the barbarians in Gallia or in Hispania who are 
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controlled by the lus gentium, who are entertained by the 
spectacles and who are impressed by the imperial 'image'. 
Its style has to be, then, more clearly decodable, more 
effectivìst and more symbolic. Since its message must 
travel very far away, classical forms are transformed into 
Roman symbols. The quantity - distance in this case - 
makes the quality." (de Ventos, 1980, pp. 186 -7, his emphasis) 
(Fig. 37). 
It is unlikely that anyone will maintain that this trans- 
formation of classical forms into Roman symbols was a 
consequence of an "act of will" at a given time. Instead, 
it is more probably that designers or decision- makers, or 
both, felt the changing social framework ( the increasing 
power of Rome) gradually. In this process, consciously 
or unconsciously, they made the context's requirements 
possible by producing more decodable and more symbolic 
forms *. Consequently, designers and decision -makers in 
Rome succeeded in objectìvating basic social relations in 
the existing social framework (the consumption of images, 
the magnitude of the empire, education of the peoples it 
contained etc). It appears reasonable to suggest that 
this objectivation was made possible by the fact that they 
had "digested" the philosophy of what it means to be a 
member of an empire, this fact being objectivated as well. 
* It is interesting to note how this particular analogy is 
reflected in other systems of expression of the Roman 
culture. It has been noted, for example, that Seneca's 
tragedies, which were adapted from the Greek, showed, 





In his book "Gothic Architecture and Scholasticism ", Erwin 
Panofsky offers a fascinating, if not convincing, explanation 
for the solution of a problem posed to the architects of 
High Gothic Cathedrals (Panofski, 1957, p. 674). In 
incorporating the rose window in the western fassade of the 
cathedral, the designers appeared to have to choose between 
two distinct possibilities of a solution: they could either 
inscribe it in a square, or they would have consistency in 
the horizontal and vertical lines in the fassade. The 
dimensions of the rose window in relation to the central 
vault did not allow them to have both. "They were faced 
with two apparently contradictory motifs, both of them 
sanctioned by authority, one could not simply be rejected 
in favour of the other ". 
But as Panofsky explains, they were heavily influenced by 
scholastic argumentation at the base of which lies the 
doctrine of reconciling the seemingly irreconcilable. It 
appeared that things had to be worked through to the limit 
and to be reconciled in the end. And, after a series of 
attempts (in the construction of the cathedrals of St. Denis, 
Notre -Dame de Paris, Mantes, Laon and Amiens) they finally 
arrived at the solution needed in 1240 -1250 in the 
cathedral of Reims. "The rose was inscribed within a 
pointed arch of a huge window, thereby becoming elastic as 
it were" (Fig. 38). 
Panofsky does not state whether the architects of these 
cathedrals were consciously seeking to apply the philosophical 
doctrine in their work or whether they were that much influenced 
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The Cathedrals of Laon (1160 -1225), Notre -Dame de Paris 
(1163 -1250) and Reims (1211 -1290). In the first two, 
the dimensions of the rose window caused certain 
asymetries in the west fassade, especially in regard to 
its horizontal lines. The problem was solved in the 
third case, the Reims Cathedral, which is considered to 
be one of the finest examples of Gothic Architecture. 
FIGURE 38 
by scholasticism that it had penetrated in their unconscious 
way of approaching problems. In any case, if his explanation 
reflects what really ahppened, then the dominance of the 
particular philosophy in people's minds was objectivated in 
concrete form by the particular solution and the preceeding 
quest for it. Furthermore, the successive different 
solutions given to the problem were the designers' personal 
input and reflected their particular attitude in respect 
to this aspect of the composite need and the existing ideology. 
A third illustration shows people sharing common basic 
ideologies which are replaced by different ones, when changes 
in the social framework occur. It concerns Aegean island 
settlements. When these were first built in the form that we 
roughly see them today (14th, 15th century AD) their settlers' 
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occupations were fishing, small trade, and very little 
agriculture. The islands' limited resources along with the 
common fear against adversity (pirates, drought etc.) pro- 
duced a remarkable unity among the settlers which was 
reinforced by the fact that there were very limited 
possibilities for somebody to become rich. This unity 
shared by everybody represented itself on environmental form 
in such a way that, although no house is prominent, no two 
of them are alike. As noted above, most villages, apart 
from a few exceptions, did not even need building regulations. 
Shared feelings about fellow -villagers also resulted in a 
very interesting elaboration of semi -public and semi- 
private spaces, as well as the formation of the town square 
as a place of gathering rather than any form of imposing - 
symbolic nature (Figs. 23, 39). 
Later developments allowed some villagers in a few islands 
to become successful traders. This fact, on the one hand, 
disrupted the socio- economic basis of the islands' unity 
while, on the other hand, inevitably resulted in changes in 
their built form. The merchants could no longer identify 
with their modest houses. They built bigger ones and, in 
most cases, they erected high walls along their courtyards 
and replaced their doors with heavier ones. The image of 
these islands has changed completely and this can be felt 
immediately when one approaches them (Sapounakis, 1978) 
(Fig. 40). 
But even when one contemplates environmental change conducted 




Private and public space in a 
typical village section. Streetscape 




Houses, like the prominent 
one in the small harbour of 
Hydra, 
belong to rich families. 
Apart from their impressive 
dim- 
ensions, they are characterized 
by their distinctive front 
doors and the fact that 
the piece of land they occupy 
is 
surrounded by a high wall. 
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considered to be a carrier of more than one ideology on 
different levels, and it is possible for some aspects of 
them to be in conflict. 
A house in Jeddah 
using both tradit- 
ional and modern 
ventillation systems. 
FIGURE 41 
A person may be conscious of such a conflict as he may be in 
a stage of reforming some of his values or theories. A 
result of this may be seen in various environmental changes 
in everyday life. In Saudi Arabia for example, the conflict 
between traditional and western ideology has led owners of 
old houses, which used to be ventillated by traditional 
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ingenious methods, to install air -conditioning units in 
addition to the existing systems (Fig. 41). 
A city as a whole can be said to contain a collision of 
various ideologies. As Peter Smith points out, "the urban 
system, in its pure phenomenology, epitomizes and magnifies 
human tensions and paradoxes" (Smith, 1974, p. 114 -5). The 
social environment with all its contradictions tends to be 
projected and objectivated in concrete form not only through 
the complexities of the composite need for change or the 
external factor in the production of environment, but also 
through the actions of individual "doers ". 
To conclude the examination of the internal factor in the 
production of environment, it is evident that all represent- 
ation of social relations on environmental forms is conducted 
by the "doer ", or "doers ", for the simple reason that they 
produce the forms. Yet, it is also evident that they are 
not in complete control of the situation since production of 
environment comes in response to the need for change and 
the particular requirements set by it and is liable to the 
limitations set by the external factor. As regards these 
constrains, the "doer" can do little else than allow the 
social relations discussed in the preceedìng sections to 
become represented on the end product. 
It has been shown, however, that there is an additional 
body of objectivated social relations which may be different 
from those of the composite need and the external factor, 
and which originate from the "doer" himself. When one 
sees the "doer" as a person in his own right, his behaviour 
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is based on his prior experience and overall motivation in 
life. It is in this context that he approaches each 
problematic situation. For this reason, it appears that 
there will always be a possibility of the end product to 
contain representations of his characteristics as a 
person and his intentions as regards the particular 
situation. 
The internal factor has been examined as influencing 
environmental forms in two stages of their production: 
the stage of the interpretation of the problematic situation 
and the definition of the need for change and the stage 
of the actual design and production of the form. The first 
process allows more social relations from the conscious part 
of the "doer's" mind to be represented on the end product, 
since the doer concentrates on the requirements of the problem. 
The second process is more closely related to expressive 
behaviour and may involve elements which are deeply rooted 
in his unconscious in the form of archetypal images. 
It is basically in the stage of synthesis that the "doer" 
can be regarded as "an individual who expresses himself ", 
although this may also apply to some extent to the analytical 
stage. his input on the forms he designs partly refers to 
shared social relations and partly to his own personal 
comments and expressions. For this reason, the "doer's" 
input can be seen as objectivating his personality (even 
if this is merely in the form of a certain "personal touch "), 
while, on the other hand, it can also constitute an 
additional channel for the representation of the broader 
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social framework. Although this is clearly a complex 
function, one may trace isolated social relations (shared 
by a certain group of people), along with the "doer's" 
intentional or unintentional comments, in the concrete forms 
of man -made environment. 
Finally no clear formulation can be made as regards the 
physical features that social relations, which are 
channeled through the internal factor may correspond to. 
As they originate from the "doer ", they do not necessarily 
relate to the need for change directly and hence, they 
may become objectivated in any part of the end product. 
1.2.5 Conclusion 
From all the illustrations which have been laid above and 
in relation to the methodological approach set in 1.2.1, it 
appears reasonable to come to the formulation that: social 
relations, which are somehow involved in the process of the 
shaping of man -made environment, channeled through the 
components of the composite need for change and /or the 
external and the internal factor as described above, may become 
represented on the end product in the shape of concrete 
features. This process, which has been used as an instrument 
in the form of a working hpyothesìs throughout this approach 
appears to provide an adequate explanation for the variety 
of forms in man -made environment. As not all differentation 
in form may be considered to correspond to potential 
information, this process appears to be giving an adequate 
account of the potential informational content of man -made 
110. 
environment as well. 
Checking the criteria set in 1.0, one may maintain that, 
when a certain appreciable amount of knowledge over the 
conditions of the production of a certain environmental 
form is provided, the approach outlined in 1.2.1 and 
followed in the subsequent sections may help in identifying 
a significant part of the amount and nature of the 
potential informational content. On the other hand the 
methodological model used seems to be flexible enough to be 
applied in different circumstances. The social -environment - 
built -environment relationship, which served as an indication 
for the definition of the methodological approach, can be 
said to be "re- proven" through analytical observation. The 
problem of attaining the whole picture of the potential 
informational content, as well as its hierarchical organiz- 
ation in respect to the need for change (whose analysis will 
also serve as a basis for a later part of this study) will 
be discussed in the following section and in relation to 
semiotics. The approach in the preceeding sections will also 
be appraised in a later part of this study in as much as 
the question of the importance of breaking down meaning into 
social relations is concerned. 
It would be an omission not to mention the limitations 
involved in the approach employed. Firstly, the approach 
appears to be leaving out of consideration several geometrical 
patterns of spatial organization, such as those described 
by Moholy -Nagy in "the Matrix of Man" (1968). Why does a 
certain settlement, or spatial form, develop in a linear 
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fashion, while the one next to it may be concentric? A 
formulation which could answer this question is that certain 
social relations, as for example the need for certain 
people to be housed, living together, living in an orderly 
way and so on, may only affect spatial form so that it is 
patterned. Whether, then, such patterns will be square 
or orthogonal may be accidental or based on the particular 
conjuncture. Another attempt to explain this would 
naturally involve the acceptance of certain innate qualities 
in the human mind so that variety in patterns may be 
attributed to Jung's archetypal symbolism (Jung, 1964). 
Apart from all else, it would, then, strongly signify the 
continuity of the human species. A third approach would 
be to acknowledge that geometrical shapes, such as a circle, 
a square, or a triangle, differ in qualities. For example, 
the centre of the circle lies the same distance apart from all 
the points in the perimeter and this does not happen in any 
other shape. In this respect, certain shapes may be 
expected to fit in different social relations differently 
(as, for example, in the case of the village plane of 
Omarakana). 
A second problem may arise from faint social relations and 
expecially when these are products of the unconscious. 
Evidently, there is very little that can be done with this. 
It appears however, that a number of social relations are 
bound to exist in such a state and one can not predict the 
way that it is expected of them to affect built form. 
Thirdly, the question of the every day production of 
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environment by "non- institutionalized" producers has 
been dealt with unsatisfactorily. It may be argued that 
what was discussed in relation to the primary functions and 
the existence of forms is more applicable to this case and 
especially when one is re- shaping the environment for one's 
own use; the reason being that, then, there are few 
questions of intentionality of communication. It also 
appears reasonable to suggest that in most cases of every 
day production of environment, criticality is significantly 
low, spatial forms or arrangements are not expected to be 
permanent and, hence, there is an increasing possibility for 
the end product to be characterized as a "low probability" 
one. 
Lastly, tc come to Levi -Strauss's statement according to 
which different societies appear to invest a varied amount 
of meaning in their spatial organization, the above example 
may serve to show that this may be expected to be the case 
for individuals as well; as regards for instance the 
difference between a tidy and an untidy person. And, 
although there may probably be an explanation in psychiatry, 
in the present context it appears reasonable to attribute 
this discrepancy partly on the grounds that they both invest 
meaning in the environment, but that order is something in 
which they differ. In this sense there may be some remote 
possibility for people, in settlements which bear little 
relation between social structure and spatial organization, 
to have invested some other kind of social relations in their 
forms. Invested meanings in environments may vary from say, 
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the bedouin and the desert (which, although bare, seems to 
have so much meaning invested in it that it arouses weaker 
feelings of alienation than, for example, a modern housing 
estate does), or the case of the Pitjedadjara tribe 
mentioned earlier, to the arrangements of furniture in the 
courts of law in the U.S. According to Hazard one may infer 
a whole body of social relations as regards the judicial 
system in that country depending on the way the furniture 
has been arranged (Hazard, 1962, p. 181 -188). 
Potential information, in as much as this is embodied in the 
environment through the process of its shaping, may vary 
largely. As noted, social relations "may be" represented 
on environmental forms. Whether they do or not, may be 
attributed to various factors, 
the user, may feature the degree of gratification of basic 
human needs, the possibility of the active transformation of 
the image (as in the case of the desert, see 2.2), and so on. 
As noted in the preceeding sections, the representation of 
social relations on environmental forms is influenced by a 
long series of factors, but it can not easily be seen as 
being determined by any of them. 
1.3 SOCIAL RELATIONS AND THE SIGN IN MAN -MADE ENVIRONMENT 
The danger which is clearly involved in dealing with the rich- 
ness of the environment's potential informational content is to 
loose quality in the name of quantity. For this reason, and 
in relation to the problem of acquiring a whole picture of the 
potential content of a form, it is important to relate the find- 
ings of the preceeding sections to the theories of semiotics. 
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Let us consider Saussure's concept of the sign as consisting 
of signifiers (plane of expression) and signifiers (plane of 
content) (Barthes, 1967, p. 39). A certain set of social 
relations will be a signified to the object's characteristics 
which represent it. The two entities - features on the one 
hand and set of social relations on the other - will form a 
sing. Naturally, since there is no sign when there is nobody 
to receive it, the above is liable to the percipients' 
characteristics and especially their past experience (see 
also 2.2). The degree to which this past experience is 
shared determines the amount of knowledge over the social 
relations of the particular situation and the broader context. 
Evidently, there are cases of considerable misfit in the past 
experiences of the "doer" and the percipients as, for example, 
in the use of the toilet bowl in different cultures. In that 
case, the same feature, say, the bowl as a whole, was a 
signifier to different sìgnifieds generally depending on whether 
one was from the north or the south of Italy (see also 
Von Uexkull, 1934, for similar discrepancies). 
In any case, this does not stop social relations, which are object - 
ivated on a form, being regarded as potential signifieds,especially 
when this objectivation was intended as in the case of Bonta's 
signals *. Furthermore, since a certain degree of sharing of 
* Based on Buyssens's and Prieto's ideas, Bonta comes to an 
interesting distinction as regards the signs in the built 
environment. Depending on whether these signs are 
intended to communicate or not, he calls them "signals" 
or "indexes ". A third category of "intentional indexes" 
comprises these signs which are used to communicate but 
are not recognized as such by the percipient (Bonta, 1979, 
pp. 26 -30). 
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experiences exists anyway, especially for members of the same 
society, one may assume that a significant number of social 
relations will normally act as signifieds. The rest of the 
social relations which have become objectivated on a form 
will potentially do so. 
In examining the sign in the built environment, one is faced 
with additional difficulties. Although one may identify 
a series of pairs of signifiers and signifieds, yet these are 
not always clear. The analysis in 1.2 pointed out that social 
relations are not necessarily objectivated in distinct features 
of the end product. The physical characteristics of a form 
fundamentally refer to multisensory perception and may often 
appear obscure and ill- defined mainly because of their nature, 
(f.i. elements in the rough texture of white -washed wall). 
While some of them may be clearly distinct elements, others 
remain undistìnguishable, unidentifable and certainly immeasure- 
able (see also 3.3). The question of what stimuli may be 
regarded as a source of information remains unresolved (Ittelson, 
1976, p. 146). 
Furthermore, the amount of social relations which usually 
becomes objectivated is typically endless. It is not seldom 
that environmental change is influenced by social relations 
as varied as the "doer's" relations with his parents in 
childhood, the attitude of a certain group of people towards God, 
an accidental loss of life, and so on. Apparently, all 
efforts to approach the sign through its general description 
based on the careful calculation and measurement of representat- 
ional analogies must be abandoned. This approach should be 
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left for cases in which distinct ends require the examination 
of particticular aspects of the sign *. 
Given the holistic correspondance between social relations 
and physical features in the environment, it is important for 
this study to concentrate on the principles of their represent- 
ation. What is needed at this stage is the understanding of 
how discrepancies in the nature and significance of social 
relations which have to do with the production of an object 
correspond to differences among the features of the end 
product. 
Prior to this, it is important to make one point clear. Social 
relations are typically objectivated on environmental forms 
according to certain codes, however complex, articulated or 
multidimensional these may be. Whether the particular object - 
ivation is intended or not, ideas, thoughts or concepts about 
people or things are codified into words, symbols or images 
selected from those existing in the vocabulary of a particular 
language. Such codes usually exist in the form of "social 
contracts" (Broadbent, 1977, p. 480). The code itself under- 
goes changes with each usage, either by being reproduced and 
therefore strenghened or by being transformed and renovated. 
In the light of what has been discussed in 1.2.4, it is 
interesting to note de Ventos' statement on the evolution of 
codes in which he identifies three fairly distinct transfor- 
matory stages (repetitive use of the code, "eccentric" use, 
pertinent creative use) that lead to the emergence of a new 
* However, it is interesting to note Walther's division of 
signs into ten basic types according to the kind of 
information they contain ( Krampen, 1979, pp. 38 -42). 
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code (de Ventos, 1980, p. 181). 
Let us now concentrate on the question of the content of object - 
ivations and the correspondance of social relations to the 
features that signify them according to the codes noted above. 
Since social relations which influence the shaping of objects 
originate from various directions, some of the features of an 
object end up being a consequence of more social relations than 
others. Such features attain the potential of being denser 
in meaning than others. Features which have been given more 
than one meanings acquire the potential of operating as "shift- 
ers" ( Barthes, 1967, p. 22; Agrest, 1976, p. 61). Shifters 
provide the conditions of the probability of producing different 
readings. According to Agrest, these connective structures of 
transition are the key to the understanding of the complexity 
of the built environment as an infinite text. The importance 
of this notion of shifter is that it potentially accounts for 
keeping the amount of information perceived at a reasonably 
high level while their nature differs according to the 
difference in readings (see also cognition, in 2.2). 
The approach in the preceeding sections has suggested that 
certain social relations, which are more important than others, 
as regards the production of an environmental form, will tend 
to be more probably and, perhaps, more effectively objectivated. 
It has been observed that social relations which refer directly 
to the functions needed are responsible for not only the basic 
dimensions of a form but for its mere existence (.see 1.2.2). 
This tight connection between the object and its function forms 
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what Barthes calls the "function- sign ".* 
As Eco points out, "the object of use is , in its communicative 
capacity, the sign- vehicle of a precisely and conventionally 
denoted meaning -its function" (Eco, 1980, p. 20). It follows 
that social relations which are so important as to initiate the 
production of an object - namely, those of the primary need and 
the primary function - become so clearly objectivated as to 
constitute a sign of denotation. 
Krampen has argued against the use of the notion of denotation 
on the grounds that it advocates a "mono- functional" rather 
than "poly- functional" environment (Krampen, 1979, p. 34). 
Eco saw the concept of connotation as overcoming this problem. 
Signs of connotation can be defined as being formed by social 
relations which influence the shaping of an object and are not 
directly related to the primary need for its existence. Eco 
writes that, "besides denoting the functìon,the architectural 
object could among other things connote a certain ideology of 
the function" (Eco, 1980, p. 23). As we have seen in the 
previous part of the chapter, these "other things" to evoke 
connotations may be ideologies of the user or the problematic 
situation, the social framework or the particular conjuncture 
and, finally, the "doer" himself. Thus apart from denoting 
its primary function (i.e. "what" it is), an object connotes 
ideologies of this function (i.e. "how" it takes place). To 
relate the issue to Krampen's arguement, Eco saw connotation 
* To stress the significance of this relation, Barthes writes 
that "as soon as there is a society, every usage is converted 
into a sign in itself" (Barthes, 1967, p. 41). 
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as possibly "becoming so functionally important that the 
basic function might even be slighted, or distorted ". The 
case of the throne (Fig. 7) typically illustrates this point. 
Barthes, uses the term "rhetoric" to describe the set of 
signifiers to such connotations and the term "ideology" for 
the signifieds. Since signs of connotation are the result 
of the expression of social relations stemming from the 
complexities rather than the primary need in environmental 
change, they are bound to be unordered and discontinued. And 
as they can be regarded as having a whole "function sign" as a 
signifier, their plane of content will tend to be much broader 
than that of denotations (Barthes, 1967, 1977). 
According to Barthes, when one comtemplates his environment, 
"the first degree of intelligibility (below which one would 
perceive only lines, forms and colours) corresponds to the 
level of the identification of an object ". At this stage 
meaning is merely relational and operational. But, he argues, 
"anyone from a real society always disposes of a knowledge 
superior to the merely anthropological and perceives more than 
just the letter" (Barthes, 1977). These higher levels of 
intelligibility* allow symbolism and ideology to be experienced. 
In view of the above observation as well as the distinction 
* In a study conducted as early as 1939, Panofsky analyzed works 
of art and distinguished three "layers" of "meaning ". The 
primary or natural subject matter, the secondary or convent- 
ional subject matter and the intrinsic meaning or content 
Panofsky, 1939, pp. 5 -7). 
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between denotation and connotation, we may analyse the sign 
in terms of first, second and third level experience. The 










SIGNIFIER The object as a whole and basic 
functional features 
All physical feat - 
ures and "function - 
signs" of the object 
SIGNIFIED Identification 
of object and 
primary 
function 
Social relations of 
the significance of 
the primary function 
in different 
contexts (i.e. 
ranging frm the user 
and the particular 




ideologies of the 
composite need for 
change, the user, 
the doer, the 
particular situat- 
ion, the social 
framework, the 
particular 
conjuncture and so 
forth. 
TABLE 1.3 
One can easily see that this table refers to signifieds as these 
are invested in ojbects in the course of their production. Con- 
sequently, and in reference to what has been discussed before, 
it becomes distorted in real life situatons by the intervention 
of basically two factors. Namely, the evolution in the social 
context after the object has been produced* and various 
* According to Eco conception of the "consumption and recovery 
of forms ", the primary function of a form may change with 
the evolution of society. It may be replaced by a 
secondary one. The Parthenon for example was used as a 
shrine originally, while in contemporary times it has become 
a symbol, and that was its secondary function once (Eco, 
1980, p. 28). 
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discrepancies in the perceivers' personal parameters, mainly 
past experience and motivation. Yet, both factors basically 
influence the model quantitatively. This affects the depth 
of experience in regard to the quantity of social relations 
which act as signifieds. The qualitative dimension of the 
distortion is limited to changes in respect to the perception 
of the object's primary function, or functions (for example, 
Pyramids and the toilet bowl, for the two factors respectively). 
Table 1.3 aims at providing a picture of the whole range of 
social relations which may affect the shaping of an environmental 
form and become represented on it. The approach in 1.2 has 
pointed out that social relations involved in the production of 
environment vary largely in terms of width and depth since they 
may encompass figurative aspects of most, if not all, environ- 
mental objects while, on the other hand, they are of the most 
dispositional character as regards the evolution of mankind. 
To the extent that the above table contains these social 
relations in all their wealth and depth, it fulfils the first 
aspect of the second criterion set in 1.0. 
Another point which has to be stressed with reference to table 
1.3 is that in the analysis conducted in the preceeding sections 
nothing has shown that one must expect all social relations 
involved in the production of a form to be objectivated in the 
end product. Some of them may, for a number of reasons, manage 
to result in concrete differentiation in form, while others may 
not. Furthermore, it has to be made clear that there is no 
distinct one -to -one correspondance between a social relation 
and a concrete feature in the sense that a single feature may 
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correspond to more than one social relations and vice versa. 
Lastly, it seems that it had to be left to semiotics to 
structure the sign hierarchically in terms of its significance 
The concepts of denotation and connotation, although criticized 
by several researchers and on different grounds, appear to be 
well fit for this hierarchy as they provide a notion of the 
need for change which generates forms. 
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PART TWO 
COGNITIVE NEEDS AND THE 
EXPERIENCE OF MAN -MADE ENVIRONMENT 
124. 
2.0 INTRODUCTION 
Once the link between social relations and differentiation 
in form has been analyzed, the interest centers on man, the 
perceiver. The aim of the second part of this study is to 
concentrate on human needs which ask for cognitive experience, 
i.e. cognitive needs, and examine how they relate to the 
potential informational content of man -made environment as 
well as how this affects man's mental world. 
To achieve this, it is important to explore the nature of man's 
cognitive needs and the process of cognition. The two 
issues are discussed in the first two sections of this part 
of the study. After constructing a model of the levels at 
which cognition of man -made environment may occur,the aim of 
the second section is to establish empirical evidence as to 
which aspects of the theoretical model take place in reality. 
The third section attempts to outline the diachronical 
aspects of cognition of man -made environment by sketching both 
the context in which it occurs and its impact on man's inner 
structures. The fourth section considers the properties of 
both personal and environmental parameters in perception in an 
attempt to establish cues for the prediction of public images. 
Finally, the significance of the individual's cognitive exper- 
ience of man -made environment is assessed in view of what has 
been discussed in the first two parts of the study. 
Before getting involved with the discussion of the main issues, 
there are several items which need to be mentioned and, 
hopefully, clarified. The first of these is concerned with 
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the approach adopted. 
As regards the philosophy of the approach, it has been noted 
in the introduction that, in an extremely controversial 
discipline like psychology, there are by and large two main- 
streams of philosophical dispositions among writers. These 
originate from the philosophies of nativism (Leibnitzian trad- 
ition) and empìricìn(Lockean tradition). Although findings, 
in both traditions, start from entirely opposing assumptions, 
they both seem to give a fair account of different aspects of 
reality. The present study aspires to the difficult task of 
dealing with its problem without committing itself to either 
of these schools of thought. The way to overcome dichotomies, 
then, is to point them out and comment on both in an attempt 
to examine how each of them affects the argument in question. 
A reservation is held for the problem of testing the formul- 
ations drawn from this study against empirical evidence. 
However, because of the very nature of the subject, it is not 
possible to come to an absolute conclusion as to what social 
relations are experienced in man -made environment. 
On the other hand, it has also been noted that man is to be 
seen as a person as opposed to an organism merely responding 
to external stimuli. In the present context, the significance 
of this typically existentialist dictum does not so much lie in 
outrulling behaviourism as in diverting the researcher's and, 
especially, the designer's attention from man's merely 
operational needs. Man has other needs apart from those 
which relate to goal- oriented activity (see 1.2.2). The 
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issue then becomes a question of exploring how man's cognitive 
needs relate to this distinction (see 2.1). 
As regards the scope of the approach, in view of the questions 
sought for, this part of the study deals with the problem of 
how and in what form social relations embodied in the environ- 
ment become "internalized" in people's mental structures. 
This is seen in response to man's cognitive needs. Consequently, 
the argument will not concentrate on neuro- physiological issues 
other than those needed, or on the purely visual aspects of 
perception. As the interest lies in the way social relations 
stored in the environment are assimilated, cognition will 
basically be seen as it occurs in what Piaget describes as 
the higher levels of intelligence, in which cognitive structures 
already present in the perceiver's mental world are so developed 
that a concrete operation is not needed as an intermediary stage 
to knowledge (Piaget, 1972, pp. 46 -51). 
Since this study focuses on cognitive experience of man -made 
environment in relation to the person's intellectual 
development, there has to be a discrimination against affective 
and evaluative experience. Evidently, both cognitive and 
evaluative experience occur together and form an inseparable 
whole (P.E. Vernon,1961, p. 37). Still, some compensation to 
the theoretical division can be drawn from the fact that 
cognitions of evaluations or affects are to be treated as 
cognitive experience (see Heider, 1958). Jung has argued 
that every event of the conscious mind has its psychic 
associations (Jung, 1964). In view of this, and as these 
127. 
psychic associations may be "felt" (i.e. both as affects and 
as cognitions over these affects), one may suggest that as 
social relations in man -made environment are cognited and 
"psychically" experienced, cognitions of the latter function 
give man a measure of both the outside object and his inner 
self. This observation provides an explanation for the way 
in which the experience of social relations in man -made 
environment may indirectly relate to self- consciousness. 
Furthermore and with reference to the methodology adopted, it 
has been noted that, in 2.3, the diachronical aspects of 
cognition will be discussed, while a theoretical model for 
cognition is to be elaborated in 2.2. The problem which arises 
is that, since diachronic aspects of perception may occur both 
before and after any single perceptual experience, then 
synchronic aspects will be treated as having no context on 
which to be based. This awkward problem is treated by 
approaching cognitive processes in 2.2 as "neutral" functions, 
like complex equations which have to wait for the necessary 
variables so that they are put in operation. The missing 
variables are the person's already existing cognitive 
structures and they are to be identified in 2.3. 
The last item which remains to be discussed in this intro- 
ductory note is the definition of several terms which will be 
persistent all through this part of the study. 
The first two are "personal parameters" and "timulus "or 
"environmental parameters ". Depending on the school of 
thought, theorists have attached different weight on each. of 
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these two families of parameters which are in action in 
virtually any situation a man finds himself and which may be 
in conflict as to who will determine his behaviour, and this 
includes his experience. Lewin stood in the middle and argued 
that behaviour is a function of both (Lewin, 1964, pp. 238 -40). 
Originating from a different viewpoint, anthropologists 
contend that there is a third family of variables to be 
considered: cultural parameters (Rapoport, 1976, 1977; p. 108; 
see also Tyler, 1972, for the discussion on the identification 
of such variables). The notion of a single individual's 
personal parameters (and expecially his prior experience of 
the world) can be considered as being broad enough to include 
these, while it is to be noted that there may be many group- 
the parameters of different individuals. 
Personal parameters can be distinguished in the person's past 
(or prior) experience, and his motivation (which are his more 
trait -like characteristics) as well as his state of mind and 
his course of action at the given moment in time. Genetic 
factors are considered to be incorporated under the first 
two. Furthermore, in cases of groups of people, we may talk, 
of personal parameters, although this is clearly an ordered 
aggregate of factors and variables which is difficult to be 
identified in all its dimensions. 
Environmental parameters are also difficult to be considered 
in their fuller dimensions. In the context of the present 
study, one may talk of the amount and nature of potential 
information in the environment although neither the first 
nor the second may be exactly known. The nature of 
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information may be particularly confusing as, on the one hand, 
there is no evidence as yet as to what constitutes a stimulus 
as a source of information, (Ittelson, 1976, p.146), while, 
on the other, the word nature may refer to both figurative and/ 
or semantic aspects of the environment. When referring to 
more specific situations, solutions to the problem can be 
given by stating which aspects of environmental parameters in 
particular affect a function in question. 
The other term that needs explaining is the term "schema ". 
Bartlett first used the term in the 20's (although the notion 
originated from Kant) and described it as referring to "an 
active organization of past reactions, or past experiences 
which must always be supposed to be operating in any well - 
adapted organic response "(Bartlett, 1964, p. 201). The term 
was then taken over by Piaget who used it extensively with 
basically the same meaning. They both implied that a schema 
is a motor -sensory response to a particular set of environ- 
mental cues which helps to structure behaviour by being stored 
in memory to be re- activated when a set of similar cues comes 
into view. In the context of the present study, motor 
schemata are not taken into consideration. Furthermore, as 
regards other mental cognitive schemata, one may assume that 
a significant part of them consists of social relations while 
they may also have certain aspects referring to the senses 
(visual, tactile, olfactory and so on). 
Although in the literature it tends to be used in a confusing 
manner, the term "image ", is closely related tc the idea of 
schemata. Boulding defines it as subjective knowledge - "what 
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we believe to be true" - all the accumulated, organized 
knowledge that an individual has about himself and the world 
(Boulding, 1956, pp. 5 -8). In this sense, images are like 
schemata, as described above; they are not necessarily 
figuration, they may be to a degree shared between different 
people, they may be composed of both facts and values and so 
on. Momentary images may be regarded as the entirety of a 
person's perceptual experience at a given moment in time. 
Such a construct, which is both conscious and unconscious in 
nature, may usually be expected to embrace many different 
cognitive and evaluative schemata. 
Finally, another term which requires some clarification is 
that of a person's intelligence. The literature is replete 
with a series of difinitions (Wright et al, 1970, p. 482). 
Yet, the interest in the present context lies in exploring 
the relation between perceptual input and the process of the 
individual's intellectual development. For this reason, 
there appears to be no need for an exact definition of 
intelligence as such but merely in as much as it relates to 
the development of mental schemata which, as we will later see, 
form the link between the two poles of the above relation. It 
is interesting to note P.E. Vernon's view that "intelligence 
corresponds to the general level of complexity and flexibility 
of a person's schemata, which have been built up cumulatively 
in the course of his lifetime" (P.E. Vernon, 1960, p. 37). 
Based on this notion, which is also adopted by Piaget, the 
impact of environmental experience will be assessed in as 
much as it affects these properties of schemata which form 
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the basis on which the individual's skills and capacities are 
grounded. 
2.1 THE NATURE OF MAN'S COGNITIVE NEEDS 
In this section, we will consider man's needs to know and to 
understand, i.e. man's cognitive needs. The discussion in 
1.1.2 pointed that an environmental form is required to satisfy 
both the needs which are instrumental to the primary function, 
or functions, and those which are more directly related to 
basic human needs and, hence, transcend the scope of the 
particular activity performed in space. As the interest 
in the present study is in examining the implications man's 
cognitive needs may have on design, it is essential to explore 
the literature on the issue in an attempt to see whether these 
needs do fall under both the above categories as regards man's 
cognitive experience of man -made environment. 
It has to be acknowledged that cognitive processes were not 
always seen as referring to a need to know which existed in 
its own right as a basic human need. Gordon Allport said 
that "some theorists - such as Schopenhauer, Kempf, Freud 
and others - have held that cognition (our thought -life) is 
essentially the servant of our needs and drives" (G.E. Allport, 
1961, p. 259). In a similar sense, this can be said to apply 
to early behaviourist writers, such as Watson and Thorndike, 
and even later ones like Skinner. Interpreting the view of 
such early theorists, Bruner criticized them by stating that 
they regard it as merely being incorporated to other forms of 
goal striving. Bruner said that the only reservation these 
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these writers held for cognition corresponding to a more 
autonomous "need to know ", is for cases in which the individual 
is confronted with novel stimuli (Bruner, 1956, p. 16). 
Theorists of personality, who were to some extent following 
the Leibnitzian philosophical tradition and, hence, ascribed 
more qualities to the human mind than the blank slate condition 
and inertness at birth, found it difficult to conform with tr.is 
view. Karen Horney declared that Freud's conception of cog- 
nitive processes is applicable only the neurotic. Instead, she 
maintained that man's higher mental processes exist in their 
own right and are not "at the beck and call of his impulses" 
(Arndt, 1974, pp. 270 -1). Gordon Allport - who thought in 
terms of dimensions, rather than dichotomies, as regards the 
basic philosophical argument, and consequently allowed that 
man was both active and passive - argued that "there is nothing 
secondary about cognition. The hunger to know, to comprehend 
our environment is a basic motive in life" (G.E. Allport, 1961, 
p. 274). 
It appears that the writer, who has further developed the idea 
of man's cognitive needs, is Abraham Maslow who is noted for 
the existentialist origins of his approach to the study of 
personality (see 1.1.2). Maslow said that the main reason we 
know little about the cognitive impulses, their dynamic or 
their pathology, is that they are not important in the clinic; 
"even cognitive psychopathology is pale, subtle, and easily 
overlooked or defined as normal... As a consequence, we find 
nothing on the subject in the writings of the great inventors 
of psychotherapy and psychodynamics, Freud, Adler, Jung etc." 
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(Maslow, 1970, p. 48). 
Based on evidence from his clinical work (see also Beck et al, 
1979) and other studies, Maslow argued that "the overcoming 
of obstacles, the occurence of pathology upon thwarting, the 
wider spread occurence (cross- species, cross -cultural), the 
never dying (though weak) insistent pressure, the need of 
gratification of this need as a prerequisite for the fullest 
development of human potentialities, the spontanious appear- 
ance in the early history of the individual, all these point 
to a basic cognitive need ". He, then, observed this need 
escalating in two ways as, "even after we know, we are impelled 
to know more and more minutely and microscopically on the one 
hand, and on the other, more and more extensively in the 
direction of a world philosophy, theology etc. ". In response 
to this, and along with his five sequential stages of basic 
human needs (see 1.1.2), he postulated the existence of a 
smaller hierarchy in which the desire to know is stronger over 
the desire to understand. These cognitive needs, however, 
should not be considered as separate from the basic needs 
because "the desire to know and to understand are themselves 
co native, i.e. having a striving character, and are as much 
personality needs as the basic needs" (Maslow, 1970, pp. 50 -1). 
In this sense, Maslow incorporated in his smaller hierarchy of 
basic human needs the instinctoid need to make sense out of 
one's environment as well as "the need to know for its own 
sake, for the sheer delight and primitive satisfaction of 
knowledge and understanding per se" (Maslow, 1968, p. 63). 
This latter impulse, which is clearly associated with unique 
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affective states and is described by Bruner as leading to a 
"Eureka" experience, has been used as a basis for inferring 
the presence of a generalized cognitive need by a number of 
theorists (Bruner, 1956, p. 17). 
Among contemporary psychologists however, the existence of 
autonomous cognitive needs, such as the ones described by 
Maslow, is not widely accepted. Maslow's holistic formulat- 
ions in this context appear to be eligible to serve as 
indications for an explanation to the problem, while a certain 
bias towards overt behaviour has led the issue to be approached 
at a different level. Studies such as Bartlett's (1932; 1958) 
and Tolman's (1948), where the "effort after meaning" and the 
concept of a cognitive map in purposive behaviour was stressed, 
introduced Gestaltist cognitivist elements in behaviourist 
thinking and provided the initiative for research in cognitive 
psychology. 
Theories of the relative consistency among cognitive structures 
in the individual's mental world, like the theory of cognitive 
dissonance postulated by Festinger (1959), and the attribution 
theory, which originated from Heider (1958), proved to be 
notably influential. Festinger's main point of departure was 
the formulation that the presence of dissonance in man's mental 
world gives rise to pressures to reduce that dissonance 
(Festinger, 1959, p. 263). One way of coping with such 
pressure is through further cognition. Heider, who is more 
directly concerned with cognition as influencing action, adds 
more to the discussion on cognitive consonance (or "balance ", 
as he calls it) by maintaining that "of great importance for 
135. 
our picture of the social environment is the attribution 
of events to casual sources" (Heider, 1958, p. 16). 
Although these theories clearly point toward the identification 
of a certain need -state which arises from man's mental world, 
it has to be acknowledged that there still seems to exist some 
doubt as regards the nature of this need -state - i.e. whether 
it leads to a motive, drive, tense state or else (see Davies, 
1968, p. 330; Weiner, 1972, p. 293 and pp. 301 -7) and the 
extent of the pressures it sets (Wyer, 1974, p. 139 -40). Still, 
as the cognitive structures in a person's mental world when 
taken as a whole may rarely be in complete consonance (Festinger, 
1959, p. 16), allowing for some discrepancies in individual 
personalities, it seems reasonable to assume that, for any 
person, there will always be a tendency to reach such a need - 
state. In this sense, exploratory activity may be seén not 
only as resulting from the accidental encounter of novel 
stimuli but also as being initiated by the very complexities of 
tLe development of man's mental world (Hunt, 1963, p. 399). 
An interesting overview of the significance of knowledge for 
man is provided by writers such as Piaget (1971), Waddington 
and Lorenz. According to them, life processes in general, 
and evolutionary processes in particular, are fundamentally 
involved with the acquisition of knowledge about the environ- 
ment. In general, the greater the knowledge an individual 
member of any species has of the environment, the greater are 
the chances that the individual will survive and reproduce 
in that environment (Fishbein, 1975, p. 132). A similar 
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generic approach which arrives at the same conclusion is 
based on cybernetics and, has been postulated by Herbert 
(1972, p. 101 -6). Such biological or mathematical approaches 
are pointing at the importance of the need to know and to 
understand as being derived from the very fact that man finds 
himself in a world in which he has to adapt in the most 
efficient way in order to survive. 
It appears from the above that, although knowledge of the 
environment can be considered as being of notable significance 
to man, the need to know and to understand is not always 
accepted as existing in its own right, i.e. an autonomous 
basic human need. But even if one does not accept this stance, 
theoverview of the literature, presented above, shows that cog- 
nition may correspond to other basic human needs such as safety 
needs, adaptation needs, a need for some balance in the person's 
mental world, a need to explore the environment as a result of 
the development of man's inner structures and so on. Although 
these needs may relate to goal -oriented behaviour as regards 
the activities performed in space (f.i. in adaptation), they 
do not always do so since they are a function of man's deeper 
psychological needs and stem from the totality of his beìng- 
inch e- world. Cognitive experience of the environment may 
relate to cognitive needs which have developed from those 
deeper needs and exist regardless of the activity the person 
is engaged in at the time. In this sense, whether taken as 
autonomous or not, cognitive needs can be seen as follow'ng 
the distinction proposed in section 1.1.2. 
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2.2 THE RECEPTION AND INITIAL PROCESSING OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL STIMULI 
In order to examine how man's cognitive needs relate to his 
experience of the potential informational content embodied in 
man -made environment, it is essential to consider the functions 
and processes which affect the way cognitive experience occurs. 
As noted in 2.0, the issue can be approached from two different 
angles and it is necessary to follow both so as to attain a 
clear picture. The first approach isolates cognition from 
many of its long -term aspects and assesses the dynamics of the 
intricacies involved in the momentary situation. The second 
approach views the issue in a diachronical sense. By doing so, 
it provides a picture of the context in which individual cog- 
nitions occur (in terms of cognitive structures already present) 
and allows such cognitions to be considered in relation to their 
impact on the person's mental world, seen as a whole. 
Evidently, both approaches are concerned with the analysis of 
the same event, i.e. man's cognitive experience of his environ- 
ment. Since the aim is to arrive to conclusions as regards 
different aspects of it, however, they are required to be 
methodologically distinghished, even though to an extent over- 
lapping. 
In this section, the first approach to the issue will be 
conducted. Since cognition is part of the broader function of 
man's perception of his environment, several fundamental aspects 
of the latter function must be considered. The term perception 
as used in the literature embodies a multitude of definitions 
and meanings, whether referring to the actual process of 
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perceiving or to the end product of this process. The defin- 
ition is often implied rather than being explicit. It is 
interesting to note that the "International Encyclopedia of the 
Social Sciences" takes over fifty pages to discuss the meaning 
of perception. 
In the classical and strict sense perception relates to sit- 
uations where stimulus is present. Perception is the middle 
step in a hierarchical process of sensory awareness between 
sensation, which is the initial, unorganized, response to a 
stimulus, and cognition and evaluation, which represent a 
general awareness based on some form of a summary of all previous 
stimuli. 
Awareness or interaction with the environment is achieved 
primarily through visual experience, although it is clearly an 
amalgam of other sense experiences, such as auditory, olfactory, 
tactile and so forth. In the present context, however, 
perception refers to more than direct apprehensions of the 
senses, as the perceived environment is significantly more than 
the sum of sensory experiences. Perception, therefore, is used 
neither in a physical and neurological nor in a strictly literal 
sense, but more extensively. Such a definition, incidentally, 
is in keeping with the Latin origin of the word "percipere ", to 
comprehend. 
It follows that perception can be divided in three fairly 
distinct stages: sensing, cogniting and evaluating. Acting 
may be considered to be a fourth stage only that it does not refer 
to the experience of the environment as such but to the overt 
response to it. These three stages (and, in some extreme 
cases, all four of them) do not generally exist as distinct 
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periods of time. Unconscious reception and processing of 
stimuli and the forecasting of what is to be perceived draw 
them together into a continuum. Although environmental 
experience retains the hierarchical order noted above, this 
continuum ostensibly exists as a whole and is sometimes diff- 
icult not to be approached as such. 
2.2.1 Expectancy 
A very important dimension in perceptual experience is given 
by the fact that, even before the sensing of environmental 
stimuli occurs, one is generally prepared for it. Kelly 
considered the element of anticipation as being critically 
central in his "theory of Personal Constructs" (Kelly, 1955, 
and especially pp. 46-50) while a similar attitude can be 
found in writers in the Gestalt tradition, such as Lewin and 
Tolman. Piaget wrote that previously acquired information 
causes anticipatory reactions at all the higher cognitive 
levels, to the extent that one of the essential functions of 
knowing is to bring about foresight (Piaget, 1971, p. 91). 
In real life situations a person always tends to anticipate 
the situations he finds himslef in. Whatever the situation, 
man automatically grasps its basic components, that is "the 
feel of the place ", while being simultaneously aware of what 
may happen. This "awareness" however, generally occurs in a 
literal sense, as there is evidence to suggest that a major 
part of this anticipatory function takes place unconsciously 
(Kaplan, 1970; Dixon, 1971). Whether conscious or unconscious, 
it is mainly based on the comparison of the particular situation, 
as this becomes conceptualized through its basic components, to 
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analogous situations, events, generalizations of these and 
their outcome. Such Juxtaposed data typically contain social 
relations in the form of cognitive schemata which are encoded 
in the individual's mental world. 
The need for the individual to familiarize himself with the 
"feel of the place ", wherever he finds himself, basically stems 
from his safety needs and is sustained by the fear that some- 
thing might spoil his course of action at the time. The role 
of his memory system in this is evidently crucial. Further- 
more, the fact that, even in fairly early developmental stages, 
one somehow manages to anticipate and grasp the "feel of the 
place" suggests that, even when already acquired knowledge of 
reality may be considered inadequate, one may still be capable 
of activating some anticipatory set of mental schemata from the 
memory banks of the brain. A similar ability for the 
adaptation is also to be noted for cases in which people find 
themselves in environments and situations they are not familiar 
with. It appears that there can always be a certain set of 
schemata which is to be juxtaposed to the uniqueness of any real 
situation to a satisfactory degree.* 
The word "situation" does not only contain attributes of a 
particular social environment but it also implies the individual's 
orientation and predisposition towards it. These characteristics 
* It might be interesting to see how this juxtaposition may 
form so accurate a fitting that, in extreme cases, it may 
result in what is psychiatrically defined as "deja vu" or 
"jamais vu ". 
141. 
of the person may be seen functioning at two different levels. 
Firstly, in relation to his motivation and, secondly, in 
respect to his current state, that is: his state of mind at 
the moment. In any case, the process of grasping the "feel 
of the place" is influenced, not only by personal parameters, 
but also by environmental ones. A clear and legible environ- 
ment will tend to be grasped easier than a confusing one 
(See also 3.3). 
The reading of every situation one finds himself in and the 
understanding of the social relations which constitute its 
basic components is very significant both for the percipient 
and for the scientist. By triggering schemata which are 
encoded in the memory banks to come at hand, it both revitalizes 
them and keeps the brain alert while, at the same time, it 
provides an indispensable context for perception to occur in. 
Due to expectancy, perception of the environment occurs in a 
continuum and tends to be always forecast. Therefore, one 
not only expects what is to be perceived, but also one might 
even know how one would perceive a particular object. For 
instance, a person may "know" beforehand, the moment he opens 
the door to enter the room, that it will appear beautiful or 
that a particular object in it will attract his attention. 
The fact that certain perceptions are expected while others 
are not is related to two important characteristics of the 
actual experience of the environment. Firstly, it provides 
an element of subjectivity since one tends to relieve one's 
own schemata, the product of one's own past experience, rather 
than to adjust them (see Boulding, 1956; and 2.3.2). This 
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can be seen from the experiment in which several species of 
birds will attempt to escape when a certain model (the model 
of a large bird with short neck and long tail) is passed 
overhead. Birds that were occasionally attacked by a hawk 
were used to the idea that such a thing may happen again. 
Consequently, they responded strongly to a hawk silhouette 
passing overhead (Buss, 1973, p. 145; Fig. 42). 
Secondly, anything unexpected tends to draw more attention 
than what it would normally draw. In other words, low 
predictability increases the level of arousal (Shannon and 
Weaver, 1949, p. 108 -9; Mehrabian and Russell, 1973). In 
view of what is being discussed in the previous part it can 
be clearly seen that the built environment as a form of human 
expression may deliberately incorporate the element of surprise 
to attract attention. In this sense,higher level of arousal 
and attention appears to be evoked by the objectivation of such 
social relations that the percipient would not expect to 
perceive in a given social context. Consequently, he has to 
focus his attention closer on the intruding social relations, 
while at the same time it is important for him to reassess 
social relations which relate to the "feel of the place" of 
the particular situation seen as a whole (Fig. 43). 
Although surprise and novelty contributes significantly to the 
direction of an exciting environment (f.i. Japanese garden, 
open -air market, and even Alice's encounters in "Alice in 
Wonderland "), it may still incorporate two weaknesses as it 
mixes with the person's personal parameters, and especially 
his interest in the situation. Firstly, not all unexpected 
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Moving it to the left 
caused no escape 
responses in birds. 
Moving it to the right 
caused escape responses 
in birds. 
Moving the model to the left caused no escape responses 
to birds. Whereas, moving it to the right, it did. 
FIGURE 42 
Top left: "Object ", by Meret Oppenheim, 1936. 
Top right: One of the buildings of "Best" Products. 
Bottom: The roof of Gaudi's Casa Mila, 1905 -10. 
FIGURE 43 
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encounters are pleasing, in fact, as arousal and attention 
become increased, one's expectations may become difficult to 
satisfy. Secondly, although as we will later see there are 
group images in perception what is expected to be experienced 
remains largely a function of individual personal parameters. 
Consequently, if a designer wishes surprise to be evoked he 
would either ensure that he is well aware of the user's 
personal parameters in their basic components, or introduce 
such functions in the design (i.e. people in the street, open - 
ended design etc.) that will enable elements of potential 
surprise to keep recurring (see 3.2.3). 
In summation, expectancy of perceptual experience can be seen 
as being a function of both personal and environmental 
parameters. It can be regarded as an attempt from the 
individual's point of view to grasp the "feel of the place" 
of any situation he finds (or, is going to find) himself in. 
As such, it presupposes the activation of an anticipatory set 
of schemata stored in the brain in order to fit to the basic 
components of the situation in question. This function, which 
usually occurs unconsciously, helps to keep schemata alert and 
provides a background for experience. In doing so, and in 
relation to the person's interests in the situation, it may 
be expected to affect the actual experience of the environment 
as this is bound to take place in the context provided by this 
background. 
It may also be said that the continuity, which is manifested 
in the perpetual forecasting of environemntal stimuli, 
constitutes a structural element in the way in which man's 
experience of his environment occurs. Ignoring it may have 
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serious consequences both in practical and theoretical 
situations geared towards an explanation of man's perception 
of the environment. 
2.2.2 Sensing the Environment 
Man perceives his environment through his senses. Stimuli 
from the environment are received by the sensory organs where 
they are transformed into neural impulses so that they are 
carried through the nerves to the brain. Each kind of 
receptor has its own neuron path to the cortex. The nerves 
from the eye to the brain, for example, convey impulses only 
about light, and this is true whether they are electrically 
stimulated or are stimulated by light or even by rubbing the 
eyes. And there is point -to -point projection of the retinal 
image on the occipital lobe of the cortex. Thus different 
kinds of sensory impulses are kept separate by sending them 
along distinct and specific routes from the receptors to the 
sensory areas of the cerebral cortex, which is the final part 
of the sensory neural circuit (M.D. Vernon, 1962, pp. 12 -13). 
The initial phase of perceptual experience, according to many 
theorists, is essentially figurative in nature (Piaget, 1969), 
it involves all the senses and it is needless to comment on its 
necessity. 
Certain aspects of this stage are of some importance in the 
context of the present study. Firstly, the fact that stimuli 
from the environment may be received by any sensory organ, and, 
in fact, as it usually happens, by many receptors simultaneously. 
Although it seems to be needless to point out the typically 
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multisensory nature of perception, designers generally tend 
to contemplate the environment in visual terms. Yet, although 
vision appears to be particularly flexible in relating to 
distinct and definite schemata when compared to other senses 
(and, hence, is more reliable because of its nature), environ- 
mental experience is an amalgam of all senses. 
The second aspect of interest relates to the distinction 
between man's cognitive and operational needs. Based on an 
impressive series of experiments, Piaget has argued that, at 
this stage of perceptual experience, they eye focuses on 
certain elements in a form. This function, which Piaget 
calls "centration ", explains perceptual deformation, as in 
the case of primary illusions. Compensation to this, he 
argues, can be derived from the co- ordination of such 
centrations, a co- ordination which he calls "decentration" 
(Piaget, 1969). He then related this process to the explor- 
atory drives of the human mind. Bruner later suggested 
that a process, which operates in much the same way as Piaget's 
decentration, may be what "frees" cognitive activity from the 
"domination" of man's particular goal- oriented behaviour 
(Bruner, 1956, p. 16). 
Finally, it has to be acknowledged that the question of defin- 
ing exactly what properties of the incoming, say, optic array 
are informative for vision, is not settled yet for psychol- 
ogists (Ittelson, 1976, p. 146). Accordingly, the exact 
definition of the transitional point between sensation and 
its cognition remains obscure. Both for methodological 
and substantial reasons, it is important that in the context 
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of the present study the process of sensing the environment 
is confined up to the moment that intelligent brain interferes 
in the form of cognitive schemata of social relations. 
Evidently, this is merely a theoretical distinction since, as 
discussed previously, mental schemata may be activated in 
advance, before actual sensing occurs, as a result of expectancy. 
It has to be noted that this methodological viewpoint is not 
consistent with the one expressed by Rapoport. Rapoport 
distinghishes three stages of perception (perception, cognition 
and evaluation) but includes first -level cognition (that is: 
identification) in his first stage of sensory perception 
(Rapoport, 1977, pp. 30 -4). The theoretical discrepancy 
between the two viewpoints is proposed to have certain reper- 
cussions in the development of the argument. As a result, 
this issue will require further attention at a later stage, 
when the discussion will center on the amount and nature of 
potential information in the environment in view of an optimal 
level of stimulation (see 3.3.2). 
In the present context, sensory perception is regarded as a 
more or less mechanical procedure, as it is characterized by 
the confinement noted above. Hence, the distinction between 
sensing the environment and cogniting it is approached as 
being qualitative in nature. In any case, it is evident that 
sensory perception constitutes the vital and indisposable 
"doorstep" of environmental experiences. 
2.2.3 Environmental Cognition and Possible 
Varieties of Cognitive Experience 
As has been mentioned above, any individual at any moment 
possesses an experience of the world and this experience equips 
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him with a vast amount of knowledge in the form of mental 
cognitive schemata. Such schemata, which are not necessarily 
dimensional and may contain social relations, vary in abstract- 
ion and are encoded in a fairly hierarchical order in the 
memory banks of the individual's brain. As the individual 
finds himself in a situation and environmental stimuli are 
expected, a significant amount of relevant schemata (having 
to do with the social relations which constitute the basic 
and other components of the stuatìon) are unconsciously 
brought back from the memory banks to stay at hand. 
As soon as a stimulus reaches the brain it triggers several* 
relevant schemata, generally out of those already energized, 
and is juxtaposed to them. This process, which constitutes 
the essence of environmental cognition, is by no means as 
simple as it sounds, a reason for this being the operation 
of the unconscious, or "primitive" (see Smith, 1977, pp. 32 -5) 
part of the brain. 
In a strict sense, it is only when environmental stimuli 
channelled through the senses meet relevant schemata in the 
brain that they become environmental signs. It is only at 
this stage that they become attired with meaning, even when 
this meaning is the mere identification of an object. In 
fact, this first level cognition (i.e. identification) may 
vary to an extent from one person to the other since it is a 
function of past experience. In some extreme cases, as 
for example in the case of the toilet bowl, it may even vary 
* As Bruner (1956) has shown, this is generally not a one - 
to -one relationship. 
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amongst people who, by and large, share the same culture. To 
avoid such misunderstandings and to stress the significance of 
personal and consequently, cultural background experience in 
providing the basis for the cognitive dimension in perception, 
it appears to be reasonable to have excluded first level 
cognition from the stage of sensing the environment. 
The Selective Organization of Perceptual Input 
The effect of personal parameters, and especially past exper- 
ience and motivation, in how this initial stage of matching 
schemata to incoming stimuli takes place, is also related to 
selectivity. This aspect of perceptual experience may be 
seen as occuring at three different levels, all having to do 
with how cognition takes place. 
Firstly, as the early Gestaltists have pointed out, the 
individual sees objects as organized Gestalten. Although, 
retinally an object can be described as a mosaic of discrete 
pinpoints of light of varying wavelengths, the fact that 
cognition is based on juxtaposition of schemata makes people 
experience chairs, buildings, landscapes and so on. Secondly, 
among all the possible characteristics of an object only 
certain ones are experienced. Concepts from information theory, 
like redundancy and channel capacity, explain how the perception 
of a few characteristics of an object is enough for the object 
to be identified (Rapoport, 1977, p. 196). Finally, only 
certain objects, or features of objects, among all that exists 
"out there ", enter the person's experience of the external 
world. Other features either play a minor role or are not 
included at all, for reasons other than redundancy and channel 
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capacity. This may partly be attributed to expectancy and 
the anticipatory set of schemata already activated, and partly 
to a phenomenon which Gordon Allport described as the pro- 
jection of the person's "mental set" on the perceived situation 
(G.E. Allport, 1961, p. 259). This latter function may even 
be expected to de -form the image to fit the requirements of 
the individual. 
The selective organization of perceptual experience is 
determined by both personal and environmental parameters, as 
two interacting sets of determinant factors. In this sense, 
when one wishes to make a telephone call, phone booths become 
brighter and clearer; one's house always stands out in one's 
eyes as opposed to those of the neighbours. So does a corner 
shop, a particular bench or tree, in short most of the spots 
in the neighbourhood or even in the city centre that one might be 
or feel somehow related to. In other words, social relations 
which have been either objectivated on environmental forms in 
the course of their production or invested in them once they 
are produced, as well as the way these social relations are 
represented in concrete form, combine with the person's past 
experience and motivation, state of mind and course of action 
at the time to determine how selectivity will occur. Thus, 
humans are regarded as active perceivers in as much as they, 
consciously or unconsciously, organize their perceptual 
experience. 
Possible Varieties of Cognitive Experience of the 
Man -made Environment 
Although discrepancies in personal parameters may interfere in 
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number of ways in the way cognitive experience takes place, 
most psychologists would agree that what people tend to "see" 
in the environment is objects in the broadest sense of the word 
(see, for example, Seymour, 1979). In the context of 
perception of man -made environment, this would be first -level 
identification (see table 1.3). This is sustained by the 
fact that cognitive activity often is instrumental, functional 
in nature, as it relates to man's everyday purposive behaviour. 
Thus, objects may be expected to be identified basically in as 
much as their basic qualities, and, above all, their function, 
relates to man's operational needs (see also Fig. 44). 
But, man may be expected to perceive more than this. As 
cognitive schemata are representations of reality on any 
possible level of approaching it, a single environmental stimulus 
may evoke multiple cognitions corresponding to juxtapositions 
against different schemata. Gregory has argued that perception 
involves conscious and unconscious inference, "a kind of problem 
solving, a kind of intelligence" (Gregory, 1970, pp. 30 -31). 
In this sense, it appears that cognition may not necessarily 
have to confine itself to the first level identification of 
man -made environment. It seems logical to suppose that 
cognition may extend to cover the whole potential informational 
content of a certain environment, especially in view of Heider's 
argument, according to which it is important for our picture of 
the social environment to attribute events to casual sources 
(Heider, 1958, p. 16). 
At this point let us again consider the potential informational 
content of man -made environment as this has been discussed 
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TOP: "Brillo Boxes ", by 
Andy Warhol, 1964. 
BOTTOM: "The Air and the 
Song ", by Rene Magritte, 
1964. 
It appears that one must 
not assume that first 
level identification is 
always an easy task as 
there may be several over- 
lapping primary functions. 
FIGURE 44 
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in the first part of this study. Table 1.3 presents an 
array of social relations which may be represented on 
environmental forms in the process of their shaping. As 
noted in 1.3, those social relations may be seen as unfolding 
in two different dimensions, i.e. width and depth, depending 
on whether one considers different environmental forms or 
whether he is searching for the most enduring and disposit- 
ional characteristics of society and the world, as these have 
affected the shaping of a single form. 
It is possible that, in this content, new meanings are added. 
As society evolves, standards and needs change and this may 
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affect structures of the past. This has happened in cases 
of forms like the Pyramids or the Parthenon (see 1.3) and 
there is no reason for it not to occur in more short -term 
changes. As environment forms may be considered to be 
cultural modifiers (Hillier et al, 1972), it is reasonable 
to expect that culture may react by putting additional 
meaning on them. Yet, this meaning is of interest in the 
present context only if it corresponds to an appreciable 
consensus among members of this culture. Only then, it can 
be considered as an inseparable attribute of man -made 
environment and, as such, it can be regarded as being inte- 
grated in the potential informational content identified 
above. Additional or new meaning may be incorporated in 
each of the categories of table 1.3 depending on what it 
refers to. The case of Parthenon, for example, affects the 
first two categories, whereas meanings which have recently 
added to villages in the Greek mountains , referring to them 
being remote, backward or else, are connotational. 
In view of this enriched potential informational content of 
environmental forms, cognitive experience may theoretically 
be seen as occuring at three different levels in respect to 
table 1.3. Apparently, second and especially third level 
cognition involve a notably wide spectrum of schemata of social 
relations. A number of illustrations of such social 
relations were given in 1.2, where the way in which potential 
information are stored in man -made environment in the process 
of its shaping has been examined. 
Furthermore, as the individual gets actively involved in 
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perception, cognitive experience does not confine itself to 
these. Depending on all four of the individual's personal 
parameters, cognition may disentangle itself from what is 
literally "there" to be perceived. As such, it may range 
from a tangential associational cognition (e.g. as described 
by Smith, 1974, p. 52) to a completely different meaning 
being attached to the object. Arthur Koestler had said that 
activities such as listening to music or, even, reading Kant 
can lead to the experience of a whole series of apparently 
irrelevant schemata (Koestler, 1964, p. 325). In addition 
to this, the "effort after meaning" may be so urging that, 
as Lawson wrote, "we find pictures in the clouds and the 
coals of the fire almost as readily as we recognize the 
faces of our friends and relatives" (Lawson, 1980). 
Fourth level experience may be regarded as being related to 
what Sartre called "the imaginative transformation of the 
image;" evidently, a crucial notion of phenomenology (Fell, 
1965; see also Sartre, 1971, pp. 63 -96). Such experience 
may reach the same depths as second and third level experience; 
yet, it often does so in an inorderly manner, as it generally 
constitutes an inseparable whole with affective experience. 
It has been suggested that certain environmental features 
are more prone to give rise to associations and different 
readings than others. Jencks's analysis of metaphors 
(Jencks, 1981, pp. 40 -92, see Fig 45) and Agrest's of 
metaphors and shifters (Agrest, 1976; see also 1.3) elaborate 
on this idea. In as much as metaphors are concerned, one 
could perhaps argue that, although their experience appears 
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associational, it is not entirely so. It is not seldom 
that "doers" objectivate either distinct social relations 
from another context or somehow archetypal images capable 
of receiving a variety of interpretations. For this 
reason, such experience is both third and fourth level 
cognition. 
Charles Jencks presents a series of experiences of le Corbusier's 
Ronchamp (top left). The designer himself has admitted the 
"crab shell" form of the roof. 
FIGURE 45 
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The Problem of Testing How Cognitive 
Experience Occurs 
Once the varieties of man's cognitive experience have been 
described (in terms of first, second, third and fourth level 
cognitions), the question that arises is how can one be sure 
that people do cognite such information. Even if the 
experience of social relations in environmental forms 
appears theoretically sound as a function that may happen, 
how can it be proved that it does? 
An answer to these questions is to be found in field studies 
conducted by psychologists, architects and geographers on 
people's cognitive maps as regards the cities they inhabit. 
Apart from Lynch's pioneer work (Lynch, 1960), a series of 
such studies (e.g. Gulick, 1963; Steinitz, 1968; Milgram, 
1976; Zannaras, 1976) show that people do experience a 
number of social relations from those embodied in the man- 
made environment. Furthermore, this body of research shows 
that, whether some information will be known, or invested 
with some notable importance and so on, is a function of 
both personal and environmental parameters. 
Nevertheless, research on the issue is not particularly 
concerned with testing the extent to which man experiences 
the potential informational content of man -made environment; 
especially with respect to its richness, as this has been 
identified in the first part of this study. Most of the 
experiments and field studies conducted do not approach 
cognition in its own right, or in its relation to man's 
basic needs (see 2.0), but rather as referring to a particular 
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activity performed in space. Hence, the features in the 
image of the city tend to be seen in as much as they pro- 
vide cues for way- finding (see 3.1 and 3.3.1), the meaning 
of a particular space is approached in its relation to man's 
purposive behaviour in it (as, for example, in Wools and 
Canter, 1970, p. 144), and so forth. With reference to 
research conducted in environmental psychology, Mehrabian 
and Russell write that "environmental psychology has been 
concerned with two major topics: the emotional impact of 
physical stimuli and the effect of physical stimuli on a 
variety of behaviours such as work performance and social 
interaction" (Mehrabian and Russell, 1974, p. 4). 
Although it lies beyond any doubt that instrumental 
cognition is of evident significance to man, the interest 
here is in testing which social relations out of the whole 
range of the environment's potential informational content, 
are actually experienced. The studies mentioned above 
pointed out at the fact that, with reference to table 1.3, 
cognition is basically expected to occur at the first 
identificational level, while certain aspects of the second 
and third level are also expected to be experienced, as long 
as they relate to man's purposive behaviour. The question 
that remains unanswered is what happens with the rest of 
the environment's potential informational content; does 
it only exist without being utilized or does it merely have 
to refer to the needs of instrumental cognition to be exp- 
erienced. 
It appears that to conduct an experiment aiming at identifying 
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which of the possible varieties of cognitive experience 
actually do take place in real life situations is an except- 
ionally difficult task. What can be observed in the 
studies mentioned above is that answers given by the inter- 
viewees may well be functions of their broader understanding 
of the environments they live in - i.e. the broader image 
they have acquired from their environments. For this 
reason, even when the object of research is becoming 
particularly specific (as, for example, in Lynch and Rifkin, 
1976), the fuller dimensions of momentary cognitions remain 
concealed. The issue is further obscured by the fact that 
a certain portion of cognitive experience tends to occur 
below the threshold of consciousness, especially in cases 
of familiar environments (Smith, 1974, p. 33). Although 
there is evidence to suggest that subliminal stimuli may 
even determine ongoing perceptual experience (Dixon, 1971, 
pp. 29 -64), it is highly unlikely that any interviewee is 
able to give an account of the mental schemata triggered 
by such stimuli. 
In view of the above, one is forced to adopt a more 
phenomenologically inclined approach. In this, subjective 
experiences of particular individuals are to be examined with 
reference to specific objects. Since the interest is in 
examining what social relations out of those stored in man- 
made environment in the process of its shaping are exper- 
ienced, the approach will not be concerned with fourth level 
cognition. It is clear, however, that this separation is 
not always possible. As people project to some extent, 
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their "mental set" in objects they experience, the outcome 
is theoretically liable to include, at least, some fourth 
level cognition. 
With reference to social relations of the ideology of the 
function (i.e. connotational), Roland Barthes unfolds his 
reflections of the launching of Citroen's DS Model (Fig. 46). 
He writes that he experienced its smoothness as "an 
attribute of perfection because its opposite reveals a 
technical and typically human operation of assembling" 
(Barthes, 1981, p. 88). 
Similarly, when Charles Jencks discussed his cognitions of 
Beverly Hills star houses, he firstly referred to the sign of 
status transmitted to him by the historical origins of the 
style of most houses. Furthermore, his experience of 
smaller elements in such a mansion, and especially the 
chimney, door, landscaping and elements of the street point 
out at the seclusion of a rich, yet "human and homely ", star 
in view of an "ordinary" public domain (Jencks, 1981, pp. 
56-8; Fig. 47) . 
Historians' cognitive experience is also bound to contain 
cognitions of social relations which lie deeper than what 
may be regarded as the surface. A measure of Panofsky's 
and Giedion's interpretations were given in the preceeding 
part of this study. In "Art and Technics ", Mumford 
describes three paintings, three nudes painted in different 
epochs (Middle Ages, Renaissance, and nineteenth century), 
and comments that such artefacts may enclose the maximum 
of meanings (i.e. deep second and third level social 
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relations) with minimum materials. "In these condensed 
aesthetic forms, we find three different ways of looking 
at the world, three different pholosophies, three cultures 
not just three women" (Mumford, 1952, p. 20). It may 
not be surprising that, in view of such cognitions, another 
historian, Cloagg, proposed an architectural interpretation 
of history. In this attempt, what he found of particular 
interest was the understanding of how specific environmental 
forms managed to survive through the ages by means of the 
changing significance of their existence. Deep second 
level cognitions in a cross -cultural and cross -temporal 
perspective are persistent throughout the discussion (Cloagg, 
1975). 
As cognition is, to an extent, a learned process *, it 
lies beyond any doubt that the writers above were trained 
to decode the objectivations of social relations in man- 
made environment. A similar remark can perhaps be passed 
with respect to artists (Fig. 48) and writers of imaginative 
literature (like those examined by Eco, 1972, and Tuan, 1976) 
who are particularly noted for the variety and complexity 
of their cognitions. The experiences of such individuals 
indicate that, given the circumstances, it is possible for 
the widest as well as the deepest dimensions of the 
environment's potential informational content to be cognited. 
* The views of psychologists, as regards this issue, remain 
unresolved since the problem lies at the core of the 
argument between the two philosophical traditions. 
However, the stance that a large part of cognition, 
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To see how people, who are not particularly trained may 
decode social relations from man -made environment one should 
take a look at how intensional communication of such messages 
takes place in everyday life. For the fact that such systems 
of communication repeat themselves and keep recurring, it can 
be drawn that man does go beyond the surface in his cognitive 
experience of environment. In Malaspinas's (1981) and in 
Duncan and Duncan's studies (1976), for example, it has been 
shown that particular elements were incorporated in environ- 
mental forms in lower class areas so as to communicate the 
users' aspirations as regards their class and group member- 
ships. Such elements were most probably experienced as 
connotational by other inhabitants of the area (see 1.2.4 
and Figure 32). 
Similar observations may be drawn from other forms of every- 
day life communications, such as advertising. Promoters 
of car stereo equipment incorporated in their advertisement 
features such as luxurious clothes, a fast cosmopolitan car, 
and, above all, an impressive entrance to a building approp- 
riagely lit and reminiscent of the Monte Carlo Casino (Fig. 
49). Without any verbal clues referring to status, 
advertizers are almost certain that anybody in the western 
world will cognite the connotational message they wished 
to convey. 
It appears from the above that there is some evidence to 
suggest that the possible varieties of cognitive experience 
which have been identified earlier may actually take place 
in real life situations. As cognition is to some extent a 
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learned process, such experiences are expected to differ 
between different individuals depending among other factors, 
on their familiarity over the way in which certain events 
have led to the representation of social relations on 
environmental forms. 
However, no absolute conclusion can be reached in respect 
to the levels at which people experience their environments. 
Heider's argument of causal attributions may well be applied 
to particular events and representations of social relations, 
but this does not necessarily mean that everybody experiences 
the whole range of the environment's potential informational 
content. The very nature of the problem does not make it 
possible for concrete formulations to be empirically proved; 
at this stage, it is only tendencies and possibilities that 
can be identified. For this reason, the "may's ", which 
keep recurring with reference to such formulations, appear 
to be essential. Although there is some evidence to suggest 
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that cognition may refer to the deepest and widest social 
relations in the informational content of man -made environ- 
ment, experiencing the whole range of this content remains 
a theoretical potentiality. 
2.2.4 Cognitive Experience in View of Man's 
Cognitive Needs 
An important dimension of the dynamics of cognitive experience 
of man -made environment is revealed when one considers man's 
cognitive needs. If one follows the distinction between 
instrumental and more generalized cognitive activity (see 2.1), 
it appears reasonable to expect that the nature of the needs 
to which such activity relates will have some effects on what 
aspects of the environment's potential informational content 
will tend to be experienced. 
In this sense, it may be expected that in everyday goal - 
oriented behaviour (like that of the activities which are to 
be contained in spaces that designers create) the object of 
cognition will correspond to the question of what is to be 
used, avoided, negotiated and so on (see also Appleyard, 1973, 
for the idea of operational perception). Along with the 
evident need for first level identification of objects and 
primary functions, there may often be cases in which a person 
will have to choose whether there is a need to cope with a 
certain task or not, in view of the particular goal he has in 
mind. This clearly involves cognitions of the significance 
of objects and their functions and, in this sense, goal - 
oriented behaviour may be expected to require some second 
level cognition. In this, the significance of objects and 
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functions is to be assessed within the context of the part- 
icular activity. 
Furthermore, purposive behaviour may be expected to ask for 
the cognitive experience of more social relations, like those 
which are connotational in nature and refer to the question 
of how something is to be treated. These social relations 
of the ideology of functions may have been objectivated in 
distinct isolated elements or spatial relationships and it 
may also be expected that, in certain cases, their represent- 
ations spread over the whole range of an environment's 
features. When one is searching for a precise stereo system, 
he will concentrate on specific items in it, whereas in find- 
ing a peaceful room to study the holistic impression will 
basically matter. Although the latter case may seem to 
imply that all features in the environment played a role in 
instrumental cognition, it appears reasonable to argue that 
only a small part of the environment's informational content 
(i.e. what relates to the need for the activity of studying 
to be conducted peacefully) had to be experienced. 
In view of the above, it seems logical to come to the 
conclusion that although cognition, which relates to man's 
operational needs, may refer to the whole array of features 
in the environment, it still does not tend to cover its 
potential informational content. The reason behind this is 
that information in the environment is not seen in its own 
right but in as much as it refers to the needs of the partic- 
ular activity performed. 
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The scope of cognitive experience is widened though, when 
one takes into consideration other needs that induce 
cognitive activity or, at least, needs which, although they 
may not lead to such a motivational state, they may still be 
to some extent gratified by incoming information (see 2.1). 
As noted earlier, man's safety needs can be regarded as 
operating along these lines. Although these needs may 
relate to the particular activity performed in space, they 
do not necessarily do so. As most psychologists would 
agree, safety needs are basic human needs and, in this 
sense, they may exist regardless of man's goal- oriented 
behaviour. 
As man finds himself in society, the knowledge required is 
mainly knowledge of social relations and it may include any 
aspect of them; from trivial information about a thing, 
person or group of people to manifestations of society, and 
mankind in general. As has been earlier discussed, grasping 
the "feel of a place" through the re- activation of schemata 
of social relations which constitute the basic components of 
a certain situation, is an example of how the need for 
safety may be gratified. In doing so, a person must go 
deeper into decoding social relations from man -made environ- 
ment. Depending on the situation, social relations of the 
significance of functions and the ideologies of people and 
the social framework (i.e. deep second and third level 
cognition) may be required. As this matching of external 
stimuli to mental schemata generally takes place below the 
threshold of consciousness, the significance of such cognitive 
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activity often tends to be ignored. 
Similar observations can be applied to cognitive activity 
arising or referring to dissonance of the person's knowledge 
of the world and to curiosity, in the sense of exploratory 
behaviour initiated by the development of mental schemata 
in view of novel stimuli. Such cognitive experience may 
refer to any social relation from the whole range of the 
potential informational content of man -made environment. 
Since these processes are selective, in the sense that they 
are concerned with the acquisition of specific information 
they are not necessarily expected to aim at covering the 
whole content. Once cognition is freed from the demands 
of purposive behaviour however, it seems that it may refer 
to any social relations stored in man -made environment. 
Depending on the circumstances and the nature of the basic 
need it relates to (f.i. safety needs, adaptation needs, 
the need for consonance and do on), it can be directed to 
both the widest and the deepest dimensions of the environ- 
ments' potential informational content. In view of this, 
it seems reasonable to suggest that, with reference to 
different people over longer periods of time, such cognitive 
activity will tend to cover this content in both dimensions. 
The issue is elucidated further if one follows the reasoning 
in Maslow's argument, according to which cognitive needs are 
seen as forming a small hierarchy of basic human needs, which, 
in his opinion, exist in their own right. After postulating 
the existence of such autonomous needs, Maslow proceeds by 
distinguishing need -interested (what he called "D- motivated ") 
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and need -disinterested ( "B- motivated ") perception and 
cognition (Maslow, 1968, pp. 39 -41). The function of 
D- motivated perception is to relate objects in the environ- 
ment to our own needs. Since gratification comes from the 
environment (in the general sense of the word), it is 
necessary to pay attention to the world as it relates to us 
and to gain accurate information from it. He argues the.t 
this type of need -interested perception is typically sterile 
and classificatory. 
When people have achieved a stage where they have gratified 
their lower basic needs (i.e. physiological needs, safety 
needs, needs of belongingness and esteem) to some consider- 
able extent, Maslow maintains, they may be considered as 
"self- actualizers "; in other words, as living in a condition 
of "being" rather than of deprivation. Cognition at this 
stage, B- cognition, is need -irrelevant. Experiences are 
considered in their totality, in their own terms and not in 
terms of their usefulness or human relatedness. Maslow 
argues that, in the case of B- cognition, there is no attempt 
to force the object of experience into preconceived segments, 
but it is fully attended to with a receptive attitude. The 
standard polarities and dichotomies are transcended so that 
there is a fusion between selfishness and selflessness. 
Attention floats freely, so that the unique, the idiographic 
can be perceived. Thus, the world is explored and mani- 
pulated and cognition may be regarded as providing a basis 
for what can be termed as "peak" or'Inystîc experience" 
(Maslow, 1968, pp. 74 -96, 213 -4). 
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A similar formulation has been advanced by Fromm who 
argued that man's character is formed from the interaction 
between the socio- economic conditions of the society in 
which he lives and the potentials within him (Fromm, 1947, 
1955). His character structure determines the way he 
perceives the world and he proposed two ways in which this 
may be done: reproductively and generatively. In repro- 
ductive perception the world is experienced according to 
what exists on the surface or what is supposed to exist in 
terms of the predominant social character. In generative 
perception, the world is enlivened and recreated by the 
person's spontaneous mental and emotional activity. This 
is not only achieved through the imaginary fourth level trans- 
formation of the image but also by going beyond the obvious 
meanings. 
Fromm argues that while everyone is able to perceive in both 
modes, the relative weights of the two modes differ widely. 
When generative perception atrophies, the person becomes the 
stark realist who can not penetrate beyond the surface givens. 
Alternatively, when generative perception dominates, his 
cognitive experience may be totally distorted by delusions. 
According to Fromm, both extremes (realism and psychosis) 
are symptoms of sickness, and what is needed is integration, 
rather than a combination of the two modes of experience 
(Fromm, 1947, pp. 88 -90). 
While Maslow's distinction between D- cognition and B- cognition 
refers to stages in the development of the person's person- 
ality in respect to the relative gratification of his basic needs, 
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Fromm defines his duallism in a difference sense and allows 
any person at any time to percieve the world in an amalgam 
of his two modes of perception. Fromm's generative mode of 
perception, apart from being based on the exploration of 
social relations, objectivated in the perceived object, 
through second and third level cognition, is also closely 
related to fourth level cognition, i.e. the active or 
imaginary transformation of the image. Maslow's argument, 
in which B- cognition is regarded as exploring the situation 
in itself, as well as previously discussed cognitive activity 
referring tc other types of needs, do not necessarily include 
such experience. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to argue 
the, the more instrumental cognitive experience ìs, the less 
the image is likely to be transformed. 
It is needless to argue that both Maslow's and Fromm's 
formulations, which are based on the assumption that man is 
active not only with respect to his operational needs but 
also in his being -in- the -world, expand the scope of cognitive 
experience to the limits. By placing the interest in the 
exploration of the perceived abject as an entity in its own 
right, Maslow is, in fact, proposing that, in the state of 
"being ", man will not tend to confine himself to decoding 
specific social relations stored in man -made environment but 
that he may have a tendency to "read" such environments for 
the sake of knowing and understanding then. Provided that the 
codes, under which social relations become represented in the 
environment, are relatively known,a whole series of such 
social relations, which include notions of mankind in general, 
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may be unfolded and cognited. 
From the above discussion, it follows that there is a 
certain relation between the nature of the need to which 
cognitive activity refers and the part of the environment's 
potential informational content that is experienced. In 
instrumental cognition, only a part of the content of table 
1.3 appears to be needed. When cognitive experience_ does 
not refer to the particular activity the individual is 
engaged in at the moment, it may be directed to any social 
relations in the environment. For this reason, and even 
if it does not cover th.e whole range of the environment's 
potential informational content, it may be regarded as having 
a tendency to do so. 
The viewpoint, assumed by writers such as Maslow or Fromm, 
which contains the supposition that in man there is an 
inherent need to know and to understand, gives clearer 
dimensions to th.e problem. Since in the condition of 
"being" the interest is shifted in exploring the world and 
situations in themselves, cognition is deliberately stretched 
to the limits of the potential informational content of man- 
made environment. In a similar sense, Fromm's generative 
mode of perception attempts to provide an explanation for 
cognitive experience which goes beyond the surface into 
deeper meanings. Such meanings may either be stored in 
the environment or they may simply exist in the person's 
mental world. 
In view of the above, we can proceed to certain conclusions 
with reference to the argument that has been elaborated in 
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the preceeding section, i.e. to what extent can man be 
expected to experience the social relations in the environ- 
ment's potential informational content. It has been noted 
earlier that, provided that man is aware of the codes under 
which social relations have been objectivated, he is 
theoretically capable of experiencing any of these. It has 
also been said that, although it can not be empirically 
tested that he does, there is evidence to suggest that 
certain individuals do experience social relations in man- 
made environment. These social relations have been found 
to belong both to the in depth and the in width dimensions 
of the environment's potential informational content. 
The realization that man may have a certain need to know 
and autonomous or not, is 
distinguished from his operational needs, appears to be 
sustaining a tendency to experience more social relations 
than what is required by specific purposive behaviour. 
This tendency may relate to any social relation of table 1.3 
and, hence, it may be considered as supporting the signif- 
icance of the variety and richness of the whole range of 
the potential informational content of man -made environment. 
Nevertheless, it has to be noted that the inherent difficul- 
ties in testing both the exact state of man's cognitive 
needs and the way the environment is cognited, do not allow 
an absolute conclusion to be reached. In this sense, the 
above formulations can be no more than suggestive. 
2.3 COGNITIVE EXPERIENCE AND MAN'S INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT 
After examining the proceedings which accompany the reception 
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of a single, theoretically isolated, environmental stimulus, 
it is of fundamental importance for this study to come to 
an understanding as to how the above is linked with the 
development of the individual's mental world. Such an 
attempt implies that the perceptual impact will have to be 
approached over longer periods in the person's life. Natur- 
ally, some periods may be more critical than others in as much 
as they affect the individual's process of individuation 
and this depends mainly on the developmental stage he finds 
himself in. Apart from re- establishing the role of schemata 
by putting them in a different context, the aim of this 
section is to show that single cognitions, like those of man- 
made environment, play a significant role in the person's 
process of intellectual development. Knowledge of the 
world is not simply attained by means of individual percept- 
ions of the environment, as perhaps it might have been implied 
in the preceeding section. Instead, it is basically the 
result of a rather tedious, enduring process of intellectual 
development, in which the impact of trivial and apparently 
superficial cognitions appears considerably strengthened. 
There are two lines of approach to the empirical study of 
intelligence. The first, which may be called the statist- 
ical approach, capitalizes upon individual differences in 
tasks which, by general agreement, are held to require 
intelligence. Though primarily quantitative, this approach 
does involve qualitative considerations. The second, the 
qualitative approach, ignores individual differences and 
analyses intellectual processes within the individual in 
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the direction of bringing out the factors which affect 
them, and how they change qualitatively in development 
(Wright et al, 1970, p. 483). 
In the qualitative approach, basically developed by Piaget, 
the main aim is to uncover the logical structures and to 
show how these develop from birth to maturity. Since in 
the present context the interest lies in examining the 
development of such inner structures, like mental schemata, 
Piaget's work may be considered to be directly relevant to 
this study. 
The important concepts from Piaget's work, which elucidate 
the problem of the context in which cognitions take place, 
as well as how they are integrated in the individual's mental 
world, are those of assimilation and accomodation of incoming 
stimuli. It is interesting to note that, although certain 
aspects of his impressive body of research and findings were 
met with criticism (f.i. Flavell, 1978), the 
notions of assimilation and accomodation were practically 
left uncriticized. 
Before entering into the discussion of how these two concepts 
affect the line of argument in the present study, it is 
essential to take a look at the way in which schemata are 
supposed to be organized in a person's inner structures. 
2.3.1 Cognitive Structures 
The separate cognitions of an individual are grouped to form 
larger cognitive structures i.e. sets of hierarchiized 
schemata which may contain social relations. Such structures 
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are formed on the grounds that the schemata incorporated 
therein relate to a particular subject, whatever the nature 
of this is. In this respect, it is evident that a person's 
mental world comprises numerous such structures with some 
degree of autonomy. These structures are essentially 
interrelated, one penetrating through and often being part 
of another, since they may be as varied as "9th Century 
Russian Art ", "the sky at night ", "my grandmother ", or even, 
"the feeding of melancholy ". 
How separate experiences are grouped to form structures is 
determined by environmental and personal parameters (in this 
case the person's past experience and motivation). Temporal 
conditions and variables, such as the state of mind and the 
person's course of action at the time, do not affect the 
process significantly since such grouping in structures 
occurs over longer periods of time. Piaget writes that, 
in the earlier stages of intellectual development, schemata 
in cognitive structures are relatively few and simple whereas 
at the higher levels of intelligence they are vast in number 
and hierarchically organized in complex groupings (Piaget, 
1971, pp. 60 -8). 
In so far as individual experiences are culturally shaped, 
members of a culture will tend to form similar cognitive 
structures. This similarity will fluctuate depending on 
the degree of acceptance or consensus among members of a 
culture with respect to a particular structure. Thus, 
members of the same culture will tend to identify and 
classify specific houses under the cognitive structure "house ". 
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The same people will identify a hut as a "hut" rather than 
a "house ", whereas the person living there may probably have 
developed a different cognitive structure which would allow 
his home to be included under the heading "house ". 
Cognitive structures are not only formed in respect to 
isolated, identifiable objects as in the case of a house. 
They may refer to abstract or concrete conditions, aspects 
of situations and so on. Let us consider "the city at 
night" as a structure. Everybody has experienced the city 
at night repeatedly in the past and has inevitably developed 
a number of cognitive schemata relating to this situation and 
forming the relevant structure. This system may be expected 
to contain schemata such as "people generally don't work at 
", "one goes to bed at night ", "when floodlit, St. Paul's 
Cathedral becomes the impressive landmark it deserves to be ", 
"the night generally is the time for entertainment ", "last 
night we had a wonderful time ", "the commercial centre is 
pitch black by now and is an awful experience to be there" 
and so on. 
Man's mental world is typically made up of such structures. 
It is clearly impossible to find a single cognition "living 
a life of its own" since all schemata are integral elements 
of, at least, one cognitive structure. 
2.3.2 Assimilation and Accomodation of Experience 
The concept of cognitive structures and their role in 
describing the structuring of the individual's already 
attained experience of the world, do not explain the long - 
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term impact of perception by themselves. They merely provide 
us with an explanation of the context within which novel cog- 
nitions are to be incorporated. The whole process would 
appear to be a mechanical procedure of cumulative storage in 
a predictable static manner were it not for the operation of 
Piaget's functional factors of assimilation and accomodation 
(Piaget, 1971, 1971a, 1972). Instead of referring to an 
external bond between associated elements - as the behaviour- 
ists' conception of association did - Piaget's view regards 
cognition as a process in which incoming stimuli and fully 
integrated within the existing structures. 
Assimilation consists of taking in stimuli and "translating" 
them by the means of relevant structures acting as programs. 
Accomodation, then, represents the other side of the coin. 
While an environmental input is being altered (cognited, 
defined, appraised) by the structures in the person's mental 
world, these structures and, consequently, mental world in 
its entirety are being altered by input; the latter function 
constitutes accomodation. 
Assimilation ensures continuity and stability in the face 
of a complex and changing world, while accomodation leads 
to the changes in inner structures needed for adaptation to 
new circumstances. Over a period of time, accomodation of 
cognitive experience shapes the individual's trait -like 
characteristics, and through these, his personality by 
acting directly or indirectly on his already gained exper- 
ience of the world, his value system, his motivation and 
aspirations in life, and so forth. 
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But let us first start with an elementary illustration 
showing the basic principles of the two processes in 
operation in a case of, basically, first level cognitive 
experience. When one perceives an object one has never 
seen before as such, like say, a dentist's chair or a 
collapsable chair (Fig. 50), several structures of schemata 
from the memory banks are activated to be juxtaposed to 
environmental input. As noted above, the vast majority 
of environmental forms, however novel they may appear to be, 
will always somehow relate to some cognitive structures in 
people's past experience. In the case of the chair, one 
expects this relation to to established on the basis of 
social relations having to do with its primary functions and 
its ideology (see also Seymour, 1979, pp. 217 -99). 
As cognition occurs, the object is assimilated by the means 
of schemata of relevant structures. That is, several 
schemata manage to get through, decipher the codes which 
link social relations with their objectivations in the 
particular chair and match themselves with these social rel- 
ations. Finally, an object, which a couple of seconds ago 
was a "non- event ", as far as the percipient is concerned, now 
has some "substance" for him being attired with meaning, 
such as "chair ", "specialized use ", "full of gadgets ", "a lot 
of human thought and effort invested in it ", "lush high -tech 
industrial design ", "it must be very expensive" and so on. 
Accordingly, it may also be attached with various feelings 
accompanying cognitions, as well as possibly rational 
evaluations, such as, "Poor dentists! They need a fortune to 
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FIGURE 50 
go into private practice ". 
All this new cognitive experience does not stay inert, but 
is incorporated in the activated structures. For example, 
the system "chair" and its schemata are widened and enriched 
with new evidence. Similar specialist's chairs will be 
more readily identified while at the same time the percipient 
will be easily prepared to realize certain social relations 
that go along with a certain profession. Possibly, notions 
such as "a chair is a solid, unbreakable object ", or "it 
is unfair that I had the hardest time in the world to afford 
the furniture in my private office as a gynaecologist ", might 
have to be relived against new experience and, perhaps, be 
dropped. On the whole, schemata are forced to become less 
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abstract and more accurate representations of reality, while, 
at the same time, they are constantly being "threatened ", 
of revolutionary change (Boulding, 1956, pp. 7 -8). This 
function corresponds closely to the notion of'paradigmatic" 
shifts in sciences as elaborated by Kuhn (1970). 
The ability to assimilate and accomodate varies largely and 
this depends on personal (both trait -like and temporal) as 
well as environmental parameters. Eco writes that "perhaps 
an architect could build me a house that would defy every 
architectural code and perhaps this house would permit a 
pleasant and 'functional' form of inhabitation; but it is 
clear that I will not know how to inhabit it as intended 
unless I recognize the house as a context of signs referable 
to a known code (Eco, 1980, p. 20). Discrepancies in two 
individuals' personal parameters which may result to unde- 
cipharable objectivations are capable of hindering the normal 
function of assimilation and accomodation, and as a result, 
of causing both operational and deeper psychological problems 
(see also 2.4, 3.2 and 3.3). 
On the other hand, flexible and unbiased schemata, paired 
with conscious learning through training, may become remark- 
ably competent to assimilate social relations on many 
different levels. A possibly extreme case of this can be 
met in the legendary figure of Sherlock Holmes as far as 
cognitive experience is concerned. 
As noted above, however, assimilation and, expecially 
accomodation of experience can be seen more clearly if they 
are approached over longer periods of time. As bits of 
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experience are stored in the memory banks of the brain, 
they may eventually be rediscovered and relived (possibly, 
but not necessarily) with the reception of novel perceptual 
input. In this sense, a certain "bit" of experience may 
have to take long to be "properly" assimilated and accom- 
odated. Bartlett referred to patterns of schemata which 
underwent re- patterning when re- activated tobetested against 
novel stimuli (Bartlett, 1964, p. 196). 
One may, therefore, think of the case of a person living for 
a certain period of time in a different social context. Not 
as a tourist, as this would imply certain special character- 
istics for the environment (approached by definition, in this 
case, as a "spectacle ") and force the relation to function 
at another level, but as an ordinary person whose main 
occupation is not the contemplation of his surroundings. 
As is generally the case for such a person, cognitive 
structures like "a town ", "a given social context ", "people 
in the street ", or simply "buildings ", will have been fairly 
developed in terms of accuracy. On the other hand, the 
specific cognitive structure "this particular place, its 
context in terms of social relations, and my attitude towards 
it" is expected to consist of schemata of considerable 
abstraction if one supposes that it is rather based on general 
descriptions and information "about" the environment than on 
first -hand experience, as is usually the case. 
The person's ability and, of course, interest in assimilating 
and accomodating perceptual experience in the long run depends, 
as noted, on both personal (in the form of culture, personality 
traits and so on) and environemntal parameters (e.g. clarity 
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or monotony in the way social relations are objectivated in 
the environment, see 3.3). The specific structure relating 
to the particular place will be enriched through assimilation 
and accomodation as far as first level cognitive experience 
is concerned. Because of operational needs, the individual 
will have to be able to identify bus stops, his place of 
work, eating places and so on. 
But experience does not stop there. Once the person becomes 
familiar with the vocabulary according to which social 
relations have become objectivated in the given context, he 
will eventually be expected to deepen his experience to the 
second and third level. The degree to which this will 
happen is a function of his ability (and interest) to 
assimilate and accomodate and there appears to be an 
interaction between the two sides of the function. The 
increased understanding, along with a possible change in 
attitude, will allow him to re- assimilate experience and 
invest environmental forms with more balanced meaning. A 
number of field studies indicate a strong probability for 
such an increase in understanding (f.i. Steinitz, 1968, 
Pocock and Hudson, 1978, p. 24). 
The result of going deeper into experiencing social relations 
in the environment in a more generalized form (e.g. the 
locals' attitude to work and entertainment) implies unlocking 
and activating structures concerned with matters (whether 
knowledge, values or beliefs) of increasing significance to 
the individual. As assimilation and accomodation may occur 
in a circular retroactive manner, some "bits" of experience 
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may take considerably longer to become consciously accom- 
odated.at such a level. The fact that schemata of such 
significance are re- discovered and, whether strengthened 
or modified, will become less abstract and more accurate 
constitutes a cornerstone for the link between cognitive 
experience and the development of the person's mental 
world. 
It is interesting to note how contemporary research in 
psychiatry may come in relation to this argument when 
applied to man's perception of the built environment. 
Recent studies have provided the evidence to sustain the 
supposition that a language system, which does not contain 
a variety of concepts and meanings in all their subtleties, 
may effect a cruder form of communication between people. 
Subsequently, this may effect in mental retardation and 
maladjustment (Rutter, 1978). To the extent that this 
finding can be applied to man's cognition of the richness 
of the environment's potential informational content, it 
appears reasonable to suggest that man -made environment may 
not offer the possibility for a variety of schemata to dev- 
elop. This is not meant to imply that the built environ- 
ment can determine a person's intellectual development; yet 
it is clear that it is possible for it to come as a factor 
in this direction. 
Adaptation and the Functions of Assimilation and Accomodatìon 
As it can be seen from the above, assimilation and accomodation 
are complementary; one cannot occur without at least some of 
the other. Not only environmental input results in at least 
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a small change in a person's inner structures, but also no 
learning or any kind of change in these can occur unless 
there has been at least a partial assimilation of new 
material (see also 3.3.2). When assimilation and accom- 
odation are balanced, behaviour is most adaptive, but such an 
equilibrium is not the usual state. It is the mere temporary 
end of a developmental sequence from a less mature stage to a 
more mature one. This notion of moving towards an equil- 
ibrium that itself is dynamic and unstable is a basic axiom 
in Piaget's theory ( Piaget, 1971, pp. 2 -37 and p. 171F; see 
also Hyde, 1970, pp. 24 -29). Development, then, consists 
of a sequence of stages, each starting with an imbalance and 
ending with a temporary equilibrium. 
There are two kinds of imbalance that involve assimilation 
and accomodation and influence perception in its potency as 
a vehicle in the direction of the individual's intellectual 
development. In the first, assimilation dominates accom- 
odation. This is the case in which only stimuli consistent 
with momentary interests are attended to, with the result 
that thought processes are self- centered and unrealistic. 
Cognitive processes are too subjective failing tc take 
account of the complexity and flux of the environment. When 
one perceives the environment - and, in this case, this may 
become increasingly unconscious - one does so with the eyes 
of personal bias, one relates it to strict, rigid schemata 
(being incompetent to integrate novel social implications 
to them) and jumps to arbitrary conclusions. 
In the second kind of disequilibrium, accomodation dominates 
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assimilation. Stimulus inputs trigger change in cognitive 
schemata, and the whole of mental world, too easily and 
behaviour may become imitative. This imbalance may 
eventually lead to imaginative situations (imitations of 
present persons, deferred imitation and, finally, mental 
illusions). The problem has been raised by R.D. Laing 
when discussing the "false -self system" (Laing, 1971, pp. 
125 -50). This denial of self can not last long and only 
an increasing tendency to assimilate, and consequently 
"assert" the self, may lead to an equilibrium. 
Although these two kinds of imbalance can be seen to occur 
over longer periods of time, they may also be regarded as 
being potentially "there" at any time as the equilibrium 
is dynamic and unstable. This appears to be a function of 
the person's trait -like characteristics as well as his state 
of mind at the time. 
To recapitulate, assimilation and accomodation can be seen 
as being functional factors in perception in a twofold manner. 
On the one hand, by relating perceptual input to the develop- 
ment of the person's inner structures, they give a picture 
of the context in which experience occurs while, at the same 
time, they explain how it is integrated in man's mental world. 
In this sense, single cognitions of the man -made environment 
may modify, strengthen,or alter mental schemata, cognitive 
structures and the person's mental world as a whole. On 
the other hand, by relating esoteric changes to the way the 
environment is experienced, they provide an explanation for 
the form man's cognitive needs may attain as a result of the 
development of his mental world. 
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2.4 THE FORMATION OF GROUP IMAGES 
Once the understanding of the occurence and importance of 
cognitive experience has been established for the case of a 
single individual, the question that arises is what 
characterizes group images. Evidently, the designer is 
very seldom concerned with a single person's image of the 
objects he designs, since such objects are generally brought 
to life to appeal to wider and more complex groups of people. 
This is typically the case for the urban environment. 
Therefore, the understanding of the way in which the environ- 
ment is likely to be experienced by groups of people, as mixed 
and varied as, say, city dwellers may be, is of essential 
importance in the urban designer's profession. 
From what has been elaborated in the preceeding sections, it 
follows that the particular way a single individual exper- 
iences his environment at any given time is dominated by the 
particular formation of his personal parameters at the time 
(i.e. his past experience and motivation, his state of mind 
and course of action at the time). The variety and diversity 
of mental schemata, which may be actived in perception, provide 
the potential for remarkably different experiences. In this 
sense, momentary perceptions of the environment are in their 
entirety idiosyncratic and unpredictable, (Pocock and Hudson, 
1978, p. 33). 
This may be so even when the same environment is experienced 
by the same person, no matter how often this happens and will 
happen (e.g. a person leaving his front door, in the bus on 
his journey to work and so on). An illustration of this 
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point is provided by Rapoport who refers to the main 
quadrangle in Sydney University. Even after years of 
experiencing it and knowing exactly what to expect, the 
impact remains and is sustained by changes in scale, 
enclosure, light, colour, mood, sound quality, the lawn and 
tree, the weather and time of day and so on (Rapoport, 1977, 
p. 217; Fig. 51). 
If the problem is as it appears to be at a first glance, 
then there is hardly a way of predicting how a certain 
environment will be experienced even for a single person. 
In that case, the designer who is concerned with the image 
of the objects he creates would seem to be faced with a hope- 
less task. Nevertheless, although it is impossible to 
understand what a person's momentary image of an environment 
in its entirety may be, it is still feasible to forecast 
some aspects of it. 
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The interests of the present study as regards the formation 
of group images of man -made environments are centered in the 
examination of basically two aspects of the problem: one 
concerning the functions involved and the other concerning 
the content of the image. In this sense, the first issue 
relates to the identification of the functional qualities of 
personal parameters in cognitive experience of man -made 
environment. The second issue is concerned with the actual 
message and the question of how may one come to certain clues 
as to what a group image may be like. 
It should be made clear that the interest of this study does 
not lie in measuring group images or in examining the figur- 
ative aspects of them alone, knowledge of the form of cities. 
In view of the potential informational content of man -made 
environment, what has to be examined is whether they may be 
some groupings, in the factors influencing perception, which 
may help in predicting certain aspects of group images. For 
this reason, what is needed is a broad overview of the factors 
involved. 
2.4.1 The Function of Personal Parameters in the 
Formation of Group Images 
Let us now consider people's personal parameters and, 
especially, how these may relate to each other in case of more 
than one individuals. As it has been elaborated in 2.3.1, 
a person's mental world may be regarded as being grouped in a 
complex set of interrelated cognitive structures. Although 
individual prior experiences of the world are, in their 
entirety, unique, the structures they relate to may be regarded 
as tending to be shared (at least in their basic components) 
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among different people. The extent of this spreading 
depends on the nature of the structure, on the one hand, 
and on the individual's social environment (e.g. position 
in society, age, class, culture, etc.), on the other. 
Reversely, various groupings, sub- groupings and cross- group- 
ings of members of a given society will be expected to 
present similarities in certain cognitive structures of 
individual mental worlds. Such similarities or differences 
are expected to provide some clues for the prediction of the 
understanding of the codes which link social relations to 
environmental forms. The group, say, of antique dealers 
will be expected to be able to identify a much more extended 
set of social relations represented on certain objects than 
what the average person would. 
A measure of image variation with people's past experiences 
can be traced in the drawings of mental maps of cities as 
these were experienced by members of different subgroups. 
As such pictures are functions of people's images, one may 
see how people depict elements (and social relations) they 
know more. The nine year old child emphasizes his home 
and school, the student, the university buildings, the 
tourist the city centre, while long -term residents have a 
more balanced, although different cognition of their city 
(Pocock and Hudson, 1978, p. 66; Fig. 52). 
From the above study, as well as from similar ones like 
those mentioned in 2.2.3, it can be seen that, whatever 
the degree of variation in image formation, it may be 
expected that there will always be some consensus, provided 
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that there are similarities in people's prior experience 
of the world. In this sense, when one refers to a given 
society, a fair amount of codes of representation of social 
relations on man -made environment is shared. This con- 
stitutes an additional reason to strengthen the significance 
of analyzing how sources of potential information are 
embodied in the environment in the process of its shaping. 
A state of some concensus may again be reached as regards 
people's motivation or state of mind at the time of perception. 
Apparently, the latter may be more effective in the form- 
ation of momentary images. In this sense, people may 
statistically be expected to be in similar moods in environ- 
ments such as holiday resorts, entertainment places or 
certain environments, which because of their nature, may 
induce peak experiences. Similarly, motivation may also be 
based on elements, such as wants or instincts, which originate 
from the unconscious. Although such elemements may be 
expected to be shared among different people, their express- 
ions in the form of motivational states may only occasionally 
result in similarities in cognition. Nevertheless, certain 
forms of motivation may apparently be shared in a more 
identifiable manner and, therefore, can be seen to lead to 
a somehow distinct grouping of the image. 
In the illustration below, the replies of two sample 
population studies in the city of Hull, resident and outsider, 
are juxtaposed (Burgess, 1974). 
Both groups made a few common selections from an adjectival 
checklist of 48 items, but only the city's inhabitants 
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illustrating the 
different perceived 
worlds by different 
subgroups; 
a: Nine year old 
child 
b: Final year 
undergraduate 











emphasized elements of general structure, such as "shopping 
facilities" and "redevelopment ", or positive affection, for 
example "friendly" and "parks ". Outsiders' motivation and 
predisposition was markedly different (along with obvious 
differences in their past experiences). They emphasised 
the negative attributes ( "heavy industry ", "unemployment ", 
"slums ", "smoke ", etc.) and they were actually presenting 
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the stereotype of a nineteenth -century industrial town in 
the north of England. 
TABLE 2.3.1 
Leading Characteristic Attributes of Hull as 




Good Shopping Centre 85 Docks 90 
Working -class City 84 Working -class City 85 
Docks 81 Ships 79 
Large Council Estates 75 Fishy 75 
Friendly 74 Heavy Industry 67 
Trees, Parks 74 Slums 63 
Ships 65 Large Council Estates 59 
Low wages 61 Unemployment 57 
Fishy 58 Cold 56 
Congested Traffic 57 Smoke 53 
Tower Block Flats 56 Congested Traffic 50 
Redevelopment 55 Drabness 49 
(from Burgess, 1974). 
As regards people's course of action at the time of perception, 
it has been already discussed how cognition may depend on 
purposive behaviour when it becomes an operational need in 
response to it (see 2.1 and 2.2.4). Yet, this parameter may 
be seen as being extended on whatever the main occupation of 
body and mind may present. In this respect, different, 
fairly clear, patterns are likely to be formed depending on 
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the nature of the occupation, the extent to which it involves 
the conscious mind, the emotions it may evoke, the variety 
in angles of viewing the environment it requires and so on. 
Different patterns will tend to give different patterns of 
perceptual experience as far as diversity in the course of 
action is concerned (e.g. possible discrepancies in a 
typist's and a cleaner's view of the same office as a result 
of discrepancies in the positioning of eye- levels and per- 
petual viewpoints relating to their movement, or non - movement, 
in space when doing their work). 
The overall view of the influence of personal parameters on 
perceptual experience seems to be pointing at the fact that 
although each and every momentary image remains unique in 
its entirety, there are still some ways of experiencing the 
environment that appear more probable than others for a given 
group of people. The above statement establishes probabilism 
as the characteristic aspect of the influence the environment 
has on people in terms of perceptual experience, at least as 
regards cognition in relation to people's basic needs. 
There are certain analogies to be drawn between what is being 
discussed in this section as regards the way the built 
environment is experienced and the approach to the question 
of its effect on human behaviour. In relation to the latter 
issue, Rapoport summarized the three prevalent attitudes as 
follows: 
1. Environmental determinism - the view that the 
physical environment determines human behaviour. 
2. Possibilism - the view that the physical environ- 
ment provides possibilities and constraints within 
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which people make choices based on other, mainly 
cultural, criteria. 
3. Probabilism - the current view that the physical 
environment does, in fact, provide possibilities 
for choice and is not determining, but that some 
choices are more probable than others in given 
physical settings (Rapoport, 1977, p. 2). 
Although overt behaviour may be considered to be a function 
of experience (Laing, 1967, p. 24) and therefore should not 
be confused with it, it appears that similar approaches or 
attitudes exist, in either a latent or an explicit form, as 
regards people's experience of man -made environment (Lang, 
1980, p. 148). 
The complexities of perceptual experience however do not 
allow an overall generalization of the way personal para- 
meters function in perception to be formulated. Nevertheless 
it seems logical to come to a broad distinction arising from 
the nature of cognitive experience. Thus, one the one hand 
one tends to agree with Appleyard in his view that experience 
tends to be more deterministic when cognition is an oper- 
ational need; although, even then, one may not have pure 
determinism, mainly because of the complexities involved 
(Appleyard, 1973). On the other hand, when cognition is 
freed from needs arising from pruposive behaviour, then, 
certain groupings as regards people's personal parameters may 
turn some cognitions into more probable than others. 
Finally, as the potential informational content of man -made 
environment may be extremely rich in social relations, it is 
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reasonable to suggest that the probability of experiencing 
a number of such social relations may appear very small. 
Although this probability is a function of personal para- 
meters, the complexities in them and the possible richness 
of the content may make experience look as though it is a 
matter of chance. One could argue that such an element 
may, in fact, be involved in these cases. For this reason, 
it seems logical to suppose that, although experience of 
social relations in the environemnt is basically character- 
ized by probabilism, it may fluctuate from determinism to 
possibilism depending on the circumstances. 
2.4.2 The Content of Group Images 
Up to this point we have discussed how people's personal 
parameters may operate as functional factors and influence 
the way perceptual input will be experienced. These 
parameters were seen as being particularly important in 
perception and a measure of this is shown by the fact that 
individual momentary images tend to be unique and idio- 
syncratic. What remains to be stressed in this section is 
the relative importance of environmental parameters as well 
as how can one come to some conclusion as regards the group- 
ings of the content of cognitive experience. 
It is interesting to note that, although a person may 
experience his surroundings according to the particular 
formation of his personal parameters at the time, this 
experience may only be drawn from the particular environment 
in which he finds himslef and nothing else. And, although 
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one may often focus one's attention to one's past experience 
(images, thoughts, events etc.), this may not happen over 
longer periods of time and one must go back into experiencing 
one's particular surroundings. The same happens for every 
person in a shared environment, as is typically the case for 
a city. 
Moreover, no matter how endless the amount of potential 
information in an environment appears to be, it can not be 
anything else but a finite rather than an infitine domain 
for experience. No two environments in this world can be 
characterized by identical environmental parameters and each 
one of them carries its own potential in the amount of 
possible information it contains. 
This stimulus dependency appears to be easily confused with 
what schemata a person has already acquired from previous 
experience, whether direct or indirect, of his environment. 
In this sense, its significance tends to be limited to 
momentary situations (Moore and Colledge, 1976, p. 6). For 
cases of both immediate, stimulus,dependent and long -term 
experience, it has been argued that the form of environmental 
features may increase or decrease the probability of them 
being experienced; such is, for example, the case of image - 
ability of features (Lynch, 1960) which may ask for responsive 
perception (Appleyard, 1973). 
In the context of the present study however, it is essential 
that we proceed further into examining how different social 
relations embodied in environmental forms may be expected to 
198. 
be experienced in view of what has been discussed in the 
previous section. In an attempt of pinpointing the areas 
of possible confusion over the perceptual input, it appears 
essential to examine the content of the message in the light 
of how an information channel operates. 
According to information theory (Shannon and Weaver, 1949; 
Broadbent, 1973, p. 210) the function of communication can 















TABLE 2.4.2 (based on Shannon and Weaver, 1949, and on 
Broadbent, 1973). 
The information source (e.g. a human brain) wishes to pass 
a message to the information destination (e.g. another human 
brain) so as to affect the latter's experience and modify its 
behaviour. This information consists of ideas, thoughts, 
concepts (signifieds) about people, objects and their 
relations (referents) which in the case of the built environ- 
ment, have to be codified into perceivable concrete form 
(signifiers). This encoding corresponds to what in the first 
part of the study has been described as the objectivation of 
social relations on environmental forms. The difference lies 
in the fact that the above model, when seen as a whole, is 
concerned with intended communication. As noted earlier, 
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social relations may manage to become objectivated on 
environmental objects incidentally or with no direct intent- 
ion for communication. In respect to this, the model of 
table 2.4.2, apart from being regarded as a whole when 
communication is intended, it can also be divided in its two 
component functions the encoding, or objectivation, and the 
decoding, or assimilation of social relations; this last 
function theoretically includes the totality of social 
relations represented on man -made environment in the process 
of its shaping. 
The two functions, which are performed by the transmitter 
and the receiver respectively, constitute the main source of 
noise in the communication model. When encoding, one 
immediately distorts from 
able list of signs. This distinction can be called semantic 
noise and it is a function of the person's personal para- 
meters and the social context. An expression of such a 
distortion can be seen in cases where there is a lack of 
congruence between activity and spatial form, as for example 
in old tenements which are now used for storage (Steinitz, 
1968, p. 243 and Fig. 53). 
Having been distorted at source, the message will be subject 
to mechanical noise within the channel (e.g. smudged letter- 
ing, tea -stains on a drawing etc.) and, when it reaches the 
receiver, it will be subject to further noise. For in the 
process of decoding, as we have seen, it is highly likely 
that activated schemata will result in the attachment of 
rather different meanings of the signs from those which the 
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Churches converted into sports clubs (left, in 
Bridge of Weir) and Job Centres (right, in 
Portobello). Verbal signs have to be big and 
impressive to overcome the semantic noise caused 
by the building envelope. 
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source intended (as, for example, in the case of the toilet 
bowl or the Chandigarh residential quarters discussed in 
1.2.4). But even if these meanings are similar, a certain 
distortion of the message will still (at least, theoretically) 
occur since schemata are, by definition, abstract represent- 
ations of reality and the degree of abstraction varies with 
the individual. 
The above sources of noise are in operation and may distort 
the message at any time during communication. As noted before, 
the body of social relations objectivated in the environment 
is not expected to be experienced in its entirety. To a 
certain extent, this depends on the source's personal para- 
meters in relation to those of the destination and the 
resulting degree of sharing the vocabulary used in encoding. 
This aspect of group image formation can be predictable to 
an extent as long as the designer carefully considers how the 
recipients' personal parameters can be grouped. In this 
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sense, a mosque designed by European standards and incorpor- 
ating European signifiers may probably be as meaningful to 
the Arabs as an advertisement in Arabic, posted in London, 
would be to the English. 
But, apart from differences resulting from discrepancies in 
the sharing of the particular vocabulary used, several other 
aspects of the content of the message can be to an extent 
predictable as well. Considering once more the table in 
1.3, one may see that an environmental object may contain 
information on three levels. Broadbent notes that, if the 
original signifiers carried largely denotational (either first, 
or second, level or, in other words "what is this" and "why 
does it exist ") meanings, communication will tend to be 
accurate. But if they contained connotational meanings, then 
it is more likely that the decoding will result in meanings 
which are rather different from those the source intended 
(Broadbent, 1973; Rapoport, 1977). 
In his early work on "the image ", Boulding used and defined 
the term "public image" as "the basic bond of any society, 
culture, sub -culture or organization" ( "Boulding, 1956, p. 64). 
In view of this, it appears reasonable to argue that if such 
a collective experience was to rely on connotational meanings 
then it is likely that it would be diffused, since most 
members of a group would tend to interpret such meanings in 
their own personal manner. 
In close agreement with this view is Venturi's criticism on 
how "the rhetoric of the image" works for the so- called 
International Style in Architecture. In his book "Learning 
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from Las Vegas ", Venturi argues that, if designers keep 
designing for connotations and associations, there is a 
danger of loosing our common language and shared experience 
(Venturi, 1977, pp. 101 -62). 
Taking another look at table 1.3 however, it can be noted 
that, mainly because of the extreme variety and multi- 
plicity of factors affecting a certain primary function, 
connotational meanings are very important in the unfolding 
of the entirety of the potential informational content in 
environmental forms. Because of this richness contained in 
connotations and in view of man's cognitive needs, one may 
argue that such meanings are needed. The question then, is 
to ensure that they will be less abstract and more specific 
so that a fair body of them will be eligible of being 
shared to an appreciable degree. 
A way to increase the probability of certain connotations 
being experienced along with denotations is through the 
juxtaposition of environments and social relations which would 
naturally belong to different contexts (see also expectancy in 
2.2.1). In this manner, social relations of both contexts 
may be expected to stand out in perception as "colouring" 
and deepening first and second level experience. An interest- 
ing illustration of this point can be seen in the case of 
surrealist works of art; especially so,in legible paintings 
like those by Magritte (Hammacher, n.d.). The careful 
placing of objects in a context other than their usual 
surprises and attracts the attention of those also contemplate 
the painting. When successful, the juxtaposition of objects 
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"Personal Values" by Magritte, 1952. 
Using differentiation in dimensions as a basic code, 
Magritte develops the idea that every day objects, 
which normally are nothing but functional gadgets, 
may take over and dominate one's personal space, if 
one is not careful. 
FIGURE 54 
and contexts allows social relations which refer to how certain 
elements are used (and which tend to be taken for granted) to 
come to surface (Fig. 54). 
Apparently, it may very seldom be asked from the built envir- 
onment to incorporate shocking juxtapositions which seem to 
involve many psychic associations. Such a technique however, 
is often followed by architects who wish to be in the so- called 
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extreme manifestations, it may be argued that such juxta- 
position of forms and contexts is more interested in making 
a point as regards the discussion on architectureal issues 
rather than to satisfy the particular users' needs (see 
1.2.4). 
What is asked from designers, however, is not to destroy 
people's experiences or produce shocking effects, which may 
give rise to feelings of depression or alienation, as 
psychiatrists may argue, but to design in a direction which 
would allow both denotational and connotational meanings to 
be experienced smoothly (see also 3.2). Bearing in mind the 
way the users' personal parameters function in perception, one 
may expect technics like the so- called "contextualism" (see 
Rowe, n.d. and Fig. 56) to operate in this direction. In 
The Entrance to 
"High Point II" 





this sense, a careful juxtaposition of contexts will not only 
be expected to increase the probability of distinct connot- 
ational social relations to be experienced, but it would also 
preserve the unity of perceptual experience. 
To recapitulate what has been discussed in this section, 
perceptual experience has been regarded as being dominated by 
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the individual's both temporal and more trait -like character- 
istics. In this sense, a momentary image will tend to be 
in its entirety idiosyncratic and unique. 
Yet, there may be certain clues which may help to come to a 
grouping of such personal experiences, either in momentary 
terms or when seen in the long run these clues, which are to 
be found in similarities in people's personal parameters, 
turn certain cognitions into more probably than others. In 
this sense, the environment may be said to be experienced 
in a probabilistic way. Depending on the circumstances and 
the particular formation of people's personal parameters, 
environmental experience may be expected to fluctuate from 
being more deterministic (as in the case of purposive 
to more possibilistic (when it is regarded as 
referring to the totality of the potential informational 
content of man -made environment). 
Furthermore, by determining the extent to which the vocabulary 
of codes is shared, personal parameters provide clues in 
identifying what has been termed as semantic and perceptual 
noise in communication. Such clues may lead to an understand- 
ing of the actual content of people's experience of man -made 
environment. The main link between social relations object - 
ivated in the environment and the perceived collective image 
appears to be first and second level denotational meanings and 
mainly those of the identification of objects. It is more 
probably for such information to be experienced at a group 
level rather than connotational meanings, although it seems 
logical to suggest that under certain circumstances (as, f.ì. 
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in cases of juxtapositions of objects and contexts) the 
probability for connotations may increase. 
2.5 CONCLUSIONS - THE IMPORTANCE OF THE COGNITIVE 
EXPERIENCE OF MAN -MADE ENVIRONMENT 
In the first part of this study, the potential informational 
content of man -made environment, as this is embodied in 
environmental forms in the process of their shaping, has 
been explored. Analytical observation suggested that 
social relations, which were represented on environmental 
forms, could be exceptionally varied in amount and multi- 
plicity as well as in width and depth. If one adds to this 
meanings that are being attached on environmental forms 
after they have been constructed as a matter of consensus of 
the social groups involved (see 2.2.3) then the potential 
informational content appears immense. 
Where does all this information go? Is the representation 
of social relations a merely accidental and peripheral 
phenomenon amidst the complexities of the evolution of man- 
kind or is it somehow utilized? And, if it is utilized, 
how important may this be for man? 
The discussion in the second part of this study approached 
the issue in relation to man's cognitive needs. Although 
an absolute conclusion can not be reached because of the 
nature of the problem, there is some evidence to suggest 
that people do experience social relations from the environ- 
ment's potential informational content. When cognitive needs 
are operational in nature, in respect to a particular activity, 
cognition is expected to be directed to a certain body of 
information so that the activity is sustained or facilitated. 
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The discussion in the second part of this study approached 
the issue in relation to man's cognitive needs. Although 
an absolute conclusion can not be reached because of the 
nature of the problem, there is some evidence to suggest 
that people do experience social relations from the environ- 
ment's potential informational content. When cognitive 
needs are operational in nature, in respect to a particular 
activity, cognition is expected to be directed to a certain 
body of information so that the activity is sustained or 
facilitated. Such cognitive experience is of evident import- 
ance while it only asks for a part of the environment's 
potential informational content to be involved. 
Further research, however, has suggested that the need to 
know may become a of 
man's other purposive behaviour. Although this cognitive 
need may arise from various sources, as, for example, man's 
safety or adaptation needs, it has also been strongly argued 
that there is a case for an autonomous need to know and to 
understand in the form of a universal basic human need. 
The realization that man's cognitive needs, whether auton- 
omous or not, may be elevated at the level described above, 
allows cognitive activity to be seen as transcending the 
operational needs of the moment. Cognitive experience of 
man -made environment can then be regarded in relation to 
man's basic needs as a person and not only as a servant to 
man's purposive behaviour of the moment. This clearly opens 
the possibility of a much greater portion of the potential 
informational content of man -made environment to be 
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experienced as the object of cognition may be any social 
relation in the environment and not only those which sustain 
the particular activity performed in space. 
If one accepts Maslow's view that, in the condition of 
"being" (in which man is supposed to have relatively gratified 
his basic needs), the individual tends to explore the sit- 
uation in itself, then one may see that experience may 
deliberately tend to cover the limits of the content. 
Piaget's notions of assimilation and accomodation of 
experience provide an explanation of the way in which consc- 
ious and unconscious cognitions become integrated in the 
individual's mental world. Apart from being kept alert, 
mental schemata become less abstract representations of 
reality, individual cognitive structures are evolving and the 
person's mental world as a whole develops with perceptual 
input. 
When this is brought in relation to the richness of the 
environment's potential informational content, it becomes 
possible for man -made environment to be regarded as possess- 
ing a different quality than providing cues for man's goal - 
oriented behaviour. It seems reasonable to argue that if 
seen as a whole, cognitive experience of man -made environ- 
ment is complementary to man's overall experience and under- 
standing of the world. Man -made environment, then, constit- 
utes an important domain from which this knowledge is 
acquired. 
It appears necessary to disentangle ourselves from the 
supposition that environmental cognition leads to foreseeable 
210. 
action, in order to arrive at this suggestion. The fact 
that a significant part of the experience of man -made 
environment in every day life tends to occur below the 
threshold of consciousness, is further confusing the matter 
by concealing its fuller dimensions. A role in this is also 
played by generic schemata which have to do with the primary 
functions of objects (such as words relating to the first 
level identification) and which are readily raised from 
memory to help the individual cope with a complex world. 
Such experience of man -made environment screens its subtleties 
and, consequently, neutralizes the dynamics of its potential 
informational content. Yet, as noted above, cognitive 
experience may be expected to be deliberately directed 
towards the fuller dimensions of this content. 
What is meant by the suggestion that the man -made environment 
functions as a domain from which man acquires his knowledge 
of the world is not that the experience of social relations 
enbedded in it comes as a revelation to a mind which is in a 
"tabula rasa" condition. Instead, one should note that, 
at some stage of his intellectual development, man has 
already acquired a certain set of cognitive structures. 
When cognition occurs, external stimuli are expected to have 
some point of reference with schemata in these structures, 
however underdeveloped and relatively few the latter may be. 
The discussion in this part of the study suggests that all 
what is experienced, and particularly what refers to the 
person's deeper cognitive needs, bears an effect on already 
existing mental schemata, cognitive structures and the 
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person's mental world as a whole. In this sense, schemata 
are strengthened, modified and, possibly, altered with 
incoming stimuli. As noted earlier, subliminal perception 
plays an important role in this so that the world does not 
have to be "rediscovered" from scratch with every cognitive 
experience. For this reason, the suggestion that man's 
experience of man -made environment is complementary to his 
overall knowledge of the world is based on the fact that 
what he already knows can be regarded as being continuously 
tested against his everyday experience of man -made environ- 
ment. 
Let us for a moment consider a typical working -class housing 
estate and children who are brought up there. Apart from 
possible hereditary factors their understanding of society 
as well as their understanding of themselves and their 
position in it, will develop through a variety of channels. 
From what has been discussed in the first part of the study, 
it may be concluded that the appearance of the estate is not 
accidental but it is more likely that several social relations, 
which were involved in its production, became objectivated in 
the end form. 
For example, it is very likely that the estate has been the 
outcome of a governmental project on a restricted budget 
which required a "fast" program in view of the government's 
priorities in the allocation of financial resources and so 
on, and that all this probably had to do with the way the 
government (and, probably, society as a whole) views the 
particular social group. It is very often that these social 
relations bear clear effects of the end product (Fig. 57), 
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Among the many channels through which these children may 
be expected to come to an understanding of the above social 
relations (that is: if they do), is through their 
objectivations in built form, especially when the estate 
is compared to other residential areas so that the dynamics 
of the codes of representation are taken into account. 
Apparently, it is highly unlikely that this will occur as 
an instantaneous enlightment,a "eureka" experience of some- 
thing that was unthought before. Instead, from what has been 
discussed so far, it seems possible that they may have developed 
some need to understand social relations in thier social envir- 
onment and that their cognitions of their surroundings may be 
incorporated in their direction. If already existing mental 
schemata of these social relations are consistent with what is 
objectivated, then accomodation suggests that they are 
strengthened while they also become more accurate. If they are not, 
then perceptual input places them in doubt and it may be 
expected that they are modified or even altered to suit incom- 
ing evidence. 
It lies beyond the scope of the present study to specify the 
relative importance of man's cognitive experience of man- 
made environment when this function is compared to man's 
overall understanding of the world. The nature of the issue 
involves the scrutiny of internal processes in relation to all 
channels through which this understanding is attained and 
this appears an exceptionally difficult field for research 
to be conducted. 
What has been discussed so far, however, suggests that cog- 
nitive experience of man -made environment may bear signigicant 
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effects on man's mental world, especially when one takes 
into account the fuller dimensions of the potential infor- 
mational content of man -made environment. In this sense, 
environmental cognition appears to be important enough to 
attract the researcher's attention. This attitude is 
sustained by the finding that man may have cognitive needs 
which relate to a body of environmental information wider 
in range than what is required by the activity he is 
engaged in. In view of the above, it seems reasonable to 
argue that, although often weak or misconceived, the function 
of man's experience of his surroundings is fairly important 
for his process of intellectual development and his under- 
standing of the world. 
215. 
PART THREE 
THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE CONCEPT OF 
COGNITIVE NEEDS ON DESIGN THEORY AND PRACTICE 
216. 
3.0 INTRODUCTION 
As noted in the overall introduction, the present study 
constitutes an attempt to explore the nature of man's 
cognitive needs in relation to the experience of man -made 
environment. This exploration is to be conducted in the 
direction of establishing possible requirements for design. 
In view of this orientation, the first part of the study 
explored the potential informational content which is stored 
in man -made environment in the process of its shaping. In 
the second part, this content, in all its richness in 
social relations, was brought in relation to the development 
of man's mental world in view of man's cognitive needs. With 
some reservations over the amount of inference involved, 
it was concluded that cognitive experience of man -made 
environment may be regarded as being sustained by a general- 
ized need to know and to understand, and, as such, it is 
characterizec by a highly significant quality. As individual 
cognitions relate to the development of man's mental world, 
man -made environment constitutes an important domain for 
cognitive experience which is complementary to man's overall 
experience of the world. Thus, when cognitive activity is not 
seen as relating to specific ends deriving from purposive 
behaviour, the object of cognition attains a different nature 
and man -made environment seen as a whole may be regarded as 
playing an important role in people's intellectual development. 
The aim of the third and final part of this study is to 
develop the above theoretical considerations further so 
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that the implications they have on architecture, and, 
particularly, urban design, can be assessed. 
As has been mentioned in 2.5, there are certain doubts as to 
precisely how important cognition of man -made environment 
may be in view of man's overall experience of the world. 
Because of the nature of cognitive activity, which is typ- 
ically an internalized process, this relative significance 
can not easily be tested. What is to be noted however, is 
that, when it comes to design practice, the whole issue can 
be seen from a different viewpoint. Since the designer is, 
among other things, the manipulater of the way in which social 
relations become represented on environmental forms, the issue 
concerns the whole scope of his work. In this sense, the 
function that environmental forms perform, by being domains 
for cognitive experience in response to man's cognitive needs, 
refers to the composite need in any environmental change a 
designer has to deal with. For this reason, taking the 
above function of environmental forms into account appears to 
be a major issue in design practice. 
The ability of many modern environments to transmit messages 
has been questioned by a growing number of writers like 
Franooìse Choay who referred to their "h.yposignificance" 
(Choay, 1969, p. 31) and Bonta who commented on their 
"desemantization" (Bonta, 1979, pp. 30. -49). This shallow- 
ness in meaning may be particularly harmful in modern societies 
in which it has been argued that there is a tendency of 
"informativism" (de Ventos, 1980, pp, 186 -190); in other 
words, a tendency to consume objects for what they stand for 
(i.e. as signs) rather than what they are. If this is 
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correct, then there is additional importance attached to 
the conclusion that environmental forms function as domains 
for cognitive experience. 
A question which arises at this point is how do architecture 
and urban design relate to man's overall intellectual develop- 
ment when they are only a part of the entire man -made 
environment. Table 1.3 shows that architecture and urban 
design involve a limited, although still extensive, number of 
social relations since they relate a limited number of 
functions. By being part of the entire mad -made environment 
however, they participate in operating as domains for cog- 
nitive experience. It appears that, in order to reach this 
generalized conclusion, one first has to take the overall 
production of man -made environment into account, as has been 
attempted in the first part of the study. After the 
conclusion has been reached, any individual part of man -made 
environment (whether this is buildings, cities in general or 
kitchen utensils) can be regarded as contributing to this end, 
even though the meanings involved in each subset are limited. 
In any case, even on a single environmental form a whole range 
of social relations may be objectivated; like, for example, 
its significance that led to its existence, ideologies of 
the "doer" or user in respect to the elements in the 
composive need and so on. In short, even if environmental 
forms appear to contain a limited range of potential meanings, 
they all take part in the function of man -made environment 
as a domain for cognitive experience which relates to man's 
intellectual development. 
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Let us now concentrate on the more specific implications 
that what has been discussed bears on design theory and 
practice. Depending on where the attention is focused, one 
may arrive at certain conclusions at a number of levels. 
These can be divided in two main categories. The first 
category, which is basically theoretical, is the outcome of 
a comparative analysis of the theoretical considerations 
elaborated in the present study - and, expecially man's 
cognitive needs and their implications - with those of 
current theories of urban design. The concluding observat- 
ions following this analysis are not, in effect, implications 
for the design but an assessment of the similarities and 
discrepancies between the present approach and contemporary 
theories of urban design. Apart from referring directly 
to design practice, it is clear that such approaches must 
be backed up with theoretical considerations deriving from 
other disciplines, especially psychology, so that an 
examination like this can take place. 
The second category of conclusions, which will be developed 
in the second section are to be drawn from the merging of 
the theoretical formulations of this study and the design 
practice. In this sense, this set of conclusions will be 
the implications of what has been discussed so far. In 
other words, the aim of this section would be the explor- 
ation of the particular requirements man's cognitive needs 
(as they have been elaborated in 2.1) may dictate to design. 
Evidently, it is fairly difficult to separate a theory's 
foundations from its point of reference and the implications 
it entails in regard to its scope. Such a course of action 
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has to be adopted for purely methodological reasons. Hence, 
there will inevitably be a need for references to a theory's 
implications while discussing their theoretical background 
and vice versa. 
The third section deals with two important issues which relate 
to the conveyance of meaning. Following what has been 
discussed in this study, the need for clarity in the environ- 
ment and the need for a balanced rate of perceptual input are 
considered. In this sense, the discussion on these two 
issues attempts to examine the implications of the mechanics 
of cognitive experience in view of man's cognitive needs, with 
reference to these particular aspects of the conveyance of 
meaning. 
Finally, the last section attempts to reassess the role of 
the designer in view of the significance that cognitive 
experience may have in the development of man's mental world. 
The conception of a broader role is inevitably paired with 
an increasing responsibility. Since a deeper understanding 
of the functions of perception in relation to man's cognitive 
needs is required, this appears to be a task that designers' 
education has to fulfil. 
3.1 THE THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF THIS STUDY IN 
RELATION TO THOSE OF RELEVANT URBAN DESIGN 
THEORIES 
The theoretical consideration that man -made environment is an 
important domain from which man attains his experience of 
the world has been based on three main points. Firstly, 
man -made environment can possible be remarkably rich in its 
potential informational content. This conclusion is reached 
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after differentiation in form has been explained by means 
of social relations which affect its shaping. Secondly, 
man's cognition of this content relates to his process of 
intellectual development. When perceived, information in 
man -made environment is integrated in man's mental world 
through assimilation and accomodation. Thirdly, this 
function of cognition, which is difficult to be empirically 
tested, is sustained by man's cognitive needs. When the 
need to know and to understand is regarded as relating to 
basic human needs rather than man's goal- oriented behaviour, 
the scope of cognitive experience is widened. The experience 
of man -made environment may, then, refer to its entire 
potential informational content in its fuller dimensions. 
Apart from leading to the above suggestion, these three points 
inevitably specify the context in which it is seen. In this 
sense, the fact that man -made environment functions as a 
domain for cognitive experience is of little value if one 
disregards the richness of potential information it contains, 
and the significance that this information may have when 
brought in relation to the development of man's mental world 
and in view of man's cognitive needs. 
3.1.1 An Overview of the Relevant Theories 
As mentioned in 1.1.2, the functionalist tradition in design 
disregarded this function of man -made environment. The early 
masters of the Modern Movement believed that architectural 
forms are to be approached as "working tools, or instruments" 
whose aim is to satisfy the needs that demanded their creation 
(le Corbusier, 1947). In revolting against indiscriminate 
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ornamentation, they preached that good forms are those which 
are derived from the "true nature" of the object of concern. 
In this sense, they paid particular attention to the oper- 
ational needs of the composite need for change. Both 
because of the relative objectivity involved in identifying 
such needs and the functionalists' bias towards economy, the 
principles of the Modern Movement proved to be remarkably 
influential as regards the architectural and design production 
of our times. 
In recent years there has been a re- examination of the 
functionalist tradition. Gandelsonas and Morton identify two 
opposing tendencies. The first is a continuation of 
functionalism which has now escalated into linking architecture 
to computer technology and to sophisticated mathematical models. 
The second is "an emerging tendency to view architecture as a 
system of cultural meaning" (Gandelsonas and Morton, 1980, 
p. 243). According to the latter tendency, buildings and 
other design projects tend to be seen as functioning at various 
levels rather than as merely satisfying the users' operational 
needs (Norberg- Schulz, 1963, p. 109 f; Hillier et al, 1972). 
A growing number of writers (like for instance, Colquhoun, 
1969, and Broadbent, 1980a) have argued that there is more 
in architecture than what the functionalist principles 
prescribe and a notable body of research is currently being 
conducted on the issue. 
As the present study focuses on cognitive experience of man- 
made environment, which may occur independently of man's 
purposive behaviour, it is placed within the realm of the 
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second of the afore -mentioned tendencies. The aim of this 
section, then, is to examine how this study relates to 
theories and views which belong to the same tendency and are 
similar in scope and orientation. This examination is to 
be conducted in view of the key formulations stated in the 
beginning of this section. 
The question of meaning in man -made environment is theoret- 
ically covered by semiology; especially its branch pertinent 
to architecture and urban design. Although semiology was 
originally founded as a broad discipline whose obejct of 
study would be "the study of signs at the heart of social 
life" (Levi- Strauss, 1978, p. 9), the discussion with respect 
to the signs in the built environment appears to be focusing 
on certain issues of the field of study in particular. As 
noted in 1.0, such semiological approaches mainly relate to 
semantics and syntactics whereas the issues of the origins 
and use of the signs do not attract equal attention. Thus, 
the discussion mainly centers on the identification of the 
sign in the built environment (e.g. Jencks, 1980; Scalvini, 
1980), on establishing the way in which the elements in the 
sign are structured (Eco, 1980) and so on. 
A possible explanation for this is that semiology had already 
developed a certain vocabulary of terms based on linguistics 
when it became apparent that elements in the built environ- 
ment may also be regarded as forming a system of signs, i.e. 
as standing for something not present. It was after this 
realization that architectural semiology took off, a little 
over two decades ago. The main effort was to transplant 
ideas and principles, which were found applicable to spoken 
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language, into the study of language of the built environ- 
ment. For this reason, the dynamics both of the origins 
and the use of the signification of man -made environment 
becomes a question of minor importance and the architectural 
sign tends to be seen as a "sign -in- itself ". 
With reference to the attitudes taken by semiologists as 
regards to the origins of the sign, one may argue that the 
approaches they adopt do not aim at the identification of 
the entire range of factors which sustain the richness of 
the environment's potential informational content. The 
emphasis often lies on the "doer" (as, in Bonta, 1979, and 
Krampen, 1979, pp. 62 -3) and this leads to an underestimat- 
ion of other channels (as, for example, the users and the 
composite need for change or the external factor) through 
which social relation may become objectivated on environmental 
forms. The lack of a systematic approach, which would have 
taken into account the dynamics of the conditions of pro- 
duction of man -made environment, may induce the designer 
into assuming that it is mainly intentional personal input 
that allows meaning to be represented on forms. One may 
argue that this is implied in Jencks's illustrations in his 
book "the Language of Post- Modern Architecture" (1981). 
As regards the use of the sign in man -made environment, the 
interest in applying linguistic principles allows little 
consideration to be taken with reference to man's cognitive 
needs in view of his process of intellectual development. 
In an attempt to relate semiology of the urban environment 
to psychology, as it was originally intended by de Saussure 
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for the case of the overall study of signs, Krampen construes 
a model of the cognitive act. His approach is based on the 
findings of phonologists in linguistics and the mathematical 
principles of set theory introduced in semiology by Prieto. 
He, then, sees cognition as a classificatory act in which an 
object is known by means of its oppositions to objects in the 
same universe of discourse and its connections with objects 
in the correlated universe. As objects are classified twice, 
once denotatively and the second time connotatively, cognition 
is an act of double classification (Krampen, 1979, pp. 51 -60). 
In relation to the present study, Krampen's process of double 
classification points out that cognition of an object occurs 
both denotatively and connotatively. It also provides a 
description of the way in which mental schemata are juxtaposed 
to environmental stimuli (see 2.2). What it does not take 
into account however, is that stimuli are not merely classified 
by means of mental schemata but they also proliferate changes 
in the person's cognitive structures and mental world as a 
whole. By ignoring the operation of the functional factors 
of assimilation and accomodation in cognition, Krampen's 
approach results in divorcing the experience of man-made 
environment from its relation to the development of man's 
mental world. 
Another element in his work that leads to the same conclusion 
is that cognition and activity are simply taken as being 
interdependent (Krampen, 1979, p. 59). This statement 
implicitly draws the attention on the relation of cognition 
to man's goal -oriented behaviour. Cognition, then, tends to 
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language, into the study of language of the built environ- 
ment. For this reason, the dynamics both of the origins 
and the use of the signification of man -made environment 
becomes a question of minor importance and the architectural 
sign tends to be seen as a "sign -in- itself ". 
With reference to the attitudes taken by semiologists as 
regards to the origins of the sign, one may argue that the 
approaches they adopt do not aim at the identification of 
the entire range of factors which sustain the richness of 
the environment's potential informational content. The 
emphasis often lies on the "doer" (as, in Bonta, 1979, and 
Krampen, 1979, pp. 62 -3) and this leads to an underestimat- 
ion of other channels (as, for example, the users and the 
composite need for change or the external factor) through 
which social relation may become objectivated on environmental 
forms. The lack of a systematic approach, which would have 
taken into account the dynamics of the conditions of pro- 
duction of man -made environment, may induce the designer 
into assuming that it is mainly intentional personal input 
that allows meaning to be represented on forms. One may 
argue that this is implied in Jencks's illustrations in his 
book "the Language of Post -Modern Architecture" (1981). 
As regards the use of the sign in man -made environment, the 
interest in applying linguistic principles allows little 
consideration to be taken with reference to man's cognitive 
needs in view of his process of intellectual development. 
In an attempt to relate semiology of the urban environment 
to psychology, as it was originally intended by de Saussure 
225. 
relates to man's cognitive needs. 
Another approach which deals with the issue of meaning in the 
environment is offered by Norbert -Schulz. In his work, the 
interest lies in linking man's holistic (both cognitive and 
affective) experience of the environment to his general 
orientation or his sense of "being -ìn- the -world ". To achieve 
this, he argues that the environment should incorporate 
existential meanings which, as man is in search for identity, 
relate to his existential space, i.e. "a relatively stable 
system of space schemata or 'image' of the environment" 
(Norberg- Schulz, 1971, pp. 10 -11; 1980, p. 221 -3). The 
elements according to which existential meanings in the 
environment are structured are the notions of place, path and 
domain which correspond to analogous notions in man's exist- 
ential space. The built environment forms man's architect- 
ural space which, if architecture is to function properly, 
should be a truthful concretization of man's existential space. 
"The task of the architect, therefore, is to help man to find 
an existential foothold by concretizing his images and dreams" 
(Norberg- Schulz, 1971, p. 114). 
As his aim is to identify existential meanings in the 
environment, Norberg -Schulz does not attempt to explore the 
fuller dimensions of its potential informational content, nor 
the conditions which sustain it in the process of the shaping 
of man -made environment. Although in his earlier studies he 
refers to a wider part of this content (f,i. Norberg -Schulz 
1963, pp. 118 -27), he later focuses on meanings which derive 
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frcm relations such as man's relation to God or to society as 
a whole and so on (Fig. 58). In this sense, he is concerned 
with the in depth dimension of the content of man -made envir- 
onment as this has been described in Table 1.3 in the present 
study. 
It can be seen from the above that although Norberg- Schulz's 
work is closely related to this study, its scope is different. 
This is also reflected on, and accentuated by, the nature of 
his approach which is based on the phenomenology of Heidegger 
(Norberg -Schultz, 1979, 1980a, pp. 6 -11). Things "out there" 
are regarded as entities in their own right (or, as "gathering 
a world ") and the main interest in their perception lies in as 
much as experience relates to man's being -in -the- world. Since 
the emphasis is on the person's identity, this phenomenological 
approach may provide an insightful look at the role of the 
environment in this. The interest in the present study 
however, is placed on bringing the fuller dimensions of the 
potential informational content of man -made environment in 
relation to the development of his mental world, aiming at 
the whole range of levels at which this development may occur. 
Apart from being confined to cognitive experience, this 
orientation asks for the dissection of the content in its 
constituent parts in the form of representations of social 
relations. This need to explore the elements which sustain 
the richness of the potential informational content of man- 
made environment is incongruous with the approach adopted by 
Norberg -Schulz. 
Furthermore, by regarding personal constructs and environmental 
experiences as givens, Norberg- Schulz assumes that places, like 
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When describing environments like Mies's Illinois- 
Institute of 
Technology, Norberg -Schulz does not refer to the 
whole range of 
social relations objectivated on the end form, 
but to "the image 
of harmonious, ordered universe" it may evoke. 
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Prague, Rome or Khartoum, will a priori have 
a "genius loci" 
Norberg- Schulz, 1980a). In this sense, there 
is no need to 
explore how people's personal parameters 
will mix with the 
nature of potential information in the environment 
in an 
attempt to see which social relations are 
more likely to be 
experienced. This need was made evident 
in the present 
study, especially since some statements 
which may serve as 
cues for the designer are required to be 
formulated. 
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Summing up, Norberg -Scholz approaches the built environment 
as a domain for experience only that he sees this experience 
referring to a different human need than the cognitive needs 
elaborated in the present study. The need he identifies, 
and which asks for existential meanings, is wider than these 
cognitive needs (since it incorporates affective experience 
and involves perception in a holistic sense) and refers to 
the deepest meanings which relate to man's existence. Thus, 
his research is not concerned with the entirety of meanings 
in the environment, nor with the way these are embodied in it 
or with the way particular social relations may be inferred 
from environmental cues. In a similar sense, the interest 
in the environment's contribution to the development of man's 
mental world lies in as much as the conceptions of man's 
existence in relation to the essence of the external reality 
are concerned. It appears reasonable to suggest that 
Norberg -Schulz's approach aims at discovering these qualities 
of the built environment which may offer man possibilities for 
"peak experiences ", to use Maslow's term. 
A third approach to the issue of meaning in the environment 
is that of Peter Smith. A point of contrast between Smith's 
approach and Norberg -Schulz's is that they both actually aim 
at identifying requirements for architecture and urban design 
which stem from human needs other than those immediately 
deriving from man's operational needs. In this sense, the 
scope of these approaches relates to the present one in as 
much as these human needs refer to the cognitive needs 
elaborated in this study. 
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As regards man's cognitive needs, Smith refers to "the need 
to make sense out of one's environment" as well as "the need 
to keep mental schemata alert" (Smith, 1974). The scope of 
his work, however, is different than the scope of the present 
study, since he is basically interested in the aesthetic 
experience of the urban environment. For this, he applies 
Cannon's principle of homeostasis, as a human tendency for 
physiological equilibrium, for the case of man's psychological 
composition and concludes that man prefers a living condition 
in which homeostasis and tension will alternate. He, then 
goes into an extensive examination of the qualities of the 
unconscious part of the brain and notes its preferences in 
terms of aesthetic experience. 
Peter Smith finds little interest in the content of people's 
purely cognitive experience of urban environments. Yet, 
as he is aiming at exploring the context in which aesthetic 
experience occurs, he focuses on connotational aspects of 
the environments he describes. Because of his particular 
orientation, in which the needs relating to the functions of 
the "primitive" brain are critical, he basically concentrates on 
meanings which correspond to archetypal images. These 
meanings, which may be stored in the environment in the 
process of its shaping, are often projected on it by people 
who are experiencing it. Smith characteristically writes 
that " by its organization of style, space, light, con- 
striction, gloom, order and apparent chaos, [the urban 
system] represents a projection of the human situation" 
(Smith, 1974, p. 114). The emphasis is not put on the 
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social relations which create this situation, as this is 
done in the present study, but on a parallelism to the 
apparent dispositional elements of human nature that it may 
reflect in people's minds. 
Another interesting approach which relates to the present 
study and which proved to be remarkably influential is Kevin 
Lynch's research on "the Image of the City ". Since,by 
focusing on imageability, Lynch's work is pertinent to the 
issue of clarity in man -made environment, it will be discussed 
extensively at a later stage of this part of the study (see 
3.3.1). In the present context however, the interest lies 
in comparing the theoretical considerations which character- 
ize Lynch's approach (and a notable number of subsequent 
studies based on his writings) to those of the approach 
adopted in this study. 
Lynch's point of departure is man's need for orientation in 
the complex modern cities (Lynch, 1960, pp. 1 -6). Although 
this need clearly involves cognitive activity, the way Lynch 
puts it, it bears little connection to the cognitive needs 
discussed in the present study. There are two reasons for 
this. Firstly, although it has been argued that the 
elements which Lynch identifies in the urban environment are 
of existentialist nature (Pocock and Hudson, 1978, p. 49), 
he basically regards the activity of orientation as way - 
finding in view of man's purposive behaviour. In this sense, 
the need of orientation is viewed as an operational need and 
this limits its scope (see also 3.3.1). 
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The second reason is related to the first. In his study 
of the requirements set by the need for better orientation 
in the urban environment, Lynch is mainly concerned with the 
arrangement and interrelationships between the physical 
features in the city. By deciding to disregard meaning in 
the environment (Lynch, 1969, pp. 8 -9), he takes little 
interest in examining how social relations, which are either 
objectivated in the environment in the process of its 
shaping or invested in it as it is being "used ", affect the 
process of orientation in the city (Fig. 59). A similar 
attitude characterizes Lynch's study on "A Theory of Urban 
Form ", in which he tends to divorce form from content (Lynch 
and Rodwin, 1970), and later research on the image of cities 
where, researchers based on Lynch's methods, put the emphasis 
on the identification of those environmental features which 
are "known" by the widest number of subjects (f,i, Francescato 
and Mebane, 1973). In this sense, environmental cognition 
tends to be viewed as cognition (or, knowledge) of the form 
of man -made environment rather than cognition of social 
relations "through" their representations on the features of 
the form. 
In response to Lynch's theory for ìmageability in the urban 
environment as a major requirement for the need for orient- 
ation, several studies (e.g. Gulick, 1963) have suggested 
that both visual form and social significance are important 
in the formation of urban images. Steinitz (1968) stressed 
the significance of congruence between form and activity in 
this, whereas Zannaras (1976) pointed at the role played by 
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the cognition of city structure (f.i. land use, variations 
in density etc.) as providing clues for way finding. As 
noted above, the need for orientation is given, a very 
different existentialist dimension - and in this sense it can 
no longer be regarded as an operational need - in the work 
of Norberg- Schulz. 
Lynch's drawings underline the nature of his approach. 
FIG!1RF 59 
To conclude the overview of approaches to design which are 
relevant to the present study, one must consider the notable 
body of research presented by Rapoport, mainly in his book 
"Human Aspects of Urban Form" (1977). Based on a remarkable 
body of both theoretical and field work from most disciplines 
relating to urban design, Rapoport pays particular attention 
on the role of cognition in the man -made environment relation. 
He sees the environment as the organization of time, meaning, 
communication and space (Rapoport, 1976, p. 223; 1977, pp. 
10 -11). In this, cognition is important both in designing 
and in perceiving man -made environment. 
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As noted in the second part of the present study although 
Rapoport includes first level identification in the perceptual 
rather than the cognitive stage of environmental experience, 
he stressed the subjective element in cognition by viewing it 
as a process of "ordering and giving meaning" rather than 
knowing the environment (Rapoport, 1976, p. 233; 1977, p. 108). 
This formulation is basically the product of research conducted 
in anthropology where individual differences may become notably 
diverging when seen in a cross -cultural perspective, and is 
not intended to lead to a phenomenological orientation. 
Nevertheless, it carries in it the danger of being misinter- 
preted in the direction of an overestimation of personal 
parameters and an underestimation of environmental parameters 
and stimulus dependency in perception. As has been elaborated 
in 2.4, there may be certain social relations represented in 
the environment which may be most probably experienced than 
others, and this can be applicable to all three levels of 
potential information stored in the environment. 
Furthermore, one could perhaps argue that if the above point 
of departure is not backed up with an approach which would put 
the emphasis on the individual, these meanings attached to the 
environment would appear to be fragmented or leading to cues 
for isolated behavioural responses, In a sense, it appears 
that Rapoport is doing precisely this - his interpretation 
of course is in direct relation to his interest in how 
people behave in different settings. Thus, although he 
acknowledges the fact that built environment is "a major form 
of cultural information" (Rapoport, 1977, p. 326), he sees 
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its function as a domain for experience as relating to 
particular messages rather than as being of a different 
quality, i.e. complementary to man's overall experience of 
the world. 
One reason for this is probably that Rapoport does not look 
at the overall production of all kinds of mar -made environment 
but only at urban design, in other words a part of the entire 
domain. As noted earlier, the examination of a partial 
production of man -made environment alone can not lead to the 
conclusions which can be drawn from a spherical viewpoint, 
whereas the function, that the overall conclusions help to 
identify, may be applicable to the parts. 
The second reason is that Rapoport appears to be particularly 
reluctant to come to an "overgeneralization about human needs" 
(Rapoport, 1977, p. 383) and prefers to concentrate on 
specific aspects of design. In this sense, he does not 
attempt to unify man's cognitive experience of his environ- 
ment by linking it to man's intellectual development in view 
of a generalized need to know and to understand. One could 
argue that his work, and especially the afore- mentioned book, 
is characterized by the lack of a clear conception as regards 
these needs. Such a conception would have served as a back- 
bone to the, otherwise fragìented, collection of case studies 
incorporated in the book. 
3.1.2 A Comparative Analysis of the Theoretical Considerations 
It is evident that the issue of meaning in the environment is 
becoming increasingly central. Yet, as it can be deduced 
from the discussion in the second part of this study, meaning 
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can be found in various different forms, as the term acquires 
a series of interpretations (see also Jencks, 1969). Since 
environmental experience is both purely cognitive as well as 
affective -evaluative in character, meaning can be regarded 
as being an amalgam of the two. Approaches like Smith's and 
Norberg- Schulz's aim at the identification of requirements 
relating to both stages of environmental experience. The 
scope of the present study is different from that of these 
approaches because the interest lies in exploring the 
dynamics of purely cognitive experience. 
Another observation that can be made as regards the theories 
discussed is that meaning would not have been dealt with 
by any writer if there had not been some conception of a human 
need it corresponds to. In all theories, except perhaps for 
writings in semiology, cognition refers to certain cognitive 
needs whether these are specific or more generalized. It has 
already been mentioned that Smith's and Norberg- Schulz's 
formulations may be taken as relating to a cognitive need 
that goes beyond the particular activity a person is engaged 
in at the time. 
Cognition of social relations in man -made environment, 
however, does not tend to be seen as being linked to the 
development of man's mental world, as this has been elaborated 
in the present study. There are several reasons to explain 
why this important dimension of cognitive experience has not 
attracted a fair amount of attention. 
The first reason is that research tends to concentrate on 
the requirements set by the particular activities contained 
in space rather than on people's basic needs. This attitude, 
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which basically stems from the behaviourist tradition in 
which people are regarded as organisms responding to external 
stimuli rather than personsin their own right, is partly 
responsible for sustaining the functionalist bias dominant 
in modern architecture. Cognition is seen as being 
operational in nature. 
As noted above, this attitude characterizes a significant 
body of contemporary research in man -made environment 
relationships. Even though the rise of cognitive psychology 
in the last couple of decades has broadened the scope of 
cognition, architectural theory tends to regard the form- 
ation of mental maps as explaining or providing areas for 
purposive behaviour rather than relating to the development 
of the person's mental world, Depending on the particular 
kind of behaviour examined (e.g, way -finding, action 
resulting from evaluation and so on), cognition is inevitably 
seen as relating to a specific body of social relations in man- 
made environment rather than to the whole range of its 
potential informational content. 
The second reason which appears tc have diverted theorists 
attention from relating cognition of man-made environment to 
the development of man's mental world has to do with the 
nature of environmental experience. When cognition is 
regarded in momentary terms, it tends to appear fragmented 
and, possibly, accidental. Even when one perceives a 
certain social relation objectivated in man -made environment 
and this seems novel to him, the dynamics of environmental 
experience are not fully considered. This may only happen 
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if the impact of cognition is approached in its long -term 
effects. Cognition of social relations in man -made environ- 
ment can, then, be seen as relating to something stable, 
although evolving, namely: man's cognitive structures. As 
noted above, Piaget's principles of assimilation and accom- 
odation of experience provide an explanation of how individual 
cognitions are integrated in man's cognitive structures and 
mental world. This function can be regarded as taking place 
both in relation to specific cognitive structures and to the 
person's entire mental world. 
The last reason to explain why the relation between environ- 
mental cognition and the development of the person's mental 
world has been underestimated is that most writers tend to 
overestimate perception of form and first level identification 
of objects. This attitude, which has already been mentioned 
for the case of Lynch's theory, has a direct implication on 
the nature of mental schemata which are regarded as being 
relevant to the experience of man -made environment: schemata 
are seen as being essentially directional and shape -like 
formations. 
Peter Smith suggests that "to a child a house is as pictured 
here (Fig. 60). This is the basic house schema. As 
experience develops, the schema is extended into sub- 
categories such as terraced house, semi -detached etc. 
Ultimately, it crosses time and space to embrace historical 
and modern houses at home and abroad. The extent of the 
sub -division is a matter of experience and, to some degree, 
conscious learning (Smith, 1974, p. 27), 
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If one takes into account what has been elaborated in the 
second part of the present study then what Smith is in 
effect describing is the image of the elevation of a house 
when one faces it from the street. As experience develops 
FIGURE 60 
one may extend the schema of the elevation to include 
different house typologies. 
It can be argued that this conception of a schema corresponds 
to the schema of the form of a house, or the spatial aspect 
of the schema of the concept "house ". From what has been 
discussed so far it may be expected that, throught this 
schema, one may experience several social relations which 
have been objectivated on man -made environment as differ- 
entiations in form (e.g. characteristics of the users, the 
designer, the social framework, discrimination of rooms and 
functions within the house and so on). The mere existence 
of the house signifies that there are (or were) people who 
live in this place, and hence, it may be experienced in this 
manner. 
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When the emphasis is placed on the spatial aspects of mental 
schemata, it becomes difficult to penetrate satisfactorily 
beyond the visual aspects of a form. Cognition, then, will 
tend to be seen as referring to first level identification 
of objects, the richness of the potential informational 
content of man -made environment tends to shrink and the 
relation between cognition and the person's mental world 
becomes distant. For this reason, the term "schema" 
ought to retain its other, basic meaning from the Greek, 
and that is "model ", "an abstract internalized model of an 
external reality ". In this sense, whatever notion one 
has in mind about something "out there" is by definition 
a schema. As the interest in the present study lies in 
the exploration of the requirements set by man's cognitive 
needs, it is important that the impact of experience on 
the conceptual (and not only the spatial) aspects of mental - 
schemata are thoroughly considered *. 
The tendency to overestimate perception of form can be 
found in many writings in the literature. Historians have 
been critized as merely describing the formative aspects of 
buildings rather than relating their form to its content 
and conditions of production. Even Norberg- Schulz, who is 
* It must also be noted that the schema in the figure above 
is not the only one depicting the spatial aspects of the 
concept "house ". Such a concept is complex enough to 
constitute a cognitive structure and, ehnce, comprise an 
extended array of hierarchical schemata. Some of these 
may be so widely shared as to be strong signifiers of the 
whole structure (e.g. the smell of pipe -smoking next to 
the fireplace or that of boiled vegetables coming from 
the kitchen). 
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particularly interested in identifying existential meanings, 
often appears to be concentrating on the spatial aspects of 
schemata (e.g. Norberg -Schulz, 1971, pp. 10 -11). A 
similar attitude has also tended to characterize many semi - 
ologists who, following the properties of spoken language, 
have searched into the elements of the form of buildings 
(f.i. brick, column, etc.) in order to identify the 
"semantic unit" in architecture. It appears reasonable 
to suggest that, if such a unit is to be found, it is more 
likely to exist at the level of content, whether in the 
form of a social relation or else. Naturally, even if 
there is stimulus dependency in perception, this unit of 
meaning is subject to the individual's personal parameters. 
By focusing on man's cognitive needs, this study has been 
concerned with the experience of the environment's potential 
informational conteent and the significance that this 
function has for man. In summation of what has been 
discussed in this section, it is to be noted that the above 
Urban Design theories, although related to the present study, 
are not identical in scope since they do not center on these 
issues. 
Norberg -Schulz's approach, for example, which focuses on man 
in his own right, does not confine itself to his cognitive 
needs. Moreover, the phenomenological orientation that 
the writer adopts does not permit a comprehensive analysis 
of the fuller dimensions of the environment's potential 
informational content to be conducted. On the other hand, 
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many approaches, which tend to regard cognition as referring 
to some forseeable action, clearly entail the danger of 
confining themselves to the identification of a limited 
portion of this content as well as of underestimating the 
significance of its cognition 
3.2 THE DESIGNER AND MAN'S COGNITIVE NEEDS 
3.2.1 Cognitive Needs and the Composite Need for Change 
Man -made environment embodies a rich variety of represent- 
ations of social relations some of which become objectivated 
on it in the process of its shaping, while others are 
invested in it after it has been produced. From what has 
been discussed so far it follows that there are two ways of 
looking at how this environment is experienced; at least, 
in as much as cognitive experience is concerned. The focus 
may either be on the activity, or activities, performed in 
the particular environment, or on the individuals who find 
themselves in ìt. 
In the first case, cognition is operational in nature. 
Information that needs to be perceived, is to some degree 
dictated by the activity itself. Although a relatively 
extensive body of information is expected to be involved, 
this is bound to have certain limits since cognitive exper- 
ience relates to distinct ends. 
When the focus is placed on the individual seen in his own 
right, there are several needs that he may have developed 
regardless of the particular activity he is engaged in. In 
as much as his knowledge and understanding of his environment 
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is concerned, there is a cognitive need which may either 
exist in an independent form, as some psychologists claim, 
or may be directly stemming from other basic human needs 
(see 2.1). This cognitive need, which is liable to the 
condition of personal parameters at the time of perception, 
can be taken as bringing all what is perceived in relation tc 
the person's mental world and as having the tendency to cover 
the whole range of social relations represented on man -made 
environment in all its richness. 
According to the analysis of the composite need for change, 
which leads to the production of environmental forms, "by- 
needs" fluctuate between two poles as they either tend to be 
operational to the activities required or they may relate 
directly to man's basic needs, and hence, transcend the scope 
of the particular activity (see 1.1.2). The discussion in 
this study suggests that man's cognitive needs appear to be 
following a similar pattern. 
The immediate implication, which derives from this, concerns 
the designer. In his search for the requirements posed to 
him by the situation in hand, the "doer" must adopt two 
approaches to the issue of the users' cognitive experience 
of the forms he designs. As noted above, the difference 
between the two approaches lies on where the emphasis is 
placed. 
In activity- oriented approaches, an extensive but limited 
amount of information is involved. The discussion in 2.2.4 
pointed out that, although all features of the end product 
may have to be considered, this is typically in so far as 
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meanings which sustain or facilitate the particular 
activity are concerned. The users' personal parameters 
are naturally to be taken into account, yet these do not 
relate directly to cognitive activity. The properties and 
requirements of the particular activity contained in space 
serve as a stepping stone in this relation between cognitive 
processes and what is experienced. 
The approach in which the emphasis is placed on the user is 
essentially different. The user's needs as a person are 
considered; in this case, his cognitive needs. The role of 
the image of environmental forms in gratifying these needs 
points at the fact that cognitive activity may refer to any 
part of the environment's potential informational content. 
This, as well as other aspects of such cognitive activity, 
depend on the individual's personal parameters both in their 
trait and the state -like characteristics. What is there- 
fore required is a deeper understanding of the user's personal 
parameters. This is paired by the awareness that, as people 
may theoretically experience any social relation embodied 
in the particular environmental form, the whole range of its 
potential informational content is liable to take part in 
this process. 
The importance of the above lies in that it distinguishes two 
functions in which environmental forms are involved in as 
much as man's cognitive experience of them is concerned. 
Firstly, congition of a certain body of information in them 
is necessary to sustain or facilitate the activity in hand 
and secondly, experiencing social relations through their 
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representations on them is important for the development 
of man's mental world in view of his deeper cognitive needs. 
It is clear that the distinction between cognitive experience 
which is dictated by man's operational needs and that which 
relates to his deeper cognitive needs can not always be well 
defined (see also p. 24). As noted in 2.2, operational 
cognition may refer to all features (but not necessarily 
potential content) of an environment while congitive 
experience needed to cope with a particular task is also 
expected to be accomodated into man's mental world. In 
this sense, the two elements in the distinction may often 
be overlapping. 
On the other hand, there may often be cases in which they 
are in conflict. For example, when the emphasis is placed 
solely on the activities contained in space and cognition 
is seen as being primarily operational in nature, the 
gratification of the deeper cognitive needs that man may 
have developed appears considerably hindered. Reversely, 
an environment which looks like an agglomeration of museum 
exhibits, because of the multitude of social relations 
objectivated on it, will possibly affect goal- oriented 
behaviour (see also 3.3.2). This apparently, depends 
the nature of the activity and it may be expected that the 
consideration of the user's personal parameters will provide 
the designer with enough clues to deal with the problem. 
The above distinction becomes particularly interesting 
when it comes in relation to contemporary architectural 
practice. Partly because of the functionalist tradition 
and partly because of the context in which the designers' 
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FIGI!RE 61 Top left: Guaranty Building,by L. Sullivan, Buffalo, 
1894 -95. 
Top right: AT & T Building, by P. Johnson, New York City, 
1978 -82. 
On the elevations of these two buildings, the designers attempted 
to 
objectivate a few more social relations than what is strictly necessary 
to sustain the functions needed. Such social relations are 
the relative 
significance of the activities on different floors, a number of cultural 
elements, the significance of the project itself seen as a whole and so 
on. A similar comment can not generally be applied for the 
typical 
anonymous down -town office block, like the one at the bottom. 
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profession operates, many modern architects are basically 
concerned with satisfying the operational aspects of the 
composite need for change. A visit around a number of 
buildings in most modern cities designed in "anonymous" 
international style is enough to illustrate the point (Fig. 
61). The situation is generally becoming worse when one 
takes a look at housing estates. A door is little more 
than for passing thorugh and so is a corridor. There is 
not much else there for cognition apart, perhaps, from 
social relations which have become objectivated by precisely 
this absence (see 2.5; see also Figs. 24, 57 and 62). 
In this sense, the "doer's" intentions, in as much. as the 
objectivation of social relations is concerned, often seem 
to be confined to what is strictly necessary to sustain 
the activities contained in space. What usually comes in 
addition to this is an overall message which may often be 
abstract and tangential (see Fig. 35). Finally, and in 
relation to what has been discussed in 3.0, it appears that 
although the potential informational content of man -made 
environment can be remarkably rich, a notable body of modern 
environments remain low in content. 
With reference to the overall architectural and urban 
design production, no one can clain ths.t designers always 
work along these lines of thought with little consideration 
over people's deeper human needs, The history of archit- 
ecture, especially that of the last century, abounds in 
cases of individuals who were, and still are, particularly 
concerned about the social implications of their work. Yet, 
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FIGURE 62 Top: 
Bottom: 
A square in Antwerp 
New housing outside Antwerp C1958) 
Although the image of the square is not particularly exciting, it 
incorporates many connotational social relations of culture and 
several second level social relations of the relative significance of 
functions, like those of discrepancies between different houses, floors 
and space in the square and the nearby streets. It is not an under- 
statement to say that the housing scheme below is sticking to what is 
strictly necessary for the activities involved Ci.e. primarily, housing 
and, then, sleeping, cooking, finding the lift and so on). 
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it seems reasonable to argue that, although designers 
are currently becoming increasingly perceptive over the 
meaning of the forms they design, this occurs in an 
inorderly and superficial way since it is not paired with 
an understanding of the nature of people's cognitive needs 
and the fuller dimensions of the environment's potential 
to satisfy them. 
The distinction outlined above clearly shows that, in ident- 
ifying the composite need for change, the designer must not 
only focus on the activities contained in space but also on 
the deeper cognitive needs of the users. By placing the 
emphasis on the individual, the approach is safeguarded from 
the problems arising from the misconceptions of the funct- 
ionalist principles. The realization of the existence of 
such cognitive needs, and of the fact that environmental 
forms may take part in gratifying them, appears to be the 
first step in dealing with the low potential informational 
content of man -made environment, 
3.2.2 Cognitive Needs and Social Relations Involved 
in the Production of Environment 
The question which arises at this point is where is meaning 
to be found; is it simply to be added on whatever the final 
solution is and, if it is so, how far can this go. To answer 
the question let us take a look at the dynamics of the 
potential informational content of man -made environment as 
it has been analyzed in this study. 
Out of all social relations which are somehow involved in 
the production of environment, only a part becomes represented 
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on the end product. The approach in 1.2 and table 1.3 
suggest that there may be many social relations which could 
have been objectivated as differentiation in form. These 
social relations will tend to be excluded from the end 
product by the designer who does not see cognitive needs 
which are not operational in character as being a constit- 
uent part of the composite need for change. 
In this sense the potential content exists and it comprises 
all social relations which, however distant,are somehow 
involved in the production of environment. To acquire a 
clear picture of this potential content, table 1.3 must be 
approached in relation to the three families of channels 
through which social relations may become represented on 
man -made environment: the internal and external factor and 
the composite need for change. Since most of these social 
relations (apart, in a sense, from the designer's particular 
personal intentions) are part of and, in fact, set up the 
problematic situation, it is erroneous to see them as being 
extrinsic to it. For this reason, objectivating them is not 
a matter of filling -in the final solution with alien elements 
but concretizing what already exists in an abstract sense 
(Fig. 63). 
Naturally not all social relations from table 1,3 are 
eligible to become represented on concrete form. Some of 
them, like for example the significance of eating for man, 
may only result in the existence of a kitchen or a dining 
area. When this becomes more specific, however - e.g, 
by being regarded in relation to other functions of the house, 
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Pessac Housing, by le Corbusier (1925). 
It is interesting to note how the original scheme (above) was 
transformed by the occupants. Ground floors were walled up, 
pitched roofs were added, the ribbon windows were divided up 
and a great number of signs of "security", "identity ", 
"ownership ", were placed all over the exterior. The pure anca 
abstract Corbusian lines were destroyed by the users' need 
to "see" more in their homes. 
FIGt!.R.E 63 
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a particular social framework and so on - it leads to 
distinct differentiation in shape, dimensions, colour and 
other physical features of the end product. 
In this sense, starting from each function included in the 
final design, the "doer ", must consider both the significance 
of the need it corresponds to, seen in various contexts, and 
the ideologies involved as regards the users, the broader 
context, his own intentions and orientation and so on. 
The variety of functions contained in a single average 
project (ranging from the overall function, or functions, 
to the smallest window or pedestrian walkway) ensures an 
analogous variety of identified social relations, most of 
which can be objectivated in concrete form through a number 
of existing codes. As it can be seen from the above and 
the analysis in 1,2, these codes are remarkably varying in 
nature since they correspond to a wide range of social 
relations. In this sense, they refer to the structural 
parts of a form, its basic dimensions and features, its 
"non -functional" parts and so on. 
As architecture and urban design are low in criticality when 
compared with the design of technical objects (_Rapoport, 
1974, p. 87 -89; see also 1.1.4), the end product can 
incorporate a considerable amount of "non- functional" 
differentiation in form. It has to be noted though that 
this differentiation can only be regarded as non -functional 
in as much as the particular activity performed in space is 
concerned. According to the discussion in the second part 
of this study, it is expected to function in relation to 
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man's cognitive needs and the development of his mental 
world and this is precisely why it is required. 
As noted in the preceeding section, a growing number of 
theorists have commented on the need for the environment 
to embody meaning in one form or the other. On the 
particular issue of where this meaning is to be found, 
attention has often been attracted by the activities per- 
formed in space. As early as 1962, Aldo Van Eyck said 
that "[architecture] should be conceived as a configuration 
of intermediary places clearly defined ... [this implies] 
breakaway from the contemporary concept of space continuity 
and the tendency to erase every articulation between spaces, 
i.e. between outside and inside, between one space and 
another (between one reality and another)" (van Eyck, 1962). 
Similar attitudes have been expressed by other writers such 
as Norberg -Schulz who pointed out that the form should have 
structural similarities with the building task (Ncrberg- 
Schulz, 1963, p. 179). 
As the interest in the present study lies in examining the 
requirements set by man's cognitive needs, the analysis of 
the dynamics of the factors which sustain the richness of 
the environment's potential informational content is of 
singular importance. For this reason, the discussion in 
the first part of the study is particularly useful in 
identifying the social relations involved in the production 
of environment and the way they may become represented on 
the end product. It appears that, not only the functions 
and the overall symbolism of the form, but also another body 
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of social relations which are sustained by the external 
and internal factors may be eligible of objectivation. 
3.2.3 Personal Parameters and the Representation of 
Social Relations on Environmental Forms 
From what has just been discussed, it follows that the 
designer finds himself amidst an extensive body of social 
relations which are linked with the situation in hand. As 
noted in 1.2.4, by his position as the "doer ", he constitutes 
the "bottleneck" through which these social relations pass so 
as to result in concrete differentiations in form. Some of 
these social relations he can not do else but allow to 
become represented on the end product, others he furnishes 
with personal elements either by choosing over them or by 
interpreting them in his personal manner and, finally, a 
third body may derive from his position as regards the 
problematic situation as well as from his past experience 
and overall motivation in life. The "doer's" awareness 
over the social relations he objectivates varies and it may 
be expected that for the average designer it ranges from 
intentional to unconscious. 
In view of the low content, of many modern environments and 
people's "effort after meaning" (to use Bartlett's phrase), 
it appears that an increased signification requires an 
increased awareness from the designer's part over the social 
relations involved in the production of man -made environment. 
Yet, since the emphasis at this stage is to be placed on the 
user and his cognitive needs, this is not enough. 
What is required is a deep understanding of how cognition 
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operates, what role do social relations play in this and 
how important their representations on environmental forms 
may be for people's intellectual development in view of 
their cognitive needs. Furthermore, as personal parameters 
have been proved to be of curcial importance in perception, 
the understanding of the particular context in which 
cognitive experience is to take place is critical: which 
codes are known to people, what do they associate them with, 
what are their aspirations in life, what do they expect to 
come across in a particular environment and so on. 
In other words, the designer has to be fully aware of his 
position as a channel through which social relations are 
represented in the forms he designs, and, as such, as a 
manipulator of meaning. The understanding of the functicn 
and significance of cognitive experience for man is required 
so that the designer is not engaged in producing eccentric, 
arbitrary or meaningless solutions. As Hershberger puts it, 
in a rather strict manner, "the architect must obtain 
reliable and valid information about the relationships 
between the formal properties and attributes of what he 
designs and the thoughts, feelings, attitudes and 
behaviours they tend to evoke... The architect, to 
design new environments which will maximally benefit the 
occupants, must know which aspects or attributes of the 
physical environment cause which thoughts, feelings, 
attitudes and behaviours as a minimum. He should also 
know why, if he has any desire to predict beyond the sample 
of population he has studied" (Herschberger, 1972, his 
emphasis). 
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A study of the users' personal parameters is important 
since people differ in the way they perceive their 
environments. Among various methods aiming at the ident- 
ification of discrepancies in this, is the repertory grid 
based on Kelly's personal construct theory Csee Harrison 
and Sarre, 1976). Yet, a complete mastering of people's 
personal parameters which would give precise clues about 
their cognitive needs at all times and the way the environ- 
ment will be experienced is obviously unattainable. In 
fact, this is the reason why a deep understanding of the 
function of objects in relation to man's cognitive needs is 
needed as opposed to blueprints which are to be applied to 
any circumstances in a manner similar to Alexander's earlier 
activity matrices. This understanding appears to be needed 
at the stage of "pre- structuring" of design problems 
(Hillier et al, 1972), Since it requires a significant 
body of specialized knowledge, it appears necessary for it 
to be incorporated in the designers' educational programs. 
Even if a precise identification of people's cognitive 
needs is unattainable, the discussion in the second part of 
this study has shown that there are a number of conclusions at 
which one can arrive as regards their function. The fact 
that the whole range of the environment's potential 
informational content may take part in cognition is one of 
them. 
Furthermore, although personal paramters among different 
individuals are typically in discrepancy when seen in their 
entirety, they also include a number of similarities (see 2.4). 
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This is what enables us to come to certain generalizations. 
The fact that people may be characterized by a cognitive need 
which transcends the scope of the activity they are engaged 
in at a given moment in time is, in fact, such a general- 
ization. Similar observations can be made as regards 
people's images of the built environment. 
Following the discussion in 2.4, these images are to a degree 
shared as a consequence of similarities in personal parameters. 
Depending on the conditions in which experience takes place 
and in view of people's personal parameters, the designer can 
come to a conclusion as to which situations may ask for 
cognitive experience to occur in a more deterministic rather 
than possibilistic sense. When there is a need for the 
emphasis to be placed on certain social relations in space 
for example, a landmark may serve as a focal point to attract 
attention and initiate responsive perception (see Appleyard, 
1973). At this point, it is important to note the role 
of distinct denotational meanings in reinforcing shared 
images in people's minds (Venturi, 1977; see also Bouldìng, 
1956, p. 64). 
There may even be something to be done as regards the 
idiosyncratic nature of cognitive experience. Maslow has 
suggested that the person who finds himself in the condition 
of "Being" derives vital pleasure from examining things in 
their own right and that this may be the basis for what 
he called "peak experiences" (Maslow, 1968, pp. 74 -96). 
To approach the problem, the designer must realize that he, 
himself, is subjected to the limitations posed by personal 
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parameters in influencing cognitive experience. The issue 
is to be regarded at another level in which the designer must 
not expect to have any clues as to what the indivudual may 
experience in the environment - a high potential informational 
content is naturally required in this case. What the 
designer should aim for is to incorporate such functions and 
elements in his designs which will increase the possibilities 
for rich idiosyncratic perception to occur. It has been 
argued that incorporating elements of disorder may prove 
useful to this direction (Sennet, 1970). More specifically, 
open ended design, in which people take part within a given 
framework, as well as merely introducing people in semi- 
permanent activities in places like streets, may increase the 
environment's richness and its capacity of being stimulating 
(Fig. 64). As will later see, complexity and novelty also 
play a significant role in this. 
To conclude the section on the immediate implicationsthe 
recognition of man's cognitive needs as these have been laid 
in this study has on design, the following points can be 
stressed. The realization of the non -operational nature 
that cognitive experience of man -made environment may have 
placed the emphasis on the individual when the composite need 
for change is to be identified. This asks for the whole 
range of social relations, which are somehow involved in the 
production of a form, to be considered in view of the users' 
personal parameters. It is understood that the users' 
cognitive needs may ask for cognitive experience to refer to 
any social relation in the environment and then integrate 
its impact within the person's cognitive structures. Personal 
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There are a number of ways to ensure a changing environment which may 
generate different idiosyncratic experiences. Elements which attract 
on- lookers and, amongst other things, change the context in which an 
environment is seen (like the square in front of Beaubourg in Paris, 
above left, or the posted newspapers in Moscow, below) or even, allow 
the residents to keep expressing themselves in some manner (as in the 




parameters play a significant, if not vital role in this. 
The designer is required to acquire a deep understanding of 
the issue at several levels. Firstly, at the theoretical 
level of how cognitive experience operates and how the 
representations of social relations in man -made environment 
are linked with the development of man's cognitive structures. 
Secondly, at the analytical level of identifying the dynamics 
of personal parameters of people in a particular situation 
in relation to possibilities for cognitive experience. 
Finally, at a somehow practical level, the designer is 
required to understand his position as a channel for the 
objectivation of social relations in the forms he designs, 
and as a manipulator of potential meaning. As regards the 
particular context in which he operates, an awareness of the 
way in which meaning will be conveyed (f.î. known codes and 
so on in view of people's personal parameters is required. 
3.3 TWO IMPORTANT ISSUES RELATING TO THE 
CONVEYANCE OF MEANING 
Up to now, we have seen that man -made environment embodies 
a potential informational content of some notable dimensions 
which relates to man's cognitive needs and the development 
of his mental world. How cognitive experience actually 
takes place has been discussed extensively in the second part 
of this study and it has been found that it clearly depends 
on man's personal parameters. 
Regardless of the characteristics of the specific users of 
an environmental form, there are several provisions that the 
designer has to take care of so that information embodied in 
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his designs are transmitted smoothly and efficiently. It 
has been noted that the human mind has certain properties, 
preferences as well as limitations as regards the communic- 
ation of messages. It is characterized by a need for 
clarity, a need for a balanced perceptual rate so that 
environments should not be either too monotonous or too 
overstimulating, a need for a certain amount of novelty and 
surprise in the messages received and so on. 
Depending on the circumstances (personal parameters may be 
critical in this), these tendencies may differ, but there is 
still some evidence to suggest that, in a generalized manner, 
they exist for all humans and, in this sense, affect the 
way meaning is conveyed. 
In this section, we will consider the first two issues, 
namely, the need for clarity and legibility in man-made 
environment and the need for a balanced perceptual rate. 
If we take a look at the communication model in table 
2.4.2, they both have to do with the elimination of noise in 
the system. The theoretical foundations to deal with the 
above issues have been laid by Kevin Lynch (1960) and by 
Rapoport and Kantor (1967) respectively. In the present 
context, these are to be reassessed in view of the 
theoretical considerations elaborated in this study as 
regards man's cognitive needs. 
3.3.1 The Need for Clarity and Legibility in 
the Environment 
Kevin Lynch's Theory in a Different Perspective 
As noted in 3.1.1, Kevin Lynch, suggests that the imageability 
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of the bL:ilt environment is essential for people's orient- 
ation in the city. In explaining what he believes that 
imageability has to offer in the experience of man -made 
environment, he states that, "[ imageability is] that 
quality in a physical object which gives it a high probability 
of evoking a strong image in any given observer. A highly 
imageable city in this peculiar sense would seem well formed, 
distinct, remarkable; it would invite the eye and the ear 
to greater attention and participation. The sensuous grasp 
upon such surroundings would not merely be simplified, but 
also extended and deepened. Such a city would be one that 
could be apprehended over time as a pattern of high con- 
tinuity with many distinctive parts clearly interconnected. 
The perceptive and familiar observer could absorb new sen- 
suous impacts without disruption of his basic image, and each 
new impact would touch upon many previous elements. He 
would be well oriented and he would move easily. He would 
be highly aware of his environment ". (Lynch, 1960, pp. 9 -10). 
In developing his argument further however, Lynch assumes 
that "an environmental image may be analyzed into three 
components: identity, structure and meaning ". Following 
this observation, he hastes to divorce meaning from the 
first two components, on the grounds that there is a wide 
variability in the "individual meanings of a city ", 
confusing meaning with fourth level associational experience 
(2.2.3 and 2.4). In doing so, he inevitably confines 
environmental objects as to being capable of evoking their 
identity and structure. In this sense and in contrast to 
264. 
to what has been analyzed in the passage above, objects 
in the environment are looked upon as though they were 
devoid of any representations: of social relations other 
than those of their own "self ". The problem of image - 
ability of cities, then, is to be dealt with by nothing 
but the production of such an urban environment whose form 
would be easily imprinted in people's minds as a roughly 
shared mental map. As this map would consist of merely 
first level identificational information, the designer's 
main responsibility would be to eliminate discrepancies in 
group images by strengthening the formative aspects of the 
image of objects in relation to their organization in space. 
This is characteristically expressed by Lynch's laborious 
search for theories of orientation in primitive societies or 
through unfamiliar landscapes so as to apply them in the 
case of supposedly "meaningless" environments. Modern cities 
do carry meaning however, and one should never ignore the fact 
that this meaning may occur at various levels of cognitive 
experience (e.g. commercial centre, lively square or street, 
old district where such and such has happened, a friends 
neighbourhood, the part one visited on Sunday and so on). 
A number of studies stress the fact that such meanings play 
an important role in the formation of the image of cities 
(e.g. Gulick, 1963; Steinitz, 1968; Zannaras, 1976). 
Such multi -dimensional meaning, combined with one's past 
experience and motivation and the way one relates to one's 
environment, will generally provide enough cues for one's 
orientation. If it does not do so and there is no city 
map around, one may always ask for one's way with no actual 
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psychological costs involved since one would presumably 
have been a visitor in an unfamiliar environment. 
If Lynch accepted the fact that the urban environment 
embodies a series of representations of social relations 
which evoke meaning and feeling at various levels to 
people who experience them, then there would have been no 
need for him tc go into various theories of spatial 
orientation to support his theory. To break down the image 
into identity and structure, on the one hand, and meaning on 
the other and to dismiss the latter, does not only constitute 
a grave methodological error (as meaning may include identity 
and structure), but it also makes things difficult. 
As it has been previously discussed (see: expectancy, 2.2.1), 
the individual definitely needs to know where he is at any 
moment. Edward Hall states that "man's feeling about being 
properly oriented in space runs deep. Such knowledge is 
ultimately linked to survival and sanity. To be disoriented 
in space is to be psychotic ", (Hall, 1966, p. 99). If the 
need for orientation is seen in its broadest sense, then it 
clearly relates to more basic human needs, particularly to 
Maslow's safety needs and the cognitive needs which have 
been elaborated in the second part of this study. For this 
reason, instead of merely asking for the identification of 
spatial relationships, the need for orientation must be seen 
as referring to the deeper awareness and understanding of 
the social relations which set the immediate situation a 
person finds himself in. In this sense, it covers an 
extensive body of the social relations which are represented 
in man -made environment. 
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In view of the above, it appears that man needs a legible 
environment and that such legibility ought not to be 
confined to identificational information in respect to a 
need for basically spatial orientation, If one considers 
tables 1.3 and 2.4.2, the representations of social relations 
which are to be objectivated in the environment must occur 
clearly and legibly in accordance to known vocabularies. 
And, along with social relations themselves, their relative 
importance (e.g. primary function and ideology of primary 
function, or primary and secondary functions and so on) must 
also be clearly objectivated in a hierarchical way (Fig. 65). 
Then, juxtaposition against mental schemata will tend to 
occur smoothly and efficiently. 
When see in this context, the need for orientation is trans- 
formed to a need for "social orientation" which includes the 
first. It becomes a question of "clarity versus noise" in 
all levels of representations of social relations on environ- 
mental forms and, as such, it includes relations in space. 
In this respect, the core of the argument lies beyond the 
satisfaction of the operational need to reach certain places, 
as it has been implied by Kevin Lynch. Instead, it 
incorporates the senseof enjoyment and reassurance experienced 
by the ind;_vidual who, by grasping the "feel of the place" 
easily and by letting schemata by juxtaposed to environmental 
input smoothly and clearly, rediscovers the social relations 
in his surroundings. 
Clarity and Legibility in the Representation of 
Social Relations in Environmental Forms 
One could list a long series of illustrations showing clarity 
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Top: Middleton Park, by Lutyens, 
Oxfordshire. 
Middle: Casa Guell, by Gaudi, 
Barcelona. 
Bottom: Villa Stein, by 
le Corbusier, Garches. 
It is interesting to note the 
relation between the main entrances 
to the buildings and the service 
doors. By changing the dimensions 
of the doors, Lutyens and Gaudi 
objectivated the relative sign- 
ificance of the two functions 
clearly. Apparently, 
le Corbusier had a problem since 
he wished to keep the elevation 
symmetrical while there was space 
for only one service door. To 
achieve a clear contrast between 
main entrance and service door, 
he needed to incorporate 
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and legibility in existing environments in the sense that 
it has been discussed above. A measure of the extent 
that such a compilation could attain may be given by the 
extreme possible variety that cognitive experience may 
reach in terms of juxtaposition of perceptual input against 
schemata containing social. relations. 
At city level, Eausmann's Paris (Chapman, 1957; Pinkney, 
1958; Crosby, 1973) is a masterpiece of Urban Design, 
among other things, in as much as clarity in the environ- 
ment is concerned. Although their design was initiated 
fcr primary military reasons, the city's grand boulevards 
reflect its grandeur as well as its ambition to be regarded 
as the centre of the world (see Figs 27 and 66). The 
The Ard de la 
Triomphe in 
l'Etoile is a 
typical Parisian 
landmark, the 





The system of boulevards is neatly interwoven with a series 
of elements which vary in shape and meaning (ranging from 
impressive monuments, such as l'Etoile, to vast vacant spaces, 
such as the Place de la Concorde, and incorporating the 
Seine as part of the design). These meaningful elements 
are properly situated in terms of clarity and legibility so 
that not only spatial but also social orientation is 
simplified, as both boulevards and focal points are clearly 
loaded with social relations stemming from the country's 
endless past and present history. Many of the elements of 
the Parisian landscape (Champs -Elysees, rue Rivoli, Avenue 
Foch) have such a distinctive character which. is eligible 
of clearly representing land use and the social "physiognomy" 
of the surrounding districts. This is paired by the 
remarkable and by no means monotonous uniformity which is 
experienced from the street. The fact that only public 
buildings are to rise above a certain level is appropriate 
enough to strengthen the image of the city and its people 
as a whole (Fig. 67). 
Clarity and legibility in the environment become remarkably 
acute when individual social relations which are dominant 
in the shaping of the particular environment are considered. 
As noted in 1.2.3, the transcendance of ideological social 
relations (and religion, in particular) in Florence allowed 
il Duomo to be disproportionate in respect to other buildings 
and to dominate the city's skyline (Fig. 25). 
The City inevitably circled around it and, as the power cf 
the church has always been significant in Italy, its 
dominance is still retained. Its image radiates both this 
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fact and recent attitudes towards the past Ce.g. conser- 
vation of architectural heritage etc.). Similarly clear 
and legible images reflecting analoguous social relations 
of the wider social context can be experienced in an endless 
number of villages around the world (see Harvey, 1973, p. 32, 
for the typical 18th century English village). 
Clarity can also be achieved through the juxtaposition of 
different environments (see also 2.4.2). These may form 
the context into which additional information is to be 
embodied without confusing the overall image. At an urban 
level, this can be seen inthe case of Edinburgh city centre 
as this is probably one of the clearest inner city areas in 
the world for a city of its size. The corE of the city is 
divided into three zones (the medieval city and the castle, 
the gardens and the Georgian New Town) which. are separated 
by brief but imageable and understandable transitional areas 
(Fig. 68; see also the plan of the city centre in Fig. 27). 
All three zones are distinctly different as to the social 
relations they contain (e.g. the castle and the medieval 
mysticism, natural environment disciplined within the busy 
city with the railroad running through it as though in a 
rural landscape, the well ordered formal grid and the 
Georgian houses for the upper- middle class as discussed in 
1.2.3 and so on). 
The amphiteatrical layout which is sustained by change of 
level along the lines of transition allows the image to be 
grasped at a glance and its main components to be visualized 
both in their context and in juxtaposition with one another. 
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FIGURE 68 
As the City Council's "High Buildings Policy" notes, the 
observer gets at once the impression of being in a special 
environment which is worth exploring in detail. 
Such imageability makes it possible for additional infor- 
mation - and, above all, the extent to which present day 
society has decided to interfere either as a conscious "Act 
of Will" (Bacon, 1967), or through natural evolution - to 
be unobtrusively incorporated in the overall image. 
Although there is an abundance of discrepancies among the 
features of the three domains, it appears difficult for any 
of them, even for the possibly confusing Princes Street 
elevation, to distor the image of the city centre as a 
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whole. In this sense, clarity does not contradict variety; 
on the contrary, these two may be complementary as long as 
signifiers are sturctured in a hierarchical manner (see 
Lozano, 1974 and 3.3.2). Amongst a series of feelings which 
a person may experience in relation to specific social 
relations represented in the image of Edinburgh city centre, 
there will generally be a feeling of satisfaction for his 
social orientation in respect of his cognitive needs. 
The need for clarity and legibility in the objectivation of 
social relations on man -made environment applies to the 
whole range of different scales at which this objectivation 
may occur. Colin Rowe's contextualism (Rowe, n.d.) and 
Venturi's idea of "both -and" rather than "either -or" (Venturi, 
1966, 1977), which are based on the cognitive experience of 
the juxtaposition of objects and contexts, relate to the 
whole range of architectural production. As it has been 
suggested in the illustration above, this juxtaposition 
appears to have to be designed in an ordered manner so that it 
is clear. 
When the meaning of the overall image is to be strengthened, 
smallar scale components of the form may play an important 
role in elucidating it. In this case, instead of juxtapos- 
ition and ambiguity, there is an emphasis of the main theme. 
This can be see in this rather long but dense passage by 
Charles Dickens. 
" -Now, what I want is, Facts. Teach these boys and girls 
nothing but Facts. Facts alone are wanted in life ... 
The scene was a plain, bare, monotonous vault of a school- 
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room, and the speaker's square forefinger emphasized his 
observations by underscoring every sentence with a line in 
the schoolmaster's sleeve. The emphasis was helped by the 
speaker's square wall of a forehead, which had his eyebrows 
for its base, while his eyes found commodious cellerage in 
two dark caves, overshadowed by the wall. The emphasis was 
helped by the speaker's mouth, which was wide, thin and hard 
set. The emphasis was helped by the speaker's hair, which 
bristled on the skirts of his bald head, a plantation of firs 
to keep the wind from its shining surface, all covered with 
knobs, like the crust of a plum pie, as if the head had 
scarcely warehouse -room for the hard facts stored inside. 
The speaker's obstinate carriage, square coat, square legs, 
square shoulders -nay, his very neckcloth, trained to take him 
by the throat with an unaccomodating grasp, like a stubborn 
fact, as it was, all help the emphasis. 
- In this life, we want nothing but Facts, sir, nothing but 
Facts!" 
from Dickens's "Hard Times" 
Although the above passage analyzes signs which directly 
stem from a person's expressions, it can clearly be applicable 
to the signs in man -made environment, provided a switch is 
made to the appropriate codes. As it can be seen in the above 
illustration, it is not only the meaning which refers to the 
overall image that is stregthened. Peripheral meanings may 
stand out in an autonomy of their own in relation to the 
overall theme. These meanings clearly illuminate the 
dominant social relations and act as emphasizers; in doing so, 
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Above: A still from 
"Potemkin ", by 
Sergei Eisenstein. 
Below: Detail of 
"Guernica" by 
Pablo Picasso. 
When the artist is in need 
for a strong overall 
message, details (like 
hands, eyes, mouth, posture 
and so on) are arranged 
so that the social 
relations they objectivate 
are supporting the whole. 
FIGURE 69 
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Baroque landscape design in environment's like the Residenz in 
Wurzburg, above left, adds to the legibility of the objectivation 
of important connotational social relations, such as the greatness 
of the residents. If one focuses on the detail, the elaborate 
entrance of a prominent house in Hydra, above right, aims to 
clarify the occupants' position in society (see also Fig. 40), 
while the colourful flower -bed in display by a bank in Edinburgh, 




The occupants' identity is emphasised by as little as two pillars 
and the shaping of the surrounding wall in the house above (built 
by Lutyens in Ireland) or the gate over the entrance to the courts 
in the scheme below (designed by Erskine, in Bruket, Sweden). 
FIGURE 70 (CONTINU) 
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they also bring the characteristics of the components of 
the image in light. In this sense, social relations of the 
components become complementary to the central ones. Without 
them the overall image would have lost both in clarity and, 
according to what will be elaborated in 3.3.2, in variety. 
An extensive series of paradigms, suitable for illustrating 
how the designer can represent social relations on environ- 
mental forms clearly and legibly are given by studies such 
as the Essex Design Guide (1973) or Cullen's "Concise 
Townscape" (1961). In his insightful book, Gordon Cullen 
deals with aspects of urban imagery such as defining space, 
focal points, vista stoppers, enclosures, the distinction 
between hereness and thereness and so forth. When these 
are seen in view of what has been discussed in the present 
study, they acquire new dimensions since they can be 
regarded as ways through which clarity in the represent- 
ation of social relations in the urban environment can be 
achieved. Under this perspective, a carefully designed 
enclosure aims at reinforcing the objectivation of social 
relations characteristic of the enclosed space (Figs. 71, 
72). 
Similarly, a whole series of Cullen's illustrations relate 
to the clarification of the environment's potential infor- 
mational content. In this sense, instead of being an 
array of "gadgets" which the designer should remember to 
incorporate in his designs to make them interesting, they 
can be considered as part of the broader family of codes 
which are essential to achieve clarity in urban design. 
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The enclosed space, surrounded by the buildings of the Art College 
in Edinburgh (below), constitutes an additional level at which the 
feeling of "homeness" and "security ", provided by the institution, 
is expressed. A similar observation could have been made with 
regard to the internal courtyard of the City Chambers (above), if 
not for the hard landscaping and the different way in which it is 
being utilized. This particular enclosure clarifies the official 
business -like atmosphere of the institution. 
FIGURE 71 
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Left: Trinity Church, by R. Upjohn, N.Y., 1846. 
Right: Pan Am Building, by W. Gropius and others, N.Y., 1963 
Trinity Church is magnificently situated at the culmination of a long 
canyon-like street, seemingly protected by the walls of skyscrapers. 
The vista stopper at right, ignores the dignified old structure - 
Grand Central Station - at its base, dominates the buildings around 
it, and depersonalizes Park Avenue because its appearance is too low 
in content to play the role of the strong signifier needed for this 
central spot. In this sense, this landmark fails to concretize the 
social relations it contains in a legible way. 
FIGURE 72 
Meanings will be transmitted more efficiently and the built 
environment will function better as a domain through which man 
experiences the world. 
After elaborating on the background knowledge concerning 
clarity and legibility in view of what has been discussed 
in the first two parts os this study, let us now concentrate 
on several issues that arise from designers' everyday 
practice. What clarity and legibility suggest is that 
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noticeable differences in the amount and nature of possible 
signifiers in the environment should be in accordance to 
the social relations they represent. The designer must 
attempt not only to clarify these semantic relations but also 
to strengthen noticeable differences in signifiers based on 
the relative significance of their signifieds. In other 
words, the designer is responsible for the manipulation of 
information in the environment so that the meaning is not 
only crystallized and reinforced in all levels, but also that 
this happens in a hierarchical way. This is another reason 
for the designer to know the context in which he operates 
and the groupings of the personal parameters involved. 
Let us assume that a huge tower block overshadowed Edinburgh 
Castle. No matter how clear the city's image is supposed to 
be, it appears reasonable to assume that such an event would 
have altered it dramatically. Although the construction 
of the new tower block would possibly arise adverse feelings, 
strictly speaking it might have been a clear and legible 
reflection of changes in the values of society and the power 
structure in the city. As such, it could have been accept- 
able given, of course, the wholesome change in the social 
context. If, however, permission for rising high was 
granted, say, incidentally and under the present socio- 
ideological structure or if new buildings were still rising 
above the town but not enough to overpower the castle, then 
the image would have been unclear and confusing. 
In every -day life situations having to do with the production 
of environment, social relations can be so many and so varied 
that it may sometimes appear extremely difficult for the 
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designer to come to an understanding as to how they are 
hierarchized (see Fig. 65). It is not seldom that archit- 
ects overestimate the position and relative significance 
of their project as regards its context. Buildings, which 
should have been unobtrusive if the city was to be legible, 
end up possessing unjustifiable prominence. In view of 
this, it seems that the architect must be aware of the whole 
potential informational content of his designs in order to 
achieve clarity at different levels. It is needless to say 
that this is to be attempted bearing the users', rather than 
the designers', needs in mind. On the whole, and in view 
of table 2.4.2, one may argue that what the designer should 
aim at, by employing clarity and legibility in his designs, 
is to eliminate transmitters' sources of noise. 
3.3.2 The Need for a Balanced Perceptual Rate 
The Importance of Personal Parameters and Man's Cognitive Needs 
It has been proven that sensory deprivation or the denial of 
sensory stimulation can lead to many strange mental and 
physical effects. In the 1050s a number of experiments in 
sensory deprivation were held at McGill, Princeton and other 
universities in which volunteers were isolated in a "black 
room ", a small, completely light -proof, sound -proof and 
constant temperature cubicle, where all normal sights and 
sounds were missing, to test their reactions to silence, 
solitude and restricted movement. It was generally found 
that most subjects soon went to sleep in the extreme darkness 
and silence, but when they awoke they had difficulty in keeping 
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their minds occupied. The idea that one can use the 
opportunity provided to think deeply and solve problems 
was proved erroneous. In some cases the subject was unable 
to maintain a consistent line of thought, since ideas that 
came would quickly evaporate. In other cases some quite 
innocuous idea would arise in the mind and intrude itself so 
insistently upon the consciousness that the subject unable 
to shake it off would press the panic button (Vernon, 1966). 
The human mind needs sane flow of information from the 
environment in order to survive. Normal consciousness, 
perception and thought can be maintained only in a constantly 
changing environment; where there is no change a state of 
sensory deprivation occurs. 
From what has been discussed in 2.1 and 2.3.2, and especially 
from the elaboration of the point in which accomodation 
dominates assimilation and vice versa, it follows that 
individual cognitive needs may be expected to ask for the 
amount of experience to be increased or decreased over 
certain periods of time. Seemingly, there is an individual 
need for some perceptual rate and this need depends on the 
individual's personal parameters and varies with time. 
As an overall view, one may say that the same person in the 
same environment will tend to receive a different amount of 
stimuli at different moments of time. 
The question that arises at this point - and has served as 
the focal point for a growing discussion among researchers 
on the field - is how high or low can this flow get. In 
other words, how can one trace the limits within which this 
flow may fluctuate given the fact that people function best 
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and with minimal psychological costs at certain levels of 
stimulation with both too high and too low levels undes- 
irable (Rapoport and Kantor, 1967). 
In his study on "Human Aspects of Urban Form ", Amos 
Rapoport notes that "information is defined as that which 
removes previous uncertainty and is composed of 'bits'. 
One 'bit' of information is that amount needed to make a 
decision between two equally likely alternatives and 
every time the number of alternatives is doubled one 'bit' 
of information is added" (Rapoport, 1977, p. 195 -196; 
Crosby, 1973, p. 78, for 'binary digits'; see Fig. 73). 
Based on this definition of information, Rapoport uses 
three concepts of information theory in his approach; 
namely, the amount of information, redundancy, a response 
to selective qualities of the human brain (see 2.2.3), and 
channel capacity, i.e. "the upper theoretical limit to the 
rate of information processing in any system including people ". 
That is, he is mainly concerned with environmental para- 
meters and, in doing so, he is implying that they are basically 
responsible for people's level of stimulation. In fact, 
apart from the concept of channel capacity, which in itself 
is basically quantitative in nature, his only allowance for 
the significance of personal parameters in relation to the 
perceptual rate is his acknowledgement that "in all this, 
adaptation plays a role ". 
Such an overvaluation of the environment's role in perceptual 
experience is not very much in accordance with the rest of 
285. 
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Theo Crosby explains how "binary digits" as features of a form 
are added or subtracted from its elevation so that it is enriched 
or simplified. 
FIGURE 73 
Rapoport's work; one can possibly come to such a remark 
as regards the anthropological approach to perception 
which he adopts in his numerous case studies (see also 
2.0). When his overestimation of the environment's 
role in perception is combined with the dichotomy between 
the "perceptual" (i.e. "visual" or formative) and the 
cognitive level of perceptual experience and the under- 
rating of the significance of the latter, then the man - 
environment relationship is deprived of many of its dynamic 
elements (see 2.2.3) . It entails the danger to be reduced to a 
mere mathematical issue the inevitable solution of 
which is a symmetrical one; that is, one in which the two 
extremes lie the same distance apart from the golden average, 
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as Fig. 74 shows. Reasoning along this line of thought, 
Rapoport concludes that "at the perceptional level, inadeq- 
uate information can be equated with deprivation while 
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Let us once again consider the role of personal parameters 
in perception. As we have seen above, each individual 
perceives his environment according to his past experience 
and motivation, his state of mind and his course of action 
at the particular moment in time. The same environment 
may be evaluated as overcomplex or not, depending on 
discrepancies in previous experience, motivation and so on 
in view of people's cognitive needs at the time. For 
example, a cable room in a telephone exchange building will 
obviously tend to be experienced differently by the operator 
than by a layman; the layman's image will depend largely 
on his motivation and attitude at the time (whether, say, he 
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is just looking at it or he has to take over the operator's 
job), to say nothing of the meaning his past experience allows 
him to invest in the complexities he perceives. 
Also, as Rapoport notes, for American travellers in Russia 
whether Leningrad (Fig. 75) or Moscow were judged as more 
drab depended on the itinerary so that the city visited 
first was judged as more drab because the adaptation level 
based on American cities was used. A stay in Russia, 
however, modified the adaptation level, changed the standard 
of reference, and along with some change in the travellers' 
motivation towards the Russians, different images resulted. 
(Rapoport, 1977, p. 53). 
FIGURE 75 
In another sense, an environment which is generally charact- 
erized as pleasant and interesting may often be experienced 
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as boring if perceived under certain states of psychological 
composition. No matter how skillfully a tourist resort or 
a chinese garden might have been designed (Fig. 76), if one 
is in a peculiar mood they will appear unpleasantly monot- 
onous - if not worse because other people are enjoying 
themselves while this person can not. 
As underlined in 2.4, the environment alone can not determine 
experience. In this sense, even if it is stacked with 
representations of social relations it may still be exper- 
ienced as boring. Although the illustrations given above 
may be said to be extreme and idiosyncratic, they clearly 
demonstrate the extent of personal parameters' dominance 
over both the rate of perceptual input and image formation. 
It appears that, at any given instant, a certain relation is 
established between each individual and his immediate 
surroundings that is the individual's personal space 
(Lewin, 1964, pp. 238 -240; see also 2.0 and 2.2.1) . As this 
relation is a function of the particular configuration of 
the person's parameters at the time, it sets the perceptual 
rate expected. In this sense, monotony and overstimulation 
may be the outcome of the usually unconscious juxtaposition 
of the particular environment experienced to what was 
expected from the social environment it contains and repres- 
ents. One expects city centres to be rich in stimuli, a 
lot of which will usually demand people's attention, whereas 
in residential areas stimulation is generally expected to 
remain in lower levels (Fig. 77). Hence, environments 
will tend to be experienced and judged according to the 
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Although Chinese gardens are designed so that they are interesting 
and intriguing, the discussion in 2.4 points out that it must not be 
expected that they will always be experienced as such. The same 
applies to idyllic environments like the 19th Century estuarine 
suburb of Glasgow, portrayed below by a developer. 
FIGURE 76 
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Down -town areas, like the one above, are expected 
to be more stimulating than the residential quarters 
in a city. 
FIGt1RE 77 
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standards set for each category of them and not according 
to unified ones. 
Given the probabilistic nature of perception and the tran- 
cendance of personal parameters over environmental ones, 
one may argue that there is no monotonous or overstimulat- 
ing environment as such. It is only that, statistically, 
some environments may prove to be evoking monotony or 
overstimulation more often than others in respect to the 
social environment they represent. Since every situation 
carries its own dynamic, the designer must be rather scep- 
tical before listing environments under already formed 
categories. The knowledge of the groupings of personal 
parameters of the users, and especially the understanding 
of the form their cognitive needs may take, is essential 
to come to a conclusion as to the degree in which the amount 
of information incorporated in his designs may be expected 
to be experienced. 
The Need for a Balanced Perceptual Rate in View of the 
Representation of Social Relations on Man -made Environment 
So far it has been shown that the actual flow of information 
from the environment is expected to vary with time because 
of changes in the individual's personal parmaeters and the 
particular relation he establishes with the environment he 
finds himself in. As laboratory evidence has suggested, 
it appears that, despite small individual variations, there 
is a consensual point of visual preference among people 
as opposed to a random scatter among individuals (Rapoport 
and Kantor, 1967, quoting Streufert and Schroeder, 1965). 
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The complexities of cognitive experience, part of which 
remains below the threshold of consciousness, make it 
impossible for this optimal rate to be measured. And 
even if this happened, it would be equally practically 
impossible for a certain design to incorporate such an 
amount of information. In any case, dominance of personal 
parameters would drastically affect such an "efficient" 
setting. What can be done, however, is, once the role of 
personal parameters has been set, to come to an understand- 
ing of the nature of the function in as much as stimulus 
parameters are concerned, in view of what has been discussed 
in the previous parts of the study. 
As the human mind is testing stimuli from the environment 
against ordered mental schemata containing social relations, 
information in th.e environment is ordered and differentiated 
according to some notion of what it stands for. As noted 
in the second part of this study, although the retinal image 
of an object maybe a mosaic of discrete pinpoints of light 
of varying wavelengths, people experience the environment 
according to the first aspect of selectivity: they see 
distinct objects loaed with social relations. Therefore, 
there is never just an array of stimuli in the environment 
since stimuli tend to be grouped in patterns in respect of 
their capacity of evoking meaning (Fig. 78). 
In this sense, one may only conventionally refer to 'bits' 
and th.e amount of information in the environment as such, 
since they are paired with the social relations and mental 
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Although the rumbers of repeated patterns in the otherwise ordered living 
room below (designed by Seymour Pvigor in 1969) are probably less than 
those in the piece of tapestry above (by Helen Gibbs, 4,981), it may be 
argued that the interior design is more complicated and, hence, more tiring than the tapestry since it is lacking the social relations which 
would have made it interesting and easily grespable. 
FIGURE 78 
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can be deduced that differentiation in form, even if 
regarded in groupings, does not come into a one -to -one 
relationship with the social relations behind it. This 
is complicated further once meanings, invested in environ- 
mental forms after their production, are taken into account. 
This point provides enough cues to suggest how insufficient, 
if not erroneous, the method of using the binary digit ('bit') 
and information theory aspects alone may be. Apart from 
ignoring the dominance of personal parameters, they are only 
quantitative and do not take into account the fact that it 
is highly likely for 'bits' to vary extremely in density of 
meaning. 
According to an approach based purely on information theory, 
the pyramids in Egypt would have been classified as boring 
whereas it is obvious that for most people in this world, 
despite their simplistic look, they are notably dense in 
the social relations they represent (Fig. 79). Experienc- 
ing them would imply the activation of various cognitive 
and evaluative systems of schemata on many different levels 
and dimensions. Clearly, image formation will not only be 
based in relation to the particular society the pyraminds 
represent since it may be expected to involve a lot of 
fourth level imaginatory transformation. 
On the other hand, modern housing estates, as well as quite 
a few down -town modern "anonymous" buildings and their 
surrounding area, are very often experienced as depriving 
and even alienating, although they may be "visually" richer 
than the pyramids, or small vernacular houses, in terms of 
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FIGURE 79 
intricacy in design. As far as environmental parameters 
are concerned, the reason to explain this lies within the 
stimulus capacity to trigger a wide range of schemata. We 
have already discussed the tendency designers have to regard 
cognition as merely relating to man's operational needs (see 
3.2.1). The natural complexity and ambiguity, which are to 
be found by the particular configuration of social relations 
that characterizes such buildings' social environment, are 
very seldom registered in the resulting form. Noticeable 
differences are comparatively few and, when they do not 
relate to the social relations they might have represented, 
they remain unclear. Some intended diversity that designers 
of such environments often feel obliged to incorporate in 
their designs generally ends up being nothing more than what 
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it was (e.g. a personal "toy" to play with) and stays 
shallow (Fig. 80). 
In the elevation of this office building 
in Princes Street, Edinburgh, it appears 
as though complexity has been imposed by 
the designer. 
FIGURE 80 
In traditional architecture, on the other hand, partly for 
reasons of availability of materials and technology and 
partly for reasons stemming from the ideological and social 
structure of society, signifiers are much stronger. They 
are loaded with denotational meanings of the primary 
functions and, as these primary functions come into a complex 
amalgam, they compose an overall image which is not only 
clear but also maintains a strong element of diversity and 
complexity (Fig. 81 and Fig. 82). Such diversity and 
complexity, based on social relations of primary functions 
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Not only by this scene from Regensburg, Bavaria, 
above, but also when comtemplating the apparently 
simple building below, one is expected to be 
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Analysis of the main pedestrian street in the island village of 
Naxos, Greece. 
In the comparatively short distance of 240 metres, streetscape 




and to a lesser extent on those of the ideologies of these 
functions, are deeply rooted into the social relations of 
the context of the forms and have little to do with the 
often meaningless patterns which fill in the elevations of 
International Style buildings. The ambiguity which may 
arise is usually a result of "contrast or duplexity of 
legible meaning ",rather than of "doubtfulness and uncert- 
ainty as to what the meaning is ". 
Several writers have advocated the use of ambiguous messages 
in the design of environmental forms (Venturi, 1966, 1977; 
Rapoport, 1977; Rowe, n.d.). It is not generally clarified 
whether these messages stem from social relations involved in 
the situation at hand (composite need for change and social 
relations of the external factor) or whether they are intro- 
duced in the final solution by the architect's initiative. 
As unsuccessful handling of ambiguities in the environment 
may be liable to lead to schizophrenia depending on the 
percipients' personal parameters (Wing, 1978, p. 28), it 
seems that its employment in design is not an easy matter; 
especially when the meanings are added on the forms following' 
the designer's intentions because, then, it is less likely for 
them to be shared. In view of this, it appears reasonable 
to argue that the use of ambiguity is to be accompanied by 
a deep understanding of the function of cognitive experience 
in relation to man's cognitive needs as well as by a good 
knowledge over the user's personal parameters. More 
specifically, ambiguity is to be regarded in direct relation 
to the properties of clarity and the juxtaposition of objects 
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and contexts. 
Before ending the discussion on the optimal perceptual 
rate, let us take an overall view at the possibilities to 
have either monotonous or overstimulating environments in 
contemporary cities. It can be argued that in modern 
societies these two are not symmetrically apart from the 
optimal rate; at least, in as much as design practice is 
concerned. 
There are two arguments involved in this and both point at 
the fact that designers must be more cautious to avoid 
monotony than to oppose overstimulation. The first reason 
has already been mentioned earlier and relates to the 
economical basis of contemporary production of environment 
and the tradition of the International Style. The fact 
that the emphasis lies mainly on profit -making limits the 
budget and restricts the scope of designers. The result 
is that environments merely satisfy the operational aspects 
of the composite need for change (e.g. housing, cooking, 
sleeping)and no allowance is granted in respect to the 
function of their image and man's cognitive needs. As 
many writers have noted, cities around the world are becom- 
ing increasingly similar. On top of this, the percipient 
very seldom seems to believe that the designer "outdid" 
himself (as it might have happened more than a century ago). 
In Crosby's words, "it is just a human mind stretched too 
far" (Crosby, 1973). In addition to monotony, a feeling of 
rejection and the realization of "motivation conflict" in 




The fact that the danger in our societies lies in monotonous 
rather than overloaded environments is supported by another 
reason. As Rapoport points out, apart from avoiding the 
particular environment man may use filters to cope with 
overload. He instinctively switches off a part of his 
mind without grave psychological costs (Rapoport, 1977, 
p. 336). In this sense, a monotonous environment would ask 
for excessive fourth level experience, i.e. imaginatory 
transformation of the image. But, as this may understand- 
ably be frustrating and soul destroying, there is not much 
one can actually do apart from avoiding the place. The 
question is what happens when one meets monotony and 
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deprivation as soon as one opens one's front door, as is 
often the case? 
To recapitulate, although environments vary largely in 
the amount of potential information they contain, the 
actual information flow is determined by the percipients' 
personal parameters, cognitive needs being part of them. 
There is some evidence to suggest that there is some optimal 
range of information flow preferred among people, especially 
as regards anticipated environments. Yet, as information 
is to be regarded as consisting of meaningful "bits ", quite 
a few contemporary environments appear to be well below the 
optimal perceptual rate. 
The first task for the designer in view of the above is to 
become aware of how the need for a balanced perceptual rate 
relates to the principles of the function of the image of 
objects. It is essential to understand how the groupings 
of personal parameters, in view of the users' cognitive needs, 
allow, say, a supermarket to appear potentially more 
stimulating than a convent as far as complexity in the 
environment is concerned. In doing this, one should bring 
personal parameters in relation to the setting in order to 
come to the necessary conclusions about people's expectat- 
ions. 
With this as a guide, a long series of the social environ- 
ment's interacting and conflicting social relations are to 
be objectivated in signifiers. Their nature will tell 
whether this will occur as a denotation or a connotation. 
In this way, primary functions and their ideologies, 
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incorporating elements that the designer may possibly 
want to stress, are more liable to be portrayed meaning- 
fully and distinctly. Conflicting and interacting social 
relations in the environment will correspond to conflicting 
and interacting signifiers. 
3.4 A COMMENT ON TUE DESIGNER'S ROLE IN SOCIETY 
From what has been elaborated in the first part of the study, 
it follows that the design process should comprise two 
principal stages, namely 
1. Analysis - the identification of a composite need 
which asks to be satisfied and, 
2. Synthesis - the implementation of the means (e.g. 
an environmental form) to satisfy this need. 
A whole series of factors and relationships interfere in all 
three phrases of the "life" of such an environmental form - 
e.g. before, during and after its production. These 
factors and relationships may range from availability of 
money and materials or decision -making and conflicting 
values and priorities amongst the designer, the employer 
and the client, to more or less purely ideological relations 
of the time (e.g. the latest trends in the designers' 
established vocabulary etc). 
The designer's profession has to be seen as functioning within 
a context. This context is set by social relations at all 
levels in a given society (economic, ideological, political 
etc.) and, of course, it changes with time. The afore 
mentioned intervening factors and relationships are nothing 
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but the impact the context has on the process of the 
production of environment and a significant part of them, 
as noted in the first part of the study, lies beyond the 
designer's reach. Both the extent of the context's impact 
on the architect or designer as well as the influence the 
environment they create may have on people have been widely 
discussed. 
Designers tend to take two opposing attitudes with regard 
to their working context. Some of them have come to the 
point of suggesting that the limitations which stem from 
this context can be so overwhelmingly solid and restricting 
that the architect is left with practically no choice at 
all (see the first part of the study for deterministic 
stances). According to such views which rest on the phil- 
osophy of determinism and its effect on the freedom of will, 
the social framework and social relations as a whole at 
the time of production will determine what the result will 
be; no allowances for the designers' personal input are 
granted. 
On the other hand, another popular misconception is the one 
which underestimates the importance of factors and relation- 
ships in the social context in which architectural practice 
takes place. This attitude may lead to two different 
misunderstandings of the designer's role in society. 
Firstly, as we have seen in 2.4, the underrating of social 
relations and especially personal parameters in the society 
which is using the forms, reinforces the belief that the 
environment determines people's experience and behaviour. 
And, secondly, the element of artistic creation, which is 
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involved in the production- synthesis of environmental 
forms is stretched to its extremes. Not surprisingly, 
this mystification of the designer's job is often found 
floating in the air in institutes of architectural education 
which, inevitably, have to work on reconstructions of reality 
rather than to deal with real social relations in their 
practice. Once graduates who have undergone such an exper- 
ience go out in practice and face the "hard facts of life ", 
it is likely that they become disillusioned and switch to 
the first attitude discussed above. 
As far as the question of the designer's freedom of will 
is concerned, the discussion of the internal factor in 
1.2.4 suggests that no matter how rigid and restricting the 
limitations are, there will always be a level of some sign- 
ificance at which the designer may express himself through 
his work. This partial freedom varies with the nature of 
production of environment, the particular configuration of 
social relations which form the context it occurs in and 
the relation the designer has established with this context. 
What has been discussed in this study broadens the designer's 
scope within the framework of this relative freedom. 
Environmental forms do not only function in respect to the 
primary need that initiated their production but they also 
come in relation to man's cognitive needs in view of his 
intellectual development. Such a redefinition of the 
function of the built environment also leads to a redefinit- 
ion of the designer's role. Therefore, along with the 
traditional view that this role lies in as much as designers 
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can design environment, the primary and secondary functions 
of which satisfies a composite need, the above can be seen 
operating at another level, as far as the image of environ- 
ment is concerned. Designers are in charge of the manip- 
ulation of objectivatîons of social relations in the 
environment. This, of course, is liable to the limitations 
of the context the designer finds himself in, as this has 
been discussed above. Nevertheless, the significance of 
this second level the designer operates at is remarkable in 
its own right; as such, it is incomparable to the solution 
of the purely architectural problem. 
To give an illustration of the duality in the designer's 
social role, and especially of the second level at which 
he operates, let us fcr a moment consider the building of a 
bank's branch in a city suburb. Naturally, where the 
building will be situated is a matter of social and economic 
relations which are typical of the context the designer 
operates in and are beyond his reach. Furthermore, in as 
much as the building's elevation is concerned, it is 
expected that the client may wish the branch to radiate the 
bank's status and, perhaps, even add to it (1.2.4 and 1.3; 
see also "semiology- action" in de Ventos, 1980, pp. 194 -8). 
The client's budget, values and preferences will further 
define the context in which the designer will operate. 
Up to this point, it appears that "the architect is a 
technician who does what is asked of him by his clients" 
as it has been put by Crosby (Crosby, 1965). 
Nevertheless, the architect is normally left with a number 
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of alternative solutions which would be capable to satisfy 
the client. In other words, in dealing with structural, 
functional and decorative aspects of the project, he should 
be expected to be able to manipulate the amount and nature 
of potential signifiers in the building's elevation in a 
number of ways and still be within the limits set by the 
client. Naturally, any one of such implementations will 
tend to be experienced differently by people (Fig. 84). 
The analysis of the users' personal parameters will blend 
with the designer's intentions to determine what social 
relations will finally be objectivated. It is natural 
to expect that some of these may potentially result in 
distinctly separate group images and still be within the 
limits set by the bank. It appears that, although the 
designer's freedom is restricted significantly by the 
context he operates in, the fact that the environment he 
creates also functions through its image broadens his role 
in society to a considerable degree. 
It is not necessary to go deep into Sartre's thought to 
realize that the freedom and broadened social role which 
the designer enjoys is automatically paired with increased 
responsibility. And, although the designer's responsibility 
in as much as the primary function of the built environment 
is concerned can be easily realized, this is not always so 
when one thinks of man's cognitive needs. The discussion 
in 3.2.1 suggested that not all designers have a full 
conception of their responsibility, especially with regard 
to the role of the built environment as a domain through 
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It may be expected that the above neat designs of banks in 
Corstorphine, Edinburgh, have a different perceptual impact 
on people while, presumably, they are both restricted by 
the clients requirements. 
FIGURE 84 
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which man attains his knowledge of the world. The real- 
ization of the fact that man may have cognitive needs, which 
transcend the scope of the activity he is engaged in at the 
time and which may force cognition to refer to any social 
relation in the environment's potential informational content, 
is not always taken into account when designers identify the 
composite need for change. 
But, as has been shown, "all objectivations are susceptible 
of utilization as signs, even though they were not originally 
produced with this intention" (Berger and Luckmann, 1967, p. 
50). The discussion in the second part of this study 
suggested that, when the social relations, which are involved 
in the production of environment, are objectivated (as f.i. 
denotational meanings of primary functions), then it is 
more likely that their experience will result in relatively 
shared public images, provided that the conditions of pro- 
duction are, to some extent, known (see also 3.2.2). When 
the designer does not realize this, as well as the significance 
of cognitive experience for man, it is inevitable that he 
will not take it into consideration. The consequence is 
a "hyposignificant" environment in which very little is to 
be deciphered (Choay, 1969, p. 131). The lack of meaning 
which leads to the dissatisfaction of man's cognitive needs 
and which may even result in a certain stagnation of his 
cognitive structures, is accentuated further by the rel- 
ative importance that informative aspects of reality have 
acquired in our society (Debord, 1971; de Ventos, 1980, 
pp. 186 -190). 
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Admittedly, one ought not to blame (at least, primarily) 
the designers for the failure to produce a meaningful 
environment. When one accepts the view that in the 
environmental game there is no "architect alone" but always 
an "architect within a social context ", one can not suddenly 
forget the effect of the context; especially so, when 
several crucial factors which restrict the designer's work 
are clearly beyond his reach. If we let modern cities to 
serve as paradigms, one may argue that it is the profit - 
orientated type of society that has led to the production of 
such "visually fragmented" environments. In this sense, 
however "good- natured" or, possibly, "well -off" a single 
designer may be he can not do much to change the scene. In 
view of the above, one is led to believe that the responsib- 
ility over the shaping of environment is to be attributed to 
both individual designers and the context in which they 
operate. As the designer's freedom of will is functioning 
within certain limits, his responsibility over the end 
product follows similar lines. 
As far as the broadened scope of the designer's profession 
is concerned, it is evident that there is a need for 
designers to be properly equipped to meet the rising 
der ands. This inevitably incorporates a substantial enhance- 
ment of the background knowledge of the man -environment 
relationship. Based on the discussion in 3.2,the immediate 
implications of this, in as much as cognitive experience is 
concerned, can be summarised as follows: 
a. The designer is required to attain a deep understanding 
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of the nature of man's cognitive experience of 
man -made environment and the way it relates to man's 
cognitive needs, which may transcend the scope of 
goal -oriented behaviour, and to the process of the 
developement of his mental world. 
b. He is further required to be able to come to some 
conclusions as regards the people who will use the 
particular environments he designs. This involves 
an inquiry into people's personal parameters in 
cognitive experience, the form their cognitive needs 
may be expected to attain and so on. 
c. He is to be fully aware of his role as a channel 
through which social relations become represented 
in the environment as well as of his position as a 
manipulator of meaning. Along with this, the 
understanding of the requirements which will ensure 
the smooth transmission of potential information is 
needed (f.i. clarity and legibility, complexity 
and variety, novelty, known codes and so on). 
d. Finally, in every particular problematic situation, 
the designer is to be aware of the social relations 
involved, those of them he needs to objectivate and 
the dynamics of the potential informational content 
of the final solution. 
It appears that the issue can not be covered with blueprints 
of remedies or guidelines. Such an attitude, which has been 
in effect in the past, generally attacks parts of the 
problem as it lacks an overall understanding. In addition 
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to this, the issue of man's cognitive experience of the 
environment is as complex as the "object" of architectural 
intervention itself, i.e. people and social relations, 
and can not be readily rubricized (to use Maslow's term). 
An important initial step in the direction of the broader 
understanding appears to be the distinction between 
operational and non -operational cognition. Apart from 
safeguarding against misinterpretations of the functional- 
ist principles, this distinction places the emphasis back 
onto the users of environment and their needs. 
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